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Abstract 
Populism is one of the most pressing and thriving political issues in current democracies, 
as populist actors are extremely successful around the globe and increasing in importance. 
This has raised scholarly concerns to discuss this development also from a communication 
science perspective and explain the relation of political actors and their utilization of populist 
communication elements. This thesis answers two major research aims by first providing a 
conceptualization and operationalization of populist communication that combines and 
integrates both ideology-centered and discourse-centered definitions of populism and 
arguing that populist communication is a combination of ideology and style. By comparing the 
utilization of populist communication across different media channels, a variety of political 
actors and different political issues, this thesis secondly investigates and explains who 
expresses the populist messages and styles and to what extent populist communication is 
spread. With five comparative studies and the overarching synopsis, this thesis demonstrates 
that populist communication is especially dependent on certain opportunity structures and 
flourishes when populism affine factors, such as social media communication, party 
extremism or a high affinity to populism related issues, are combined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Zusammenfassung 
Populismus ist eine der dringlichsten und relevantesten politischen Fragen in 
zeitgenössischen Demokratien, da populistische Akteure weltweit äusserst erfolgreich sind 
und immer mehr an Bedeutung gewinnen. Dies hat wissenschaftliche Bedenken aufkommen 
lassen, diesen Anstieg auch aus einer kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Perspektive zu 
diskutieren und das Verhältnis politischer Akteure und deren Nutzung populistischer 
Kommunikationselemente zu erklären. Diese Dissertation beantwortet zwei wichtige 
Forschungsziele, indem sie zunächst eine Konzeptualisierung und Operationalisierung der 
populistischen Kommunikation anbietet, die sowohl ideologiezentrierte als auch 
diskurszentrierte Definitionen von Populismus kombiniert und integriert, und argumentiert, 
dass populistische Kommunikation eine Kombination aus Ideologie und Stil ist. Durch den 
Vergleich der Nutzung populistischer Kommunikation über mehrere Medienkanäle, 
verschiedene politische Akteure und unterschiedliche politische Themen untersucht und 
erklärt die Dissertation zweitens, wer populistische Botschaften und Stile verwendet und 
inwieweit populistische Kommunikation verbreitet wird. Mit fünf vergleichenden Studien und 
der übergreifenden Synopse zeigt diese Dissertation, dass populistische Kommunikation von 
bestimmten Opportunitätsstrukturen abhängig ist und besonders floriert, wenn Populismus-
affine Faktoren, wie Social Media Kommunikation, Parteiextremismus oder eine hohe Affinität 
zu populistischen Themen kombiniert werden. 
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Preamble 
This doctoral thesis comprises five articles published in peer reviewed scholarly journals 
and a synopsis. ARTICLE I (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017) qualitatively details how 
politicians in four countries use fragments of populist communication elements on social 
media. ARTICLE II (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017) examines how extreme and 
opposition parties use populist key messages on social media in six countries and contrasts 
Facebook and Twitter. ARTICLE III (Ernst, Engesser, & Esser, 2017) investigates the special Swiss 
case and explores the utilization of people-centrism and anti-elitism by left- and right-wing 
parties on social media. ARTICLE IV (Ernst, Blassnig, Büchel, Engesser, & Esser, 2019) 
systematizes populist-related communication styles, compares the utilization of populism-
related communication across social media and political talk shows in six countries, and 
contrasts challenger and extreme parties. ARTICLE V (Ernst, Esser, Blassnig, & Engesser, 2019) 
explores the co-occurrence of populist messages and styles over four media channels (talk 
shows, Facebook, Twitter, and newspapers) in six countries and compares fourteen often-
raised political topics, members of populist parties and backbenchers. Finally, the present 
Synopsis, highlights the context and relevance of populist communication, presents the 
overarching research questions along with the theoretical perspectives and methods 
employed, illustrates the contributions of and connections among the individual articles, 
synthesizes the overall conclusions drawn from the empirical studies, and identifies avenues 
for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
Populism is one of the most debated issues in contemporary politics. Populist actors 
around the globe are increasingly successful, effective in election campaigns, and receive 
significant media attention. Populist actors arise across the entire political spectrum and in 
various cultural and political contexts and are labeled as a “truly global phenomenon” (de 
Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018, p. 3). Left-wing populist actors and 
parties such as Chávez in Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia, Podemos in Spain, or Syriza in Greece, 
are famous examples of the political left-wing spectrum. The list of successful right-wing 
populist actors is even more comprehensive: Donald Trump in the US, Viktor Orbán in 
Hungary, Marine Le Pen in France, or Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines – just to name some 
exemplary and well known cases. This insufficient enumeration illustrates that in the twenty 
first century, a populist Zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004) has become omnipresent and is adjudged to 
a variety of political actors. Moreover, the concept of populism is generously used by 
journalists, public intellectuals and observers of everyday politics, and this development is also 
mirrored in academic research (Kriesi, 2018). Populism challenges the institutions and core 
norms of liberal democracies and, for example, has proven to provoke a dangerous amount 
of nationalism, a disregard for political correctness or an indifference to human rights. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that populism is one of the most thriving areas of academic 
research which has grown exponentially (Pappas, 2016). If the term populism or populist is for 
example searched in Google Scholar approximately 400 000 hits are issued.1  
As populism is an emerging research field in social science, many facets of the 
phenomenon have been at the center of scholarly attention. Pappas (2016) identifies four 
distinct waves of scholarship on populism. The earliest wave – the pioneers – originated at an 
international conference in 1967, which resulted in a book by Ionescu and Gellner (1969). This 
early cohort of scholars was unable to reach an unanimous verdict on the definition of 
populism, and in the 1980s many scholars still argued that populism ‘covers an unusually wide 
range of diverse phenomena’ (Canovan, 1982, p. 544). However, the pioneers’ wave sensitized 
scholars to the importance of populism and established international and comparative 
research interest. The second wave – classical populism – was established in the 1970s and 
1980s. Scholars focused on the explanation of authoritarian populist movements in Latin 
                                                          
1 More than 16 million hits are listed in the main Google search engine as of August 2018.  
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America, which resulted in a lack of comparability potential and the country specific findings 
could not be translated to liberal democracies. However this wave branded into two 
important features: the mass movement character and the importance of charismatic 
leadership. The third wave dealt exclusively with neoliberal populism by researching several 
cases in Latin America. Since the 1990s, the study of populism has also grown exponentially in 
Western democracies and the contemporary wave is largely based on the idea of a populist 
Zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004). While the definition remains a heated controversy, research began 
to assess the degrees of populism, by content analyzing the utilization of populist 
communication in party manifestos, press releases, or media coverage by predefined populist 
actors or political actors across the entire political spectrum and around the globe (e.g., 
Hawkins, 2009; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). Another area of growing 
interest is a survey data based approach to measure populist attitudes on a macro level (e.g., 
Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2013; Schulz et al., 2017) or experimental studies focusing on 
effects of populism on an individual micro level (e.g., Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Wirz, 
2018).  
However, why should we care about populism, besides the wave of success of political 
actors and the emergence and hype in academic research? What can the study of populism 
actually teach us, and can it solve the questions of what impact it has on democracies? Is 
populism more of a challenge and a corrective or a threat to democratic systems? One reason 
for the growing interest is due to the common opinion that populism embodies a dangerous 
trend that pursues problematic goals such as the exclusion of ethnic minorities or that it is 
inherently hostile to the idea and the institutions of liberal democracies (Kaltwasser, 2012; 
Mudde, 2004). In its extreme forms, populism rejects all limitations on the expression of 
popular will and the independence of key institutions (Mudde, 2004). Arguing from this 
perspective, populism is perceived as a pathology or serious threat for modern democracies. 
On the other hand, populism, more than anything, challenges the status quo by introducing 
new issues to the political agenda or challenging the political discourse of mainstream parties. 
Therefore it can be argued that this is not necessarily a dangerous manifestation and can even 
promote and stabilize a democracy by giving a voice to groups that are not represented by the 
elites (Kriesi, 2018). This potentially good effect can be perceived as functional for the health 
of a democracy (Akkerman, 2003; Canovan, 1999). Overall, the impact populism has on 
democracies ‘has tended to be less an empirical question and more a theoretical issue, which 
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is answered mostly by speculations deriving from an ideal standpoint of how democracy 
should be’ (Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 185). Therefore, I agree with Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2012) 
standpoint that populism is both a threat and a corrective for democratic politics depending 
on the political context and system of individual democracies. In democracies with consensual, 
parliamentary systems, strong institutions of checks and balances, and a strong and 
autonomous press system, populism may be less likely to become an existential threat. In 
countries with a polarized majority voting system, weak institutions of checks and balances, 
and a weak press, the perspective may be more negative (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). 
Regardless of whether populism is perceived as normatively good or bad, a real consequence 
of populism for democracies is the fact that populist actors achieve success in elections and 
become official forces in government. Hence, ignoring them completely is no longer a viable 
solution.  
The major questions that engages me as a communication scholar is not to answer 
whether populism is a pathology or a corrective measure, but rather what influences the 
media has on the phenomenon. I emphasize the crucial role of the communicative aspects of 
populism research and I am completely supportive of Moffitt’s (2016, p. 94) argument that 
“media can no longer be treated as a ‘side issue’ when it comes to understanding 
contemporary populism. It must be put at the center of our analysis”. Crucial questions 
concerning whether media outlets are seen as paladins or accomplices for populist actors and 
issues (Mazzoleni, 2014) or if media actors themselves become populist actors and 
communicate in a populist fashion are relevant. Essentially, which role certain media outlets 
play in fostering populist communication and what explanatory variables of channels, actors, 
and issues that increase the usage of populist communication can be identified. By answering 
some of these inquiries, this dissertation aims to contribute to the fourth and contemporary 
wave of populism research by focusing on political actors’ communication and utilization of 
populist communication elements across media channels in the area of hybrid and digital 
media systems.   
Although the systematic empirical research of populist communication has only started in 
the 1990s and is a rather young field comparatively, populist communication has been 
analyzed in various communication channels, and research has investigated how different 
political actors communicate in a populist manner. We have gained knowledge about how 
populism is utilized in party and election manifestos (Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 
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2014; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011), political speeches (Hawkins, 2009; Wodak, 2015), political 
party broadcasts (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), the news media (e.g., Akkerman, 2011; Bos, van 
der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011; Herkman, 2017; Rooduijn, 2014), online media (Blassnig, Ernst, 
Büchel, Engesser, & Esser, 2018), and political talk shows (Bos & Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011). 
From the actor perspective, various studies have investigated whether members of populist 
parties actually communicate in a more populist manner, and both individual country case 
studies (e.g., Bernhard, 2017; Bobba & McDonnell, 2016; March, 2017; Stockemer & Barisione, 
2017) and some multi-country comparisons (e.g., Caiani & Della Porta, 2011; van Kessel, 2015) 
have found supporting evidence for this. Additionally, a few single country (e.g., Bracciale & 
Martella, 2017; Cranmer, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and comparative international 
studies (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Schmidt, 2017) uniformly measured the proportion of 
populist communication among a wide variety of political actors. However, these studies were 
missing the integration of new media channels that have changed political communication 
patterns and routines – both from the perspective of media and political actors – immensely. 
Digital and social media are particularly relevant for populism, as they provide several 
opportunity structures that fosters populist communication and enables populist actors to 
employ new communication strategies (e.g., Krämer, 2017). Although scholars have 
intensively investigated the relationship between political populism and the mass media, as 
well as political actors on social media, the combination of populist communication and social 
media has rarely been investigated and has been neglected for a long time. At the initial 
starting point of my dissertation project, the extant research on populism in social media was 
rare and consisted of a handful of case studies of single countries of predefined populist actors 
(Bartlett, 2014; Gerbaudo, 2015; Groshek & Engelbert, 2013; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). 
Recently, scholars have begun to include how social media is utilized by political actors more 
systematically and have theoretically discussed the relation and affinity of social media to 
populism (Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017; Gerbaudo, 2018; Krämer, 2017; Postill, 2018). 
However, these newer studies still either investigate populist communication in single country 
cases, like Italy or Germany (Bobba, 2018; Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Stier, Posch, Bleier, & 
Strohmaier, 2017), or focus on Twitter communication by populist presidents in Latin America 
(Waisbord & Amado, 2017) and predefined populist leaders (Gonawela et al., 2018).2 An 
                                                          
2 Other studies focused on what effects populist communication on social media has on citizens or populist attitudes 
(Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017; Heiss & Matthes, 2017; Enli & Rosenberg, 2018; Kalsnes, 
Larsson, % Enli, 2017; Bobba, Cremonesi, Mancosu, & Seddone, 2018). 
INTRODUCTION 
5 
 
exception is the study by Zulianello, Albertini, and Ceccobelli (2018) that investigated the 
Facebook communications of 38 political leaders in 26 countries in regard to the utilization of 
populist messages.  
Despite this fundamental increase of populism research and foundational evidence of its 
utilization, two major aspects remain unanswered. First, the definition of populism and 
populist communication is still not without its challenges nor has it reached a worldwide 
consensus. I will propose a conceptualization and operationalization that combines and 
integrates the two major traditions to comprehend populist communication – ideology and 
style. I further argue that populist communication is not a binary concept but rather a matter 
of degree, possibly employed by every political actor to some extent. This allows for an 
empirical conclusion whether certain actors’ communication is more (or less) populist 
compared to others. Second, there is still no agreement on who expresses and to what extent 
political actors can spread populism, and we know little about how populist communication is 
utilized across different media channels in the digital age or which niche aspects result in a 
higher affinity with populist communication.3 In particular, the potential of new digital media 
channels and the affinity and opportunity structures of populism to social media has been 
neglected in the research field. This dissertation will present crucial aspects of channel, party, 
and issue characteristics that are helpful to understand the rise of populism in contemporary 
Western democracies and allow for an identification of explanatory factors of the populist 
Zeitgeist. This important, yet largely unexplored field of populist communication led to four 
questions that form the basis of this cumulative dissertation (see Figure 1 for an overview): 
 
1. How can we define populist communication, and how is it utilized by a broad spectrum 
of political actors in different countries across various media channels? (RQ1) 
 
2. Which types of communication channels (Facebook, Twitter, talk shows and news 
media) have high affinity for populist communication? (RQ2) 
 
3. Which types of party properties (extremist, opposition, challenger, and populist) and 
politicians (backbencher) foster the utilization of populist communication messages 
and styles? (RQ3) 
                                                          
3 Next to political actors, media actors or citizens can also act and be perceived as populist actors. However, this 
dissertation excludes the role of these actors and dominantly focuses on political actors’ self-presentation in the media.  
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4. Which types of political issues (populist issues) are affine to populist communication 
elements? (RQ4) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of Research Questions 
 
These four main research questions built the foundation of this cumulative dissertation 
project and are assessed in five journal articles and the synopsis at hand. This synopsis 
continues by (2) presenting the theoretical framework, (3) providing an overview of the 
methodological design and discussing the development of the main dependent variable, (4) 
summarizing the five individual publications, and (5) discussing and reviewing the main results 
and their implications, critically observing the overall findings and limitations and providing 
an outlook on future research possibilities. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this synopsis combines three crucial concepts that build the 
foundation of the four overarching research questions. First, I will discuss how political actors 
in general communicate in the digital media system and how the emergence of new online 
media channels reshaped the relation between political and media actors. Second, an 
integrative definition of populist communication is discussed by introducing a four-folded 
comprehension of populist communication that differentiate between populist actors and 
populism as a strategy, ideology and mode of presentation. The third theoretical component 
discusses the crucial role of different political and discursive opportunity structures that effect 
the emergence of populist communication. I then identify three main areas that that have a 
high affinity to populist communication and discuss the influence and the individual 
opportunity structures for populist communication by comparing various media types, actor 
types and issue types.  
2.1 Political actors’ communication strategies in the digital age 
The relationship between media and politics – or as Gans (1979) labeled it the tango 
between journalist and politicians – has been a key issue for several decades because of the 
mass media’s significant role in modern democracies. The main question driving the project 
at hand in this regard is how political actors use the media to achieve their political goals and 
which communication strategies (e.g., populist communication) they apply and which actions 
they take. The plan of action, aims and motives behind a political strategy that are chosen to 
use and interact with the media may vary. One helpful model for discussing this relationship 
is the Information and Arena Model by van Aelst and Walgrave (2016), which argues that the 
news media fulfill a dual function for political actors.4 The starting point is the political actor 
perspective and the suggestion that the “media’s impact mainly works via political actors that 
are (un)able to employ the media to further their goals” (van Aelst & Walgrave, 2017, p. 4). 
Also within the tradition of mediatization research, this shift from media-centric to actor-
centric in the age of the Internet is increasingly supported and describes the development in 
which political actors are no longer forced (but instead choose to adapt) to certain media 
logics if they fit their political purposes (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014; Marcinkowski & Steiner, 
                                                          
4 Other model discussing the role of the mass media in the perspective of political actors is the PMP-Model by Wolfsfeld 
(2011), the Cycles of Spin by Sellers (2011), or Entman’s (2003) Cascading Activation Model see van Aelst and Walgrave (2017). 
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2014). By implementing a functional approach, the Information and Arena Model argues that 
politicians are rational and strategic actors,5 and the model focuses on why politicians use the 
media and the motives behind their actions. The media thereby fulfill a dual role. The 
information function of the media describes the pattern by which the media provides political 
actors with necessary information. Politicians either passively consume the information 
provided by the media or actively use the consumed information in their work. Much more 
importantly for this study is the second function of the media: the arena function. Two sub-
functions are distinguished that explain that political actors must either obtain personal access 
to the media or convey their own messages in the media arena. The traditional media arena 
is ruled by particular media routines and standards of newsworthiness and news values. For 
political actors fighting for attention within this arena, the competitors are not journalists but 
other political actors.6 The overall goal in the media arena is to maximize positive publicity 
with news management efforts (Strömbäck & Esser, 2017). Because news media attention is 
generally skewed among political actors, politicians in power or political actors who are 
charismatic, communicative and attractive may have advantages in entering the media arena 
(van Aelst & Walgrave, 2017).  
The manner in which political actors strategically reach their goals in the media arena can 
be described as strategic news management. The typology introduced by Strömbäck and Esser 
(2017) describes the relationship between strategic goals and operative tactics and proposes 
two dimensions. The first dimension describes the types of strategic news management and 
distinguishes between the promotion of policies and personnel on the one hand and 
deflecting criticism and attacking opponents on the other hand. The second dimension 
differentiates between two objects of news management: policy (issues are the messages) 
and character (persons are the messages). The combination of these two-sided dimensions 
results in four arguments that allocate tactics to styles of strategic news management. First, 
political actors attempt to set the media agenda, prime the public, and frame their own 
political messages. Most effectively, political actors promote their policies and issues in all 
available communication channels through the use of channels such as websites, social media 
or advertising that they control or by obtaining news coverage that is more under the control 
                                                          
5 Strategic actor means that politicians have goals, use available means and choose their plans of action in attempts to 
realize these goals (Strömbäck & Esser, 2017). 
6 In addition to the media arena, political actors strategically act and compete in three other arenas: the electoral, 
internal and parliamentary arenas (Strömbäck & Esser, 2017; Sjöblom, 1969). Because the media arena is the crucial arena 
for the research questions at hand, the other arenas are disregarded here.  
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of media actors. Second, image management intends to strategically improve the positive and 
professional image of a politician and is often combined with event management by staging 
pseudo-events that result in good publicity. Third, agenda cutting and message control 
describe tactics that shift the attention from potentially hurtful issues by not commenting, 
playing down their newsworthiness or creating a new, more lucrative, issue. Finally, the tactic 
of attacking politicians by applying negative campaign tactics that attack the opponents’ 
personality, record or opinion are a fourth tactic utilized by strategic political actors.  
These four components of an effective and strategic news managements describe the 
general aims and motives (political strategy) that political actors apply when they address the 
media to fulfill their goals. Because the goals of political actors (e.g., vote maximizing, office 
seeking and policy seeking) remain mostly stable over time, the tactics and strategies applied 
have somewhat changed with the emergence of new and digital media (Epstein, 2018). 
Building on Denton’s (1998) typology of strategic elements, Stromer-Galley (2014) argues that 
in addition to the original components (strategic environment, organization, finance, public 
opinion polling, media, and the candidates image), the involvement of citizens is a crucial 
addition to campaign strategies in the digital age. She argues that the old paradigm of 
information dissemination and persuasion exclusively via the mass media has changed to a 
new paradigm of controlled interactivity via digital media (Stromer-Galley, 2014). Although 
political actors have always communicated with citizens in various ways depending on the 
technological possibilities (Römmele, 2003), digital media and especially social network sites 
provide politicians with a unique opportunity to engage in direct and interactive 
communication with voters. Interactivity is a new tactic that political actors can employ that 
was not explicitly mentioned in the original typologies by Denton (1998) and Strömbäck and 
Esser (2017). Additional functions and tactics offered by new and social media that are 
implemented in political actors’ communication strategies can be identified as the following: 
(1) the mobilization of the base to achieve wider attention (e.g., Kreiss, 2014; Parmelee & 
Bichard, 2012), (2) the possibility of circumventing gatekeepers and directly addressing the 
public (e.g., Parmelee & Bichard, 2012), (3) the higher potential for personalized image 
building and messaging (e.g., Gainous & Wagner, 2014; Meeks, 2016), (4) a new and cheap 
media channel to influence the agendas and frames of journalists by, for example, using 
hashtags (e.g., Enli & Simonsen, 2017; Kreiss, 2014), (5) the possibility to test and scale new 
campaign and communication strategies effectively and in a timely matter to use them as a 
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proxy for public opinion (e.g., Baldwin-Philippi, 2015; Karpf, 2017), and (6) as argued above, a 
more intense and direct involvement of citizens via interactivity (e.g., Nulty, Theocharis, Popa, 
Parnet, & Benoit, 2016; Stromer-Galley, 2014). The list of these six digital- and social media-
specific communication strategies must be viewed in addition to strategic news management 
tactics and are especially present in the hybrid media system often in combination with 
political actors. Depending on their strategic goals, political actors’ access to the media, the 
popularity and attention they receive or their financial resources, political actors combine and 
use various combination of all possible elements in their overall communication strategy.  
One specific and (for this synopsis) crucial political communication strategy is populism. As 
populism has become mainstream in politics (Mudde, 2004), various political actors utilize it 
to achieve a goal such as winning an election. The possibilities offered by new media (e.g., 
circumvention, personalization or citizen involvement) have an especially high affinity with 
populism. In the following, I will emphasize which populist-specific tactics political actors can 
use, how they are translated to communication efforts and how they differ between 
communication channel, party characteristics and issue types.   
2.2 Integrative definition of populist communication 
The omnipresent buzzword populism is a highly contested concept, it is difficult to define, 
and is has multifaceted vernacular implementations (Bale, van Kessel, & Taggart, 2011); 
moreover, both its societal impacts and its interest to scholars are continuously expanding. 
The definitional ambiguity of populism resonates mostly with the various manifestations of 
populism and its dependence on contextual factors (Priester, 2007). Following Kriesi (2018) 
and Engesser et al. (2017) I propose a four-folded comprehension of the populist 
communication logic that actors can use to communicate to the public or their voters. By 
focusing on the contemporary political and media realities of Europe and North America, I 
comprehend populism as a relational concept (Rooduijn, 2014) with a “distinct set of political 
ideas” (Hawkins, 2010, p. 5), and therefore conceive and define first and foremost it as a thin 
ideology (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2004). Next to the ideological understanding, 
populism can further emphasis the populist actor or messenger of populist communication 
itself, by asking who the messenger of populist communication is. The focus here lies on 
predefined and classified populist actors and draws conclusions about populist strategies, 
messages and styles based on these actors communication repertoires (Stanyer, Salgado, & 
Strömbäck, 2017). This actor-centered approaches hence defines actors and their 
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characteristics (not their communication) as populist. Next to this actor-centered approach 
populist communication can be perceived as a communication-centered phenomenon or an 
approach (Sorensen, 2017; Stanyer et al., 2017) that takes its starting point in key 
characteristics of populist communication and analyzes the extent to which different actors 
use these elements. Thus, it is unnecessary to predefine or classify political actors as populist 
or non-populist. I argue that communication-centered approach are more expedient, as 
populist communication is not a binary label but rather a matter of degree that can be 
potentially utilized by all sorts of political actors. Following this, populist communication can 
be understood as a political strategy (2), an ideology (3), or a communication style/discourse 
(4). Populism as a political strategy refers to populism as a mean to an end and focuses on the 
aims and motives and questions why political actors employ populist communication 
elements in their repertoires (Engesser et al., 2017). Populism as an ideology thirdly focuses 
on the core of populism by focusing on the content of populist communication (what is being 
said) and the populist communication style finally conceives of populism as a mode of 
presentation and is interested in the form of the communication (how something is being 
said). Figure 2 provides an overview of this four-folded comprehension of the populist 
communication logic.  
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of populist communication logic 
 
These four alternative ways of conceptualizing populist communication are not mutually 
exclusive and merely represent different aspects of populism (Engesser et al., 2017). The 
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populist ideology forms the basis and is the most essential and necessary component of 
populist communication. The ideological core component of populism are expressed with 
several key messages that form the foundation of the populist communication repertoire. The 
core ideology of populism and the political strategy and/or mode of presentation often go 
together (Kriesi, 2018). Hence, a populist strategy and communication style are best viewed 
as complementary to the core ideological notion of populism (Kriesi, 2018). 
The four key components of the populist communication logic are briefly introduced in the 
following four chapters. As this dissertation focuses on a communication-centered approach 
and analysis the communicative output of several political actors, the emphasis lies on 
populism as an ideology and as a mode of presentation. I therefore follow Hawkins (2009) and 
Wodak (2015) who argue that populist communication always combines and integrates 
ideological messages and communication styles.  
2.2.1 Populist actors 
A crucial actor within populism research is the political actor himself, who has the populist 
political ideology present in his mindset as a mental construct.7 The populist actors addresses 
the citizens or his voters directly with is communicative statements (e.g., via press releases, 
public speeches or social media communication) or indirectly via mass media (e.g., print or TV 
news media). The literature describes populist actors as movements (e.g., Kriesi, 2013), right 
or left-wing parties (e.g., Mudde 2004), and often as a single politicians or the charismatic 
leader. Although the charismatic leader or spokesperson of a populist movement is not 
inherent or necessary for populism, it is a feature that often occurs. Charismatic leaders are 
eloquent spokespersons, act as the vox populi, are often political outsiders and have direct 
and unmediated access to the people’s grievances (Kriesi, 2018). Populist actors or charismatic 
leaders embody the core idea of populism and address their voters with direct and indirect 
populist communication messages and styles.  
2.2.2 Populism as a political strategy 
Mostly populist actors but also other political actors use populism particularly as a means 
to its end to achieve their goals. In general, political strategies focus on the methods and 
instruments of achieving a political goal, like winning and exercising power (Weyland, 2001). 
As discussed above (2.1), political actors can use different strategies to fulfill goals like vote 
                                                          
7 This mindset can also be found in supporters and voters who share populist attitudes Schulz et al. (2017).  
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maximizing, office seeking and policy seeking and may use news management or special digital 
communication strategies within the media arena to achieve their plan of action.  Populism as 
a political strategy is defined as a specific way of competing for political power, by mostly an 
individual and charismatic leader who “seeks or exercises government power based on 
support from large numbers of followers” (Ware, 2002; Weyland, 2001, p. 12). The 
instruments of choice to mobilize the masses and demonstrate their distinctive power 
capabilities are plebiscites, mass demonstrations, or opinion polls (Weyland, 2001). 
Contemporary (populist) leaders reach the masses especially through mass media and 
especially via digital and social media, leaders are able to maintain a close and direct 
impression to the people (Weyland, 2017).  Populism as political strategy is most effective in 
crisis situations (e.g., Taggart, 2000) and the best way to “engineer mass support is to confront 
threats to popular well-being and take on the enemies of the people” (Weyland, 2017, p. 12).  
2.2.3 Populism as an ideology 
As a thin ideology, populism is defined as a relation concepts with a distinct set of political 
ideas and consists of three core concepts: the people, the elite, and popular sovereignty (e.g., 
Mény & Surel, 2002; Wirth et al., 2016). This minimal definition approach offers the clear 
advantage that the thin ideology can be combined with different host ideologies and is 
inclusive of all manifestations of populism (from left to right). Depending on the supplemented 
ideologies, the notions of the people and the elite can vary. While right-wing populism tends 
to define the people as a nation and is more likely to attack elites such as the current 
government or mass media, left-wing populism conceives the people as a class and may 
denounce economic and religious elites (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Kriesi, 2014).  
Sovereignty plays a pivotal role and is the core principle of populism. Particularly in 
opposition to representative forms of democracy, the rule of the people is the central motive 
of the populist argument. This demand for unrestricted power for the people distinguishes 
the populist idea of democracy from the constitutional and liberal logics of democracy (Abts 
& Rummens, 2007). The people operate as the locus of power by having the indisputable right 
to constitute power; consequently, all politics should be based on the unhesitating expression 
of the volonté générale (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2004). The people are characterized 
as a homogenous and monolithic group, are equipped with virtues, are commonly good and 
paramount and act according to common sense (e.g., Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Jagers 
& Walgrave, 2007; Taggart, 2000). The conception of the people can vary and differentiates 
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between people as demos, ethnos, and class (Canovan, 1999; Kriesi, 2013). Following the 
populist logic, the elites are accused of having deprived the people of their right to sovereignty 
and find themselves opposed to the people. This antagonism is essential to the understanding 
of populism and is often described as Manichean (Mudde, 2004). Elites are a non-
homogeneous group, and different types of elites (political, economic, cultural, intellectual or 
legal) can be addressed. Independent of their typology, elites are conceived of as corrupt, 
immoral, evil or incompetent and are described as the eternal nemesis of the people 
(Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mény & Surel, 2002; Mudde, 2004). In addition to elites, 
dangerous others are excluded from the people and are perceived as a threat from within the 
people (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). The ostracizing of others such as immigrants, criminals, 
profiteers, perverts, and other minorities, however, is not an intrinsic property of populism 
but instead is linked to forms of radical right-wing populism (Rooduijn,2014). 
When communicated to the public, the three ideological dimensions (people-centrism, 
anti-elitism, and restoring sovereignty are broken down into nine key messages (see Table 1). 
These nine key messages emphasis the content of the populist message and focus on what is 
being communication by political actors.  
2.2.4 Populism as a mode of presentation 
Within a communication-centered approach, populism can additionally be defined as a 
mode of presentation or a discourse that emphasizes various communication styles with a 
high affinity to populism and focuses on how political actors communicate. In my 
comprehension, different to some scholars (e.g., Moffitt, 2016), populist communication 
styles contain no ideological elements (like approaching the people) and focus only on the way 
political ideas are communicated by a political actor (Block & Negrine, 2017). A thorough 
literature research for style elements attributed to populist actors or populist communication 
resulted in the identification of seven style elements that form three major dimensions: 
negativity, emotionality and sociability. Negativity comprises negativism and crisis rhetoric; 
emotionality includes emotional tone, absolutism, and patriotism; and sociability is composed 
of colloquialism and intimization (see Table 2). Although these styles are not exclusively 
populist by itself, they have a high affinity with populism and populist actors and can be 
considered expressions of the same communication strategy that can also lead to the use of 
populist key messages (Krämer, 2017; Kriesi, 2018). Empirically, Wettstein et al. (2018b) 
showed, that there is in fact a strong linkage between the populist ideological content and 
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populist communication styles in the news media and that populist content is the strongest 
predictor for the prevalence of style elements. These results support my comprehension to 
not integrate ideological components of populism into style element as for example Moffitt 
(2016), Jagers and Walgrave (2007) or Block and Negrine (2017) suggested. I follow Wettstein 
et al. (2018b) in their argumentation, that ideological key messages and stylistic elements 
must be separated both analytically and empirically.  
Overall, my proposed populist communication logic combines four crucial aspects by 
focusing on who is communicating, why the strategy is selected, about what the actors speaks 
and how he articulates himself. As the main focus of this dissertation lies on the analysis of 
political actor’s communicative output across several media channels by means of a content 
analysis approach, I emphasis both ideological content and style elements of populism. With 
that approach, the investigation is firstly not restricted to predefined populist actors and 
allows for the integration of several, diverse political actors. Secondly, the aim is not to 
questions the aims and motives of selected political actors that employ a populist 
communication strategy, but rather empirically investigate and identify aspects that are 
beneficial for populist communication to flourish. Whether populism is a successful political 
strategy and consciously put into practice by politicians or campaign managers is unequivocal 
an interesting and important research questions, however it is not the focus of this 
dissertation project. Finally the combined analysis of both ideological messages and style 
elements contributes to the field of populist communication and allows for and empirical and 
holistic analysis across several social and political contexts.  
2.3 Opportunity structures for populist communication 
Populist communication is not detached or isolated and rather embedded in specific social 
and political contexts that effect the populist potential and can be best captured with the 
concept of opportunity structures (Engesser et al., 2017). The concept of political opportunity 
structures dates back to the seminal work by Eisinger (1973),  Tilly (1978), and Kitschelt (1986) 
and was originally developed in the context of research on social movements. Similar to 
populism, there are many definitions of the concept and scholars within the field have not 
reached a consensus (e.g., Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Giugni, 2011). Classical political 
opportunity structures represent a general setting that affects all movements and actors in a 
similar fashion (Berclaz & Giugni, 2016) and the majority of scholars agree that “fixed or 
permanent institutional features combined with more short-term, volatile or conjectural 
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factors to produce an overall particular opportunity structure” (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, 
p. 422). I follow Kitschelt (1986, p. 58) who defines political opportunities as “specific 
configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social 
mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and 
constrain them in others”. In this sense, political opportunities are issue and context specific 
and are more favorable for certain challenges or groups (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & 
Giugni, 1992). Traditionally the focus lies on institutional opportunities like the degree of 
access to the institutionalized political system or responsiveness of political authorities 
(Giugni, 2011). Next to institutional elements, scholars started to include the cultural 
dimensions to the comprehension of opportunity structures (e.g., Gamson & Meyer, 1996). A 
way to capture these cultural dimensions is the introduction of discursive opportunity 
structures (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 
2005). In this perspective, opportunities have two sides: The institutional side refers to the 
access actors have to the political system or the configuration of power within the system, 
while the discursive side relates to the public visibility, resonance and political legitimacy of 
certain actors (Giugni, 2011; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Discursive opportunity structures are 
defined as “the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message’s chances of 
diffusion in the public sphere” (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004, p. 202) and highlight the role of the 
mass media and gatekeepers as pivotal. The theory assumes that political actors will choose 
the most favorable options for action and communication to achieve their goals, which include 
visibility, resonance and legitimacy (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004; Koopmans & Muis, 2009). 
Visibility is a necessary condition for a message to influence the public discourse and depends 
on the inclusion within different media channels and the prominence of the inclusion. 
Secondly, the amount and character of public responses is an important discursive 
opportunity. As messages are more relevant for journalist that either positively (consonance) 
or negatively (dissonance) resonate, resonance helps the actors and their opinions to be more 
prominent in the media arena. Finally the third discursive opportunity structure is public 
legitimacy, defined as the degree to which reactions by third actors in the public sphere 
support an actor’s claims more than they reject them. Following this understanding, the 
probability for political actors to enter the media arena is dependent on several institutional 
and discursive opportunities.  
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Opportunity structure are essential for populist actors or populist communication – like 
for any other political actors or social movements – to successfully enter the media arena. 
Next to institutional political opportunities which are more constant and dependent on the 
political and media system of each country, I highlight the importance of the three discursive 
factors (visibility, resonance and legitimacy) for analyzing populist communication in the 
media from a communication-centered perspective. As I emphasis the perspective of political 
actors and their communicative output, I discuss three aspects that promote or hinder the 
potential of populist communication. First, I focus on the advantages and disadvantages of 
various media channels for their circulation of populist communication. Second, I define 
different groups of political actors (on party and politician level) that are expected to use 
populist communication with a higher probability. Finally, I discuss the effect of the thematic 
context and identify political issues that are more suitable for the dissemination of populist 
communication.   
2.4 Populist communication across channel types 
Research in political communication is often focused on single platforms (Bode & Vraga, 
2017). The reasons for this are fourfold (Bode & Vraga, 2017): (i) Platforms are differently 
unitized, making comparison across them more difficult; (ii) differences in the availability and 
use of privacy settings promote the study of easy- access channels, such as Twitter or the news 
media; (iii) corporations that operate media platforms are unwilling to share information 
about their audiences; and (iv) the combination of these factors render multi-platform 
research increasingly expensive. As a result, multiple media studies analyzing content are 
scarce within political communication research. Notable exceptions are single country studies 
focusing on a specific media and political system (Elmelund-Præstekær, 2011; Kang, Fowler, 
Franz, & Ridout, 2017; Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018; Walter & Vliegenthart, 2010). 
The growth of digital media and the emergence of the hybrid media system make it 
increasingly difficult to understand the role of a single medium in isolation (Bode & Vraga, 
2017; Chadwick, 2017). This trend is especially precarious in social media research, as two-
thirds of all research focuses on single platforms and analyzes either Facebook or Twitter 
(Blank & Lutz, 2017; Bode & Vraga, 2017).  
I note that especially within populist communication research, multi-channel studies are 
inevitable. Studies have shown that the degree of populist communication is context-
dependent and influenced by specific characteristics of the media channel. Bos and Brants 
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(2014) compare newspapers, television news, talk shows and party political broadcasts (PPB) 
in the Netherlands and conclude that PPB and talk shows are especially favorable for populist 
communication. Comparing speeches in Swiss parliamentary committees, open parliamentary 
floors, and talk shows, Cranmer (2011) concludes that public talk shows are beneficial for 
populist communication. These two single-country studies are not only missing validation 
based on an international country comparison but they also further neglect the influence of 
digital and social media channels. In the “fourth age of political communication” (Blumler, 
2013) however, the importance and influence of social media are essential and should be 
incorporated into populist communication research.  
Different media present different opportunity structures for political actors and influence 
the choices that channel political actors prefer in different situations. Sometimes political 
actors heavily rely on mediated communication by traditional news media outlets, and other 
topics are better placed in arenas in which the influences of media actors are limited. In 
general, political actors are motivated to exercise as much control as possible over how their 
messages are conveyed to the public. To this end, Paletz (2002) introduced a three-way 
classification according to which political messages can be subject to heavy, medium or no 
journalistic intervention. Media interventionism, in general, refers to a media-centered 
political reporting style and can be interpreted as a professionally motivated behavior by 
media actors to increase their control over the news content (Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). 
Examples of channels without intervention include social media channels such as Twitter or 
Facebook, which allow politicians to send messages to voters directly, without journalistic 
filters. An example of medium intervention is political TV talk shows, in which communication 
control is shared between political and media actors. An example of heavy intervention is a 
newspaper report in which control over the final product rests exclusively with the journalist. 
Adapting the theory of media interventionism (Paletz, 2002; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009) to 
populist communication in the media, I argue that the lower the degree of journalistic 
interference in a channel, the greater the potential for unfiltered, unrestricted populism.  
This cumulative dissertation contributes to the literature by providing one of the first 
qualitative and systematic findings related to populist communication on social media (ARTICLE 
I), comparing the occurrences of populism across Facebook and Twitter (ARTICLE II & III) and 
offering an additional comparison with politicians’ statements on political talk shows (ARTICLE 
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IV) and news media (ARTICLE V). The individual opportunity structures of each communication 
channel in relation to populist communication are discussed in the following three chapters.  
2.4.1 Social Media platforms 
Social media has high significance in contemporary politics. Twitter and Facebook have 
emerged as central media platforms and rival traditional news media in their reach and 
influence (Fisher, Marshall, & McCallum, 2018). Whereas  legacy media is based on traditional 
‘mass media logic’ with professional gatekeepers and a relatively passive audience, ‘network 
media logic’ evolves from interest-bound and like-minded peer networks (Klinger & Svensson, 
2015). The possibility to bypass the news media and the ability of political actors to 
communicate directly with the public is considered a potential self-representation mechanism 
of political actors (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013). Messages are neither mediated, edited, 
interpreted nor filtered by professional media actors. Social media are built upon the logic of 
virality, which compels political actors to communicate primarily those messages that users 
like, comment, and share within their networks (Klinger, 2013). Crucial opportunity structures 
make social media a propitious space for populist communication, and the relation between 
populism and social media have been described as a ‘elective affinity’ by Gerbaudo (2018), 
who identifies social media as an ideal platform for populism. Many populist actors especially 
consider journalists and “established” mass media to be controlled by the ruling elite. In their 
view, mainstream political reporting misses the views and interests of the people, is corrupt 
and systematically denigrates those politicians who would stand up for the true will of the 
people (Fisher et al., 2018; Moffitt, 2016). Tweets by Donald Trump such as “Peaceful protests 
are a hallmark of our democracy. Even if I don't always agree, I recognize the rights of people 
to express their views. [January 22, 2017]”, “#FraudNewsCNN #FNN [July 2, 2017]” or 
“Mexico's court system is corrupt. I want nothing to do with Mexico other than to build an 
impenetrable WALL and stop them from ripping off U.S. [March 5, 2015]” illustrate the 
enormous potential of an unfiltered and direct populist communication and the fraud news 
allegation. Nevertheless, social media do not provide a monopoly for populist actors or 
populist communication. Political actors across the political landscape may profit from the 
advantages offered by social media either in their election campaigns or in their day-to-day 
communications (Postill, 2018).  
The theoretical relation between populism and online communication was established in 
the late 1990s by Bimber (1998), who explored the Internet’s potential to “restructure political 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
20 
 
power in a populist direction and the possibility of an “unmediated communication between 
citizens and the government” (p. 137). Building upon these early theoretical assumptions, I 
argue that six opportunity structures of Facebook and Twitter foster the potential of populist 
communication and make them particularly well-suited channels of populist communication 
(also see ARTICLE II&V). First, they provide direct access to the public without external or 
journalistic interference. This allows politicians to spread their messages directly and 
unmediated. Second, social media offer the possibility of establishing a close and direct 
connection to the people, which is a crucial element for populism to flourish. Social media 
make politicians more approachable due to lower barriers of interactions and the possible 
creation of stronger ties. Third, social media foster the potential for personalization through 
targeted and personalized forms of communication. Politicians can shape their own messages, 
focus on their professional activities and either share insights from their personal lives or 
reveal their emotions and feelings. Fourth, social media can be used to create protected 
spaces in which one-sided, anecdotal evidence of populist convictions can be accumulated in 
large quantities and made accessible to followers. The repeated selective exposure to this 
one-sided information promotes an in-group mentality that populists can use to mobilize their 
supporters and coordinate political actions. Fifth, social media offer the opportunity to 
connect with specific groups and can create a feeling of community, belonging and recognition 
among otherwise scattered groups. Within these protected spaces, an aggressive and uncivil 
tone can be cultivated. Finally, Facebook and Twitter allow populist actors to criticize the 
mainstream media as distorted and unfair and offer an alternative medium to those citizens 
they have been able to alienate from the traditional media. Taken together, these six 
opportunity structures render social media an especially convenient instrument for populist 
communication.  
When comparing the two most commonly used social media platforms, I argue that 
Facebook provides a more attractive environment for populist communication than Twitter 
(see ARTICLE III). First, Facebook offers more reciprocal messages exchanges, which brings users 
closer together, enhances the quality of interpersonal communication and fosters social 
capital. Second, Facebook has higher levels of proximity, and the connection between 
Facebook users is generally more intensive, personal and intimate. Third, due to the different 
characteristics of users (e.g., age, education, socioeconomic status, and political interest), 
Twitter has a stronger professional orientation and political actors may consider it less suitable 
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for spreading blunt and emotional appeals. In contrast, Facebook is the platform for ordinary 
citizens to interact with politicians (Kalsnes, Larsson, & Enli, 2017). Schulz (2018) recently 
confirmed this argument from the audience’s perspective by showing that populist citizens 
are more likely to use Facebook as their source of political information, while non-populist 
citizens use Twitter for information purposes. Finally, Facebook has an advantage in that 
messages are not limited to a certain number of characters, which gives political actors the 
opportunity to make their case more effectively and elaborately. Jacobs and Spierings (2018) 
added to the technical argument that Twitter is less suitable for populist communication given 
their highly centralized party structure. 
2.4.2 Political talk shows 
Political talk shows are important outlets for the articulation of political affairs in a 
relatively sympathetic public setting (Baym, 2013; Jones, 2010; Kessler & Lachenmaier, 2017), 
have a positive effect on viewers’ trust in politicians (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2016), and are 
highly popular with politicians, as it affords them the opportunity to reach a large audience. 
They represent the media channel, in which communication control is shared between 
political and media actors (medium intervention) and not only offer the opportunity to bypass 
the watchdog journalism more commonly found in hard news programs but also allow for a 
more controlled self-presentation, and foster the potential for personalization (Boukes 
& Boomgaarden, 2016; Kessler & Lachenmaier, 2017). 
As a channel with medium journalistic interventionism, talk shows provide another ideal 
stage for populist communication. Moreover, previous research has demonstrated that this 
media genre offers populism the most favorable conditions compared to other public and non-
public media genres (Bos & Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011). 
2.4.3 News media 
Media appearances are both crucial and very attractive for politicians because the media 
provide a credible stage from which they can spread their messages to a wide audience. 
Political actors, however, must heavily rely on media actors to receive (favorable) coverage. 
The self-presentation of politicians and the possibility to cut out the intermediary of the news 
media is very restricted. Although the degree of journalistic interventionism is deepening on 
the media culture and the selection processes of journalists, politicians must employ clever 
news management strategies to pass through journalists’ gates (Esser, 2008). In general, news 
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media are a platform with high interventionism, which hinders the self-presentation of 
populist actors and should result in marginalized occurrences of populist communication 
compared to channels with more autonomy. Even if populism itself has a high news value and 
populist actors and their norm-violating behavior may trigger journalists to open the gates, 
they are often confronted with harsh criticism (Haller, 2015; Mazzoleni, 2008). Official 
distancing in lead commentaries may explain why mainstream media outlets can become the 
target of populist attacks, with populists blaming the news media for conspiring with the 
establishment against the will of the people (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). 
2.5  Affinity of parties and politicians’ characteristics with populism 
A second condition that is expected to affect the dissemination of populist communication 
are specific characteristics of certain type of parties and politicians. Because populism is a thin 
ideology and employed by a multitude of political actors worldwide, this dissertation aims to 
determine which special properties of political actors increases the potential for populist 
communication. I have identified five relevant characteristics of political actors that have a 
high affinity with populism and should result in the greater utilization of both populist 
messages and populist styles. In regard to political actors’ communication, this dissertation 
contributes to the field by showing that populism in Western democracies is not am 
exclusively right-wing phenomenon and that members of extreme (ARTICLE II, III & IV), 
opposition (ARTICLE II), challenger (ARTICLE IV), and populist parties (ARTICLE V), along with 
backbenchers (ARTICLE V) have a high affinity with populism.  
2.5.1 Populist parties 
First, political actors who are affiliated with a populist party are expected to utilize populist 
communication elements. Populist actors from left to right are extremely successful and have 
become important in many Western party systems. As support for populist actors increases, 
mainstream parties respond by increasingly using populist communication themselves, which 
leads to the belief that populism can be contagious (e.g., Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, 
Luther, & Sitter, 2010; Mény & Surel, 2002) and has become mainstream in politics (Mudde, 
2004). By conceiving populism as a matter of degree, I argue that it could be plausible and 
sometimes lucrative for all political actors to employ certain populist communication 
elements. However, populist actors who have internalized the core concept of populism 
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(antagonism among the elite, the people and unrestricted sovereignty) are expected to 
employ much more populist communication elements than members of non-populist parties.  
2.5.2 Extremist parties 
Party extremism is another characteristic that has been identified as having a high affinity 
with populism (e.g., Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). As populism increases, especially in 
Western Europe, it is too often too quickly associated exclusively with the radical right, and it 
is crucial to reinforce the argument that populism can be combined with various ideologies 
and not restricted to right-wing parties. Although right- and left-leaning parties differ in their 
ideologies, party programs, and social basis, they have several characteristics in common that 
are related to populist communication. At least in Western Europe, extreme parties that have 
emerged in recent decades often compensate for their small party organizations with 
substantial communication offensives, tend to remain opposition parties, and share a protest 
attitude against established parties, politics, and state structures (Müller-Rommel, 1998). 
Extreme left- and right-wing parties are therefore more prone than moderate or mainstream 
parties to challenge the current establishment, attack the elite, and glorify the people in their 
political communication strategy. 
2.5.3 Opposition parties 
A third characteristic that has an impact on populist communication is the position of a 
party in the government. Mény and Surel (2002) argue that ‘populist parties are by nature 
neither durable nor sustainable parties of government’ and ‘remain predominantly in 
opposition’ (p. 18). In line with this argument, Heinisch (2003) notes that when right-wing 
populist parties enter the government, their unique strengths turn into disadvantages. 
Opposition parties profit from their position to blame and discredit the ruling elite and present 
themselves as the sole solution for the people. Even when governments either include or are 
supported by a populist party (Akkerman, Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016), discrediting and blaming 
the alleged elites remains a core feature of populist actors. This dual role of being in the 
government and simultaneously acting as the government’s biggest critic is one strength of 
Christoph Blocher, the former leader of the Swiss Peoples Party. Blocher managed this double 
role by successfully promoting himself as challenger to the allegedly corrupt and incapable 
government, while simultaneously being part of that very same government.  
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2.5.4 Challenger parties 
The so-called challenger parties are the fourth particularly relevant party category. They 
are often perceived as a threat to the party establishment (Meguid, 2005) and are assumed 
to use populist communication to generate attention (Kriesi, 2014). Throughout the various 
crisis cycles since the 1980s, new challenger parties from both the left and the right have 
emerged and achieved success in many Western democracies (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Müller-
Rommel, 1998). Kriesi (2014) argues that these new challenger parties may be perceived as a 
threat to the establishment because they highlight problems that have been neglected by 
mainstream parties, mobilize outside of electoral channels, and resort to creative, innovative 
forms of protest communication. New right- and left-wing challenger parties can thus be 
expected to blame the elites and complain about neglect of the people’s true concerns. 
Therefore, these parties may rely on populist communication to improve both their electoral 
chances (Betz, 2002) and their media visibility (Mazzoleni, 2008). These assumptions are 
supported by a longitudinal study from Switzerland that found that new parties – independent 
of their ideological stance – relied on high levels of populist communication in party 
advertising and press releases during their initial “challenger phase” (Weber, 2017).  
The difference between challenger parties and opposition parties might not be clear at 
first sight. Although challenger parties are most often in opposition, they are relatively new to 
the party landscape and unlike the well-established opposition parties, have no tradition or 
history in their political system. Nevertheless, these two party characteristics often overlap. 
2.5.5 Backbenchers 
The final feature that has a high affinity with populism is at the level of individual politicians 
and highlights political actors that occupy a low position in the party hierarchy. The election 
of Donald Trump has again reminded us that actors from the political periphery can often 
achieve political success through the targeted use of populist communication (Stewart, 2018). 
There are also examples of this in Eastern and Western Europe on both the left and the right 
sides of the political spectrum (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). 
Findings by Davis (2009) indicate that politicians who do not have the most elevated status 
(i.e., backbenchers) are especially likely to see the exploitation of “populist news values” (p. 
209) as an important strategy to overcome the media threshold, particularly on social media, 
where they can communicate their messages directly to the public (see also Davis, 2010). van 
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Aelst and Walgrave (2016, p. 507) agree that “for backbenchers and newcomers, provocative 
statements are even more needed.” It is noteworthy that such politicians’ underdog status 
gives them a certain degree of authenticity: Backbenchers can use the anti-establishment 
dimension of populist communication particularly effectively by criticizing those in power both 
for their political failures and for their supposed neglect of the population’s concerns, thereby 
reinforcing their own closeness to the people. In contrast, political frontbenchers and power-
holder should sound much less convincing if they take a critical stand against the political 
establishment (Stewart, 2018). Political outsiders often employ a digital campaign strategy to 
spread their messages. On Facebook and Twitter, backbenchers are less disadvantaged and 
are independent from news cycles and journalists. Social media can even empower 
backbenchers and offer them the possibility to build their own power base of like-minded 
followers (Jacobs & Spierings, 2018). Backbenchers further establish a direct link to the people 
by being more interactive with citizens on Twitter than members of parliament who hold key 
positions (Spierings, Jacobs, & Linders, 2018). 
2.6 Affinity of populism to political issues 
The last condition favoring the spread of populist communication is the concentration on 
certain issues in the appeals of populist actors. Due to its ideological thinness and its 
chameleonic nature, populism can be enriched with thicker ideologies, is not restricted to 
certain parties and can be used by both left-wing and right-wing political actors (Mudde, 2004; 
Taggart, 2000). This can be seen most clearly in the populist mobilization of the involved 
issues. Certain issues serve particularly well as vehicles for mobilizing a sort of latent populist 
possibility. Van Kessel (2015),  Poier, Saywald-Wedl, and Unger (2017), Smith (2010) and 
Taggart (2017) agree that five political issues – immigration, regional identity, corruption and 
crime, integration, and economic hardship – have a specifically high affinity to populist 
mobilization in Western democracies. Taggart’s (2017, p. 205) hermeneutic analysis found 
these issues to be “appropriated” and “politicized” most frequently by populist parties in 
Europe. Van Kessel (2015, p.23) ran a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) with thirty-one 
countries to show that “the breeding ground for populist parties is especially fertile where 
related issues are salient” in public discourse. Populists put these issues on their agenda and 
bring them into wider contention, pressurizing the media and other political actors to address 
these issues also. According to Taggart (2017), the clearest and most commonly mentioned 
populist issue is immigration, particularly on the political right. Immigration addresses a strong 
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focus on the protection of national culture, an emphasis on the people as homogenous entity, 
an opposition to multiculturalism, and hostility toward outsiders and ethnic minorities. 
Second, regional identity relates to subnational identity politics; it expresses a rejection of 
central state structures and the idealization of a regional “heartland” (Taggart 2017). Third, 
the issue corruption and crime relates to allegations of institutional corruption, the failure of 
established parties, and that law and order policies require tightening (Taggart 2017; Smith 
2010). A fourth populist issue addresses European/transnational integration, which 
summarizes populist tendencies to perceive supranational authorities and legal orders as a 
threat to the sovereignty of the nation (e.g., Euroscepticism). Finally, economic hardship 
relates to high unemployment rates and growing economic inequality, and demands to 
protect the national economy from global competition (Van Kessel 2015). The resulting 
populist accusations against the elites often come from the political left. 
It is important to note that these five issues are not inherently populist themselves, but 
depending on their framing, they can have a high affinity with populism; furthermore, these 
five issues are not utilized by all populist actors (Taggart, 2017; van Kessel, 2015). What is 
striking about these populist issues is that most of them can be mobilized in either a left- or a 
right-wing form and gain high popularity. Moreover, populism and the mobilization and 
criticism of populist issues may be an important barometer of the health of politics because 
they tackle crucial key issues of contemporary politics (Taggart, 2017). 
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3. Overview of methodological design 
This dissertation is integrated into the NCCR Democracy phase III, module 2 “Populism in 
the context of globalization and mediatization” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch) project. 
All of the module’s team members have developed a working definition of populism and 
populist communication, operationalized the constructs in an extensive codebook, and 
implemented an overarching, international and multi-language content analysis that includes 
all facets of the various projects involved (Wirth et al., 2016).  
3.1 Research setting and content analysis 
In 2013 initiated the NCCR III populism content analysis project to assess the extent, 
content and presentation of populist communication in eleven Western democracies, content 
analyzing approximately 55’000 media texts in eight languages by 87 trained international 
student coders. The project assessed print news media articles during a 15-month routine 
period and past and current election periods. Additionally, it analyzed TV newscasts, TV talk 
shows, social media communications, press releases, and party manifestos.  
Within module 2, this dissertation evolved out of project IP 8, “Populism and the news 
media”, which focused on populist communication in the news media, and as an additional 
project, further analyzed populism on social media and in political talk shows during three 
time periods. Articles II-V resort to the data collection of the NCCR content analysis. The data 
for ARTICLE I evolved out of a pre-study of the entire NCCR populism project, which was 
implemented by Frank Esser and Sven Engesser in a Master’s research seminar at the 
Department of Communication and Media Research (IKMZ) at the University of Zurich.  
The units of analysis in the NCCR content analysis for this project are single statements 
(direct and indirect) made by a politician – who is considered a speaker – in print news media, 
TV talk shows and social media on a target actor or a political issue. All statements can contain 
one or several of these statements by one speaker. The speaker, the target actor, and the 
issue are defined as follows:  
Speaker: All direct or indirect statements by the identified politician or his or her social 
media accounts are considered a speaker. Because retweets are excluded from the analysis, 
only statements that are written by the politicians have been included in the social media 
analysis. 
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Target actor: An actor characterized or evaluated by a speaker’s statement counts as a 
target actor and includes other politicians, organizations, elites, or the people. The speaker 
himself can also be a target actor when he utters a statement about himself. 
Issue: An issue refers to the thematic context or policy substance of the statement 
addressed by a speaker’s statement, such as an election, migration, or security.  
3.2 Operationalization of populist communication 
The main dependent and most crucial variable of this synopsis is populist communication. 
If the thin ideology of populism is expressed in the content of a statement, the three pillars of 
people-centrism, anti-elitism and restoring popular sovereignty are addressed. When 
communicated by political actors, these dimensions are broken down into nine populist key 
messages. When populist communication is related to the way and form statements are 
presented, we conceive it as populist communication style elements. The manner in which 
political actors express the populist ideology in statements refers to three major populist style 
dimensions – negativity, emotionality and sociability – which are composed of seven individual 
populist communication styles.  
Populist communication is overall regarded as a formative measure (Diamantopoulos, 
Riefler, & Roth, 2008) based on the six dimensions and the corresponding nine populist key 
messages and seven style elements. This means that messages and styles are required to be 
internally consistent to be reliable or valid. Key messages and style elements were 
operationalized as dummy variables, and for each statement we coded whether one or more 
of the sixteen messages or styles were present. The nine populist key messages and seven 
populist communication styles are operationalized using a broad set of individual categories 
(see Table 1 and 2). For each category, we code whether it was present in a given statement. 
A key message or a style element is considered present if at least one of its respective 
categories is identified in a statement. The operationalization of the dependent variable 
populist communication developed over time. In ARTICLE I we started at the beginning and 
simply deduced five ideological key elements form the definition of populism (sovereignty to 
the people, advocating for the people, attacking elites, ostracizing others, and invoking the 
heartland) as heuristic categories. This allowed us to qualitatively scan social media content 
for populist communication cues. A more systematic approach was implemented in ARTICLES II 
and III, in which we identified three core dimensions of populism and operationalized them 
with nine populist key messages.  
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Table 1: Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populist Key Messages 
Dimension 
Populist Key 
Messages 
Underlying 
Ideology 
Categories 
Anti-Elitism 
Discrediting the 
elite 
Elites are 
corrupt. 
Elites are accused of being malevolent, criminal, lazy, 
stupid, extremist, racist, undemocratic, etc. The elite 
are called names and denied morality, charisma, 
credibility, intelligence, competence, consistency, etc. 
Blaming the elite 
Elites are 
harmful. 
Elites are described as a threat/burden, responsible 
for negative developments/situations, or as having 
committed mistakes or crimes. Elites are described as 
not being a source of enrichment or responsible for 
positive developments/situations. 
Detaching the 
elite from the 
people 
Elites do not 
represent the 
people. 
Elites are described as not belonging to the people, 
not being close to the people, not knowing the 
people, not speaking for the people, not caring for the 
people, or not performing everyday actions. 
People-
Centrism 
Stressing the 
people’s virtues 
The people 
are virtuous. 
The people are bestowed with morality, charisma, 
credibility, intelligence, competence, consistency, etc. 
The people are exempt from being malevolent, 
criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, racist, undemocratic, 
etc. 
Praising the 
people’s 
achievements 
The people 
are 
beneficial. 
The people are described as being enriched or 
responsible for a positive development/situation. The 
people are described as not being a threat/burden, 
not being responsible for negative 
developments/situations, nor as having committed 
mistakes or crimes. 
Stating a 
monolithic 
people 
The people 
are 
homogenous. 
People are described as sharing common feelings, 
desires, or opinions. 
Demonstrating 
closeness to the 
people 
The populist 
represents 
the people. 
The speaker describes himself as belonging to the 
people, being close to the people, knowing the 
people, speaking for the people, caring for the people, 
agreeing with the people, or performing everyday 
actions. The speaker claims to represent or embody 
the people. 
Restoring 
Sovereignty 
Demanding 
popular 
sovereignty 
The people 
are the 
ultimate 
sovereign. 
The speaker argues for general institutional reforms 
to grant the people more power by introducing direct-
democratic elements or increasing political 
participation. The speaker argues in favor of granting 
more power to the people within the context of a 
specific issue (e.g., election, immigration, security). 
Denying elite 
sovereignty 
The elites 
deprive the 
people of 
their 
sovereignty. 
The speaker argues in favor of granting less power to 
elites within the context of a specific issue (e.g., 
election, immigration, security). 
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We decided to exclude the dimension of ostracizing others from the main concept of 
populist communication. This consensus was reached within the NCCR module to minimize 
the emphasis on right-wing populism and conceptualize the thin ideology of populism for all 
possible add-on ideologies. Left-wing populist actors, for example, combine populism with 
socialism and follow an inclusive understanding of the people without horizontally excluding 
dangerous others, such as migrants or foreigners. The dimension of invoking a heartland was 
further excluded from the main concept, as it is not discussed as a crucial feature of populism 
in the literature (for an exception, see Taggart, 2000) and hardly ever occurred in the 
qualitative social media analysis of ARTICLE I. In addition to measuring populist communication 
based on the communicated content of populist messages, ARTICLE IV introduced and 
systematized populism-related communication styles. This systematization and identification 
of seven communication styles that have a high affinity with populism contributed to the field 
of populist communication in several ways, especially since the identification and 
systematization of populist style elements is not as established and has not achieved 
consensus in the field. This advancement of the dependent variable made it possible to test a 
much broader and inclusive understanding of populist communication by not only analyzing 
the content of political actors’ statements but also defining how those statements are 
presented and which style elements are commonly used in populist communication. ARTICLE 
IV implemented the two core concepts individually in the statistical analysis and argued that 
populist communication overall is a combination of either messages and/or styles. The 
presence of one of the six dimensions was sufficient to conceive of it as populist 
communication. Finally, ARTICLE V argues for a co-occurrence of populist messages and styles. 
Accordingly, a statement is defined as populist if it combines at least one ideological key 
message and one populist style element in the same statement.The separate use of populist 
key messages or style elements is insufficient to classify a statement as fully populist. 
However, as ARTICLES I and II have shown, populism is a fragmented phenomenon and not all 
three ideological and all three style dimensions must be represented in a single statement. 
We only expect all dimensions of populist communication to be represented in the long term 
of the continuous communication of a politician, not in every single speech act. 
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Table 2: Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populist Communication Styles 
Dimension 
Populist Style 
Elements 
Underlying Style 
Element 
 Categories 
Negativity 
Negativism 
Paint society and its 
members (part of the 
people) “in black” by 
attributing negative 
characteristics or 
condemning 
actions/situations with 
negative outcome. 
Targets are accused of being 
malevolent, criminal, lazy, 
stupid, racist, etc. or are denied 
being benevolent, likeable, 
intelligent, credible, loyal, 
consistent, etc. 
Crisis rhetoric 
Portraying a 
situation/development 
as a crisis using 
exaggerations, 
emergency rhetoric or 
declaring a scandal. 
Speaker uses rhetorical 
elements of immorality, 
exaggeration, scandal, 
emergency or war rhetoric. 
Emotionality 
Emotional tone 
Sharing positive and 
negative emotions or 
revealing feelings. 
Speaker uses emotional 
language by expressing discrete 
positive (e.g., happiness, 
contentment, hope, pride, 
trust) or negative (e.g., anger, 
uneasiness, sadness, fear, 
regret, affection) emotions. 
Absolutism 
Using an assertive tone 
and lacking relativizing 
words. Tendency to paint 
world in black and white 
without any shades of 
gray. 
Speaker uses rhetorical figure 
of absolutism by presenting 
something as the only 
conceivable option or as 
preposterous or unbearable. 
Patriotism 
Emphasizing of the 
superiority of own 
country by referencing 
an idealized and utopic 
heartland. 
Speaker uses rhetorical figure 
of patriotism by emphasizing 
superiority of own country or 
some obscure heartland. 
Sociability 
Colloquialism 
Preference for a simple, 
dialect, colloquial or 
vulgar language and use 
of nicknames to reach 
the ordinary people. 
Speaker uses vulgar language or 
slang, employs sarcasm or 
rhetorical questions and 
address targets with 
nicknames. 
Intimization 
Recounting personal and 
intimate details about 
personal life. 
Targets are described in their 
predominately personal life by 
emphasizing their family or love 
life and making references to 
personal way of life or leisure 
activities. 
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4. Individual publications and results 
This chapter summarizes the aim, research design, and major findings for each of the five 
articles that are discussed in this synopsis.  
4.1 ARTICLE I: Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology 
This article is one of the first attempts to investigate how politicians use populist 
communication on social media and questions, how populism manifests itself on Facebook 
and Twitter. The aim of this paper was to show deeper insights into the definitional elements 
of populism conceived as a thin ideology and to identify empirical types of populism by 
applying an in-depth analysis of politicians’ communications on social media.  
We theoretically identified five ideological elements and argue that populist 
communication manifests itself by emphasizing the sovereignty to the people, advocating for 
the people, attacking elites, ostracizing others, and invoking the heartland. We argue that 
because of network media logic, social media channels provide – especially in a hybrid media 
system – a perfect stage for populist actors to establish a close connection to the people and 
circumvent gatekeepers. 
4.1.1 Research design 
To investigate whether and how populism manifests itself on social media, we conducted 
a qualitative text analysis of typical Facebook and Twitter posts. We focused on four European 
countries (AT, CH, IT & UK) to identify cross-national patterns. For each country, we included 
both a populist party (FPÖ, SVP, M5S, & UKIP) and the dominant social democrat and 
conservative parties (which serve as a control group). Within each party, we identified high 
status politicians (leaders, chairman, & secretaries) and those with a very active 
communication behavior and media presence (vocal backbenchers or regular talk show 
guests). We examined all official Facebook and Twitter accounts during a period of six months 
(January 1-June 30, 2013).  
For the data analysis, we proceeded in three steps. First, we used the five ideological key 
elements (sovereignty to the people, advocating for the people, attacking elites, ostracizing 
others, and invoking the heartland) as heuristic categories and scanned the collected 
Facebook and Twitter content of all posts that fell into at least one of these categories. Second, 
we selected posts that we regarded as typical cases for their respective categories. Third, we 
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subjected these posts to a hermeneutic text analysis to illustrate how politicians utilized, 
modified, differentiated, and combined the five key ideological elements. 
4.1.2 Findings 
A major finding of this study is that populism manifested itself in a fragmented form on 
social media. Although all five key definitional elements appeared across the posts and tweets 
under analysis, these elements were generally isolated from each other or clustered in pairs 
at most. We offer three potential reasons for this fragmentation: (1) politicians may reduce 
the complexity of the thin ideology to make it more comprehensive for their followers; (2) 
politicians may keep the populist ideology ambiguous and malleable to open the possibility 
that users can complement it with their own political attitudes; and (3) fragments of populism 
may travel more easily below the radar of political opponents and critical observers. We 
further found populist communication elements across countries, parties and politicians’ 
status levels. Both populist politicians and politicians from mainstream parties utilize 
ideological key elements of populism.  
In terms of individual ideological elements, the analysis revealed that by demanding 
sovereignty to the people, politicians include aspects of democratic theory in their arguments. 
We showed that advocacy for the people is more than the mere mention of the word ‘people’, 
as suggested by previous studies. It typically implies that the populist actor perceives himself 
as a true representative of the people. Furthermore, we illustrated that the elites attacked by 
populist actors – whether they are political, economic, legal, supranational, or media elites – 
may vary substantially. We demonstrated that the ostracism of others can be conducted 
either explicitly by openly denouncing certain social groups or indirectly by means of implicit 
negation and accusing others of ostracism. Our analysis indicates that the heartland can be 
triggered by the mention of a single name or date, depending on the cultural background. 
Moreover, we identified combinations of ideological elements from the spheres of the people 
and the elite. We could also come up with one example spanning the full circle of the populist 
argument from popular sovereignty over attacks on the elite to advocacy for the people. This 
example proves that, in particular cases, it is also possible that relatively high doses of 
concentrated populist ideology are transmitted through social media. 
We concluded that social media are a particularly well-suited channel to meet the 
communicative preferences of populist actors and that they provide them with a convenient 
instrument to spread their messages. 
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4.2  ARTICLE II: Extreme parties and populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across 
six countries 
The second paper builds upon the findings of ARTICLE I and analyzes the precise relations 
between populist communication and social media, which has been mostly neglected in the 
research field. The aim of this paper was to systematically investigate the extent to which 
political actors use populist communication on social media and to disentangle the differences 
among a) extreme parties b) opposition parties and c) Facebook and Twitter.  
We define populism as a thin ideology that consists of three core concepts (people-
centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring sovereignty). When this ideology is communicated to the 
public, the actor himself becomes a crucial element of populism by using a set of nine populist 
key messages.8 We argued that social media are particularly well-suited and beneficial channel 
for populism for four main reasons: they provide direct access to the public without external 
interference; they offer the possibility of establishing a close and direct connection to the 
people; they foster the potential for targeted, personalized forms of communication; and they 
can create a feeling of community, belonging and recognition among otherwise scattered 
groups.  
Three hypotheses were tested in this paper. First, we argued that populism can be 
combined with different ideologies and is not an exclusively right-wing phenomenon. We 
argued that parties at the fringes of the political spectrum are especially inclined to use 
populist communication, which has previously been identified in party manifestos and press 
releases. Second, we argue that being in opposition to the government positively influences 
the amount of populist communication. Populist parties are neither durable nor sustainable 
parties of government, they remain in opposition, and once they enter the government, their 
unique strength becomes a disadvantage. Finally, we argue that the characteristic of a 
communication channel matters and argued that populist communication is higher on 
Facebook than on Twitter for four reasons: (i) higher reciprocal messages exchange, which 
enhances interpersonal communications and foster social capital, (ii) higher proximity, since 
Facebook is not as anonymous and the connection between users is more intensive, personal, 
and intimate, (iii) the fact that Twitter is an elite medium, used for professional purposes and 
                                                          
8 In the original article, we use a different term for key messages (populist communication strategies). The use of these terms 
is merely due to different labeling, and the two terms do not differ conceptually.  
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to consume and circulate information, and (iv) the fact that Facebook has no character 
limitations.  
4.2.1 Research design  
We conducted a semi-automated content analysis of Facebook posts and Tweets by 88 
politicians from six countries during a three-month routine period (September 1-November 
30, 2015). The selected six Western democracies (CH, DE, IT, FR, UK and USA) provide deficient 
variability regarding political systems, strong and weak populist parties and different 
consumption of political information on social media, functioning as a robustness check to 
increase the validity and generalizability of our findings. For each country, we selected the five 
most influential parties (from left to right), including a populist party. Within each party, we 
selected politicians with high hierarchical position and politicians with high social media 
resonance. We downloaded the verified Facebook and Twitter feeds and coded all verifiable 
statements. We included 845 Facebook and 555 Twitter statements by 88 politicians in the 
final analysis.  
The unit of analysis is a single statement made by a politician’s social media account 
(speaker) on a target actor or an issue. The nine populist key messages are operationalized 
using a broad set of categories and for each category we coded whether it was present in a 
given social media statement. The dependent variable – the populism index – is present if at 
least one of the nine key messages is present. The 29 parties are placed in the left and right 
spectrum using the Chapel Hill Experts Survey and we calculated an extremism score by 
subtracting the theoretical center of the scale. Additionally, a dummy for opposition party and 
Facebook was calculated.  
4.2.2 Findings 
To test the three hypotheses, we conducted analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) using the 
populism index as the dependent variable and for the purpose of multivariate validation, we 
tested the effects of all three independent variables on populist communication in a single 
OLS regression model. We find clear evidence that an extreme party position favors an 
increased use of populist communication on social media. Political actors placed on the left 
and right fringes of the party spectrum (both right- and left-wing extreme parties) draw on 
populist messages more often than centrist parties do. This result supports the first 
hypothesis. Our study further demonstrates – on the solid base of a six-country sample – that 
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opposition parties use greater amounts of populist communication on social media than 
government parties. This finding corroborates our second hypothesis and fits earlier findings 
that populist communication is mainly used to attack and discredit the political elite by 
simultaneously advocating for the people. The third important result of the study is the 
necessary differentiation between the two social media platforms and the conclusion that 
both extreme and opposition parties are particularly reliant on Facebook for their populist key 
messages. We can support our third hypothesis because Facebook seems to be the preferred 
channel for political actors to advocate for the people and blame or criticize elites. 
We further confirmed the results of ARTICLE I by showing that populism manifests itself in 
a fragmented form. The dimension of restoring sovereignty is almost absent, and the two core 
dimensions of populism hardly ever co-occur on social media. Despite the fragmented 
empirical manifestation of populism, we argue that our strategy for identifying the three core 
dimensions of populism is a fruitful approach. Additionally, we were able to identify some 
statements that included both dimensions in one statement. Moreover, 20% of our 
investigated politicians combine at least two dimensions across all of their messages, which 
means that at the politicians’ level, social media users are confronted with both dimensions.  
We concluded that this study adds to the current research on populist communication in 
the media by systematically investigating how politicians use populist key messages in their 
day-to-day social media communication.  
4.3 ARTICLE III: Bipolar populism? The use of anti-elitism and people-centrism by Swiss 
parties on social media 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the result that extreme parties use more populist 
communication in more detail and focus on the two dimensions of people-centrism and anti-
elitism in the exemplary case of Switzerland. After a brief comparative overview of parties 
from five Western democracies, we conducted an in-depth analysis of how five major Swiss 
parties use populist communication and whether they prefer people-centrism or anti-elitism 
in their messages on Facebook and Twitter. We built upon the arguments established in 
ARTICLE II that although politicians choose from a variety of communication channels, the new 
opportunities provided by social media are especially beneficial for populist communication.  
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4.3.1 Research design  
We conducted a statement-level quantitative content analysis of the Tweets and Facebook 
posts of 77 politicians from five European countries (CH, DE, FR, IT & UK) during a three-month 
period in 2015. For each country, we investigated the five largest parties in parliament across 
the left-right spectrum. In Switzerland, this included – from left to right – the Green Party 
(GPS), the Social Democrats (SP), the Christian Democrats (CVP), the Liberals (FDP) and the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP). Across all countries, we selected politicians for inclusion in our 
study according to two criteria: they either held a high position within government or their 
party (e.g., head of government or party leader) or had high resonance on social media 
(followers on Twitter) as of January 2015. For the final analysis, we considered only Tweets 
and Facebook posts by politicians that explicitly addressed an issue or social actor. This yielded 
1’220 social media statements, 217 of which were made by Swiss politicians. 
Behind the three dimensions of people-centrism, anti-elitism and demands for restoring 
sovereignty, we identified nine concrete populist key messages. When at least one of the nine 
key messages was evident in a social media post, we treated this occurrence as a 
manifestation of ‘populist communication’. To locate European parties and their politicians on 
the left-right scale, we relied on the classification system of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES). 
4.3.2 Findings 
To explore whether parties from either end of the political spectrum are more prone to 
using populist communication, we conducted linear and quadratic OLS regressions. We used 
the number of populist key messages on social media as the dependent variable and the CHES 
score for parties as the independent variable. Our findings show a clear U-curve pattern, 
illustrating that extreme parties use more populist key messages than center parties across 
the five countries. Switzerland represents an “exemplary case” in this regard, with 93 percent 
of Swiss parties’ political communication explained by this U-curved pattern. We can confirm 
that it is not only the commonly labeled populist SVP that uses populist key messages, but 
that the GPS and FDP also rely on populist communication. By analyzing the two major 
dimensions of populism separately, we also demonstrated that left-wing parties tend to 
emphasize people-centrist messages, whereas right-wing parties tend to emphasize anti-
elitist messages. It is noteworthy that the two dimensions invite different messages of political 
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communication: whereas the first is more advocative (‘pro’ people), the second is more 
conflictive in nature (‘against’ elites). 
We conclude that party extremism positively influences the overall amount of populist 
communication, especially in Switzerland. Our recommendation for future research is to 
include more extreme parties in studies of various countries. For Switzerland, it would be 
interesting to incorporate the communication behavior of far-left parties such as the 
Alternative List (AL) or Swiss Party of Labor (PdA), along with far-right parties, such as the 
Ticino League (LdT) or the Geneva Citizens’ Movement (MCG), to further support the validity 
of the U-curve pattern. 
4.4 ARTICLE IV: Populists prefer social media over talk shows. An analysis of populist 
messages and stylistic elements across six countries 
The fourth paper first aims to further develop the understanding of populist 
communication by identifying and systematizing populism-related communication styles in 
addition to populist key messages. Second, we highlight the importance of examining populist 
communication in multi-channel studies and investigating whether the channel characteristics 
of social media and political talk shows, along with party properties (extremist and challenger 
parties), influence the levels of populist communication.  
Focusing on political actors’ self-presentation and their communicative approaches, two 
main traditions in the literature can be identified, as populist communication has been defined 
as either an ideology or a communication style. We argue that these two traditions are not 
exclusive and following Kriesi (2018), Sorensen (2017) and Krämer (2017) we highlight the 
important issue that populist communication is a combination of key messages (content) and 
communication styles (form). In an intensive literature research, we identified seven common 
communication styles that have a high affinity with populism and test whether these styles 
form distinct dimensions (RQ1).  
In addition to these research questions, this paper formulates three hypotheses. First, we 
argue that both Facebook and Twitter have several opportunity structures that enhance the 
potential for populist communication. In particular the possibility of fully circumventing 
traditional gatekeepers and the full autonomy of speech and issue framing are considered 
beneficial aspects. Although talk shows present another ideal stage for populism, the positive 
advantages of social media prevail. Second, we built on previous results (ARTICLE II & III) and 
tested whether the effect of extreme parties is robust across the three communication 
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channels. In addition to extreme parties, we argue that challenger parties have a high affinity 
with populism because they are perceived to be a threat to the party establishment because 
they highlight problems that have been neglected by mainstream parties, mobilize outside of 
electoral channels, and resort to creative, innovative forms of protest communication. Thus, 
these parties may rely more on populist communication to improve their electoral chances 
and media visibility.  
4.4.1 Research design  
To test our hypotheses, we followed a three-step sampling procedure. First, we identified 
relevant countries. Second, we sampled the relevant political talk shows and listed all 
appearing politicians. Third, we collected the social media material of these politicians. We 
conducted a content analysis of social media and talk show statements (N = 2067) in six 
countries from 31 parties in six countries (CH, DE, FR, IT, UK, and US) during a three-month 
non-election period in 2015. The unit of analysis is a single statement made by a politician – 
who is considered a speaker – about a target actor or an issue. For each statement we coded 
whether a category of the newly identified seven populist communication styles and the key 
messages are present. Populist communication was considered a combination of messages 
and styles. If a statement included one of the six dimensions (e.g., people-centrism or 
sociability), populist communication was considered present. In addition to this combination, 
we tested the hypotheses for messages and styles in isolation. We assigned party extremism 
using CHES and coded parties founded after 1980 as challenger parties. Furthermore, a 
dummy for Facebook and Twitter (versus political talk shows) was calculated.  
4.4.2 Findings 
In the first step, we conducted a principal component factor analysis with the seven style 
elements and identified three distinct dimensions: Negativity is composed of negativism and 
crisis rhetoric, emotionality is composed of emotional tone, absolutism, and patriotism, and 
sociability is composed of colloquialism and intimization. We considered this finding an 
important empirical contribution to the literature on populist styles themselves, and it 
provided the basis for our further analyses. 
To test our three hypotheses in a second step, we conducted twelve multilevel models 
with maximum-likelihood estimation. All twelve multilevel models present clear support for 
the three postulated hypotheses. We demonstrated that populist communication (and styles 
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in isolation) by various political actors is higher on Facebook and Twitter than on political talk 
shows. For populist key messages, we only find a significant effect for Facebook. Key messages 
on Twitter, however, are not more common than in political talk shows. If the two social media 
platforms are compared, we can conclude that Facebook is the stronger predictor of populist 
communication and that political actors tend to prefer Facebook for their populist 
communication. We reinforce the argument described in ARTICLE III, i.e., that Facebook is more 
suitable for populist communication. We also find support for the hypotheses on party level 
and demonstrated that both challenger and extreme parties use more populist 
communication (messages and styles as well) when they communicate on Twitter, Facebook 
or talk shows.  
By comparing the three media channels, we corroborate that populist communication is 
indeed connected to Facebook and Twitter and that the advantages of social media in 
bypassing gatekeepers and disseminating messages without interference are beneficial to 
populist communication. These results provide the first empirical evidence for the theoretical 
assumption that online opportunity structures and populist communication logic interact. The 
findings demonstrate that while many commonly labeled populist parties are challenger and 
extreme parties at the same time, political parties holding only one of these properties also 
employ a high degree of populism on social media and talk shows. This result affirms our 
rationale that party extremism and challenger parties are two independent properties that 
are relevant explanatory factors for populist communication. 
We conclude that the integration of the two diverging perspectives on populist ideology 
and populist style is a fruitful and rewarding approach. We further established that social 
media is more useful for disseminating populist political communication than talk shows – 
contesting previous studies that identified the importance of talk shows.  
4.5 ARTICLE V: Favorable Opportunity Structures for Populist Communication: Comparing 
Different Types of Politicians and Issues in Social Media, Television and the Press 
The aim of the fifth and final paper was to explore favorable opportunity structures for 
populist communication identify which channel, issue and party types have a high affinity with 
populist content and style elements. With regard to channels we distinguished between those 
with high and those with low journalistic interference and compared populist communication 
on Facebook, Twitter, talk shows, and the news media. In addition to channel type, we 
identified political issues that have a high affinity with populism. Finally, we distinguished 
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between members of populist/non-populist parties on the one hand and 
backbenchers/frontbenchers on the other hand. We follow the argument established in 
ARTICLE IV and argue that in our understanding, the ideology of populism cannot be 
communicated without stylistic elements. Empirically, the core characteristics of populism 
manifest themselves in both content and form, in other words, as the co-occurrence of 
ideological expression and communication, which means that we expect political actors to 
express their populist ideology in the content of their statements while using style elements 
to emphasize further their overall points and themes. 
We identified four favorable opportunity structures for populism. First, following the 
theory of media interventionism, we expected that the lower the degree of journalistic 
interference in a channel, the greater the potential for unfiltered, unrestricted populism. We 
therefore argued that populist communication is highest in social media (channel without 
interference), followed by talk shows (channel with medium intervention) and news media 
(channel with heavy intervention). Second, the articulation of political issues with a high 
affinity with populism should foster the utilization of populist communication. We argued that 
five political issues – immigration, regionalism, corruption and crime, European integration, 
and economic hardship – are the most emphasized by populist actors, especially on social 
media. Finally, six hypotheses related to the populist affinity with certain parties and 
politicians were postulated. It is expected that members of populist parties tend to use more 
populism in their communication than non-populist politicians, especially when they 
communicate on Facebook or Twitter and about populist issues. Because political outsiders or 
backbenchers can use the anti-establishment dimension of populist communication 
particularly effectively and simultaneously establish a closeness to the people, backbenchers 
are expected to employ higher degrees of populist communication. Because they often 
employ a digital campaign strategy to spread their messages and break into the mainstream 
media and focus on issues with high news value, this should be especially pronounced on 
social media and when they discuss political issue that have an affinity with populism.  
4.5.1 Research design  
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a multi-national content analysis in six countries 
(CH, DE, FR, IT, UK, US) in 2015. We followed an individual matching approach on the actor 
level across several media channels. This sampling strategy required a four-step procedure: 
We 1) identified relevant countries, 2) sampled political talk shows and recorded all 
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statements of the appearing politicians, 3) downloaded the verified social media statements 
of the relevant politicians, and 4) collected all statements in the news media of the same 
politicians during the period of investigation. The unit of analysis is statements by the 103 
politicians included in the sample that address target actors or political issues. Key messages 
and style elements were dummy coded and the dependent variable – populist communication 
– was present if at least one of the nine populist key messages and one of seven populist 
communication styles co-occurred in the same statement. 14 political issues (on the basis of 
133 sub-issues) were coded and divided into populist and non-populist issues. For politicians, 
we distinguished between those who had a party affiliation with a commonly known populist 
party and recoded with they were holding a key position in government so that we could 
identify backbenchers and frontbenchers.   
4.5.2 Findings 
To test our nine hypotheses, we conducted analyses of variance (ANOVA) using the co-
occurrence of populist key messages and communication styles as the dependent variable.9 
We demonstrated that the amount of populist communication is dependent on the media 
channel. Contrary to expectations it is not only low journalistic interventions on social media 
that explain the high popularity of populist communication. The politicians of all six countries 
seem to have surprising success in getting their populist messages and styles into the 
newspapers and we reported even higher levels in the news media than on Facebook and 
Twitter. Additionally, we showed that the talk show bonus for populist communication no 
longer holds in digital and hybrid media systems. We prove that issues that have high affinity 
with populism contain much more populist communication than non-populist issues and that 
this is particularly evident in social media communication. We find clear evidence that 
members of populist parties indeed use more populist communication in their statements 
than non-populist actors. Even if mainstream parties sometimes resort to populist 
communication elements, commonly known populist actors combine populist messages and 
styles in every tenth statement, and they apply populist communication logic, especially on 
Facebook and Twitter. Additionally, journalists’ selection of populist communication is also 
more pronounced for populist actors. Backbenchers also tend to use more populist 
communication than politicians holding a key position, but only when they fully circumvent 
                                                          
9 We cross-validated our findings with a binary logistic regression model.  
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traditional gatekeepers by using social media. Thus being a member of a populist party is a 
much stronger predictor of the use of populist communication than being a backbencher. 
We concluded that populist communication is especially thriving in certain niche areas 
because populist actors resort more often to communication strategies and political issues 
that have a high affinity with populism contain higher levels of populist communication 
elements. We also provide evidence that populism depends on media channels and passes 
through the gates of traditional news media much more easily than when politicians use this 
communication logic themselves on social media or talk shows, where they can benefit from 
the autonomy of journalists’ selection processes. We conclude by presenting and discussing 
six explanations for this surprising finding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
44 
 
5. Conclusion and outlook 
In the final chapter of this synopsis, the major findings are summarized and classified. I will 
critically discuss the theoretical, methodological and practical implications of the results. To 
conclude, I will address limitations and discuss future research possibilities.  
5.1 Summary and classification of results 
The findings of this cumulative dissertation project contribute to international and 
intermedia populist communication research in several ways by setting out to explain two 
major unsolved aspects within the field. The first main goal was to theoretically and 
empirically define the concept of populist communication, which despite the exponential 
growth of populism research, has still not reached a full consensus. As the project proceeded 
over the years, the development and clarity of the dependent variable progressed with it. In 
line with established populism scholars, I conclude that the combination of Mudde’s (2004) 
ideology-centered and Hawkin’s (2010) discourse-centered definition of populism is 
remunerative and argue that populist communication is a combination of ideology and style. 
Whereas the ideological component is expressed in the content of a statement (what is being 
said), the stylistic elements refer to the form of the statement (how is something said). I am 
in line with Wodak (2015, p. 3), who argues that populist communication always “combines 
and integrates form and content”, which is supported by Kriesi (2018, p. 13), who states that 
“populist content and populist style tend to go together”. Moreover, de Vreese et al. (2018, 
p. 3) reinforce this understanding of populist communication by arguing that “the 
communicative tools used for spreading populist ideas are just as central as the populist ideas 
themselves”. I therefore take a communication-centered approach and consider populism as 
a communication phenomenon that is operationalized by three dimensions of the content 
(key messages) and three dimensions of the form (style elements). The advantage of this 
approach is the ability to empirically determine degrees of populist communication by various 
political actors across various media settings. By empirically operationalizing and investigating 
the utilization of both messages and styles by political actors, I go a step further than the 
theoretical discussion by the authors mentioned above and contribute both theoretically and 
empirically to the international populist communication research field. By providing a 
systematization and solution for the empirical operationalization of both populist messages 
and styles, the first part of research question 1 (RQ1: How can we define populist 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
45 
 
communication and how is it utilized by broad spectrum of political actors in different countries 
across various media channels?) is answered and not only enables the investigation of the 
other research questions, but also builds a solid foundation for future populist communication 
research. In particular, the systematic derivation and identification of populism-related 
communication styles and its empirical verification presents an added value of my on 
dissertation project in the context of the entire NCCR populism module. This independent and 
unique contribution enables the investigation of a more comprehensive understanding of 
populist communication.  
This brings me to the second main goal of this dissertation project, which was to clarify 
who expresses and to what extent political actors can spread  populism in their messages and 
more importantly, which context and niche aspects of channel, issue and party/politician 
types are fostering the spread of populist communication in a digital and hybrid media 
environment. For a summary and visual overview of the major key findings, please see Figure 
2.  
 
 
Figure 3: Visual summary of key results 
Note: Thickness and darkness indicate the influence of each independent variable for the utilization 
of populist communication.  
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First, I consider the type of media channel. This project strives to compare populist 
communication across various media channels and theoretically argue and empirically explain 
why certain degrees of populism are expected and documented. ARTICLES I-III demonstrate that 
social media channels such as Facebook and Twitter are especially lucrative and beneficial 
channels for populist communication. Political actors have adopted their communication 
strategies to the hybrid media system environment and one relatively successful 
communication strategy is the utilization of both populist messages and styles on social media 
channels. The online opportunity structures offered by digital social media platforms to 
political actors provide new possibilities for a direct, unmediated and interactive 
communication with followers and voters. These and other aspects are crucial for the 
explanation of why populist communication and social media networks form a close and 
successful relationship. In the digital and hybrid media environment, political actors can no 
longer completely omit the influences of digital media, and especially in election campaigns 
and at critical times, political actors need to incorporate new digital media channels into their 
communication portfolio. This concept is in line with the fact that audiences – especially 
younger generations – are continuing to shift away from mainstream outlets toward new 
digital and social media channels, where parties avoiding the traditional news media are more 
visible (Fisher et al., 2018; Schroeder, 2017). By comparing Facebook and Twitter, both ARTICLE 
II and ARTICLES IV and V established that the four characteristics of the social network channel 
Facebook (compared to Twitter) are especially favorable to the spread of populist 
communication, in all six investigated countries. It seems that when political actors want to 
achieve their full populism potential, the channel of choice is Facebook. There they can reach 
their like-minded followers, who are usually ordinary citizens, whereas on Twitter the user 
base is more differentiated and mostly used by professionals or highly educated citizens.  
The comparison of social media with political talk shows in ARTICLE IV and the news media 
in ARTICLE V demonstrates that we can no longer confirm the bonus for populist 
communication that has long been attributed to talk shows (e.g., Bos & Brants, 2014; 
Cranmer, 2011). With the exception of US and British talk shows, political actors are more 
likely to obtain the possibility to articulate populist messages and use populist styles in media 
channels with medium journalistic intervention. Nor does the present audience of talk shows 
or direct exchange with other media or political actors foster the use of populist 
communication. The talk show setting and the round table discussion format might hinder 
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political actors from making straightforward and bold announcements. In the digital age and 
compared to other media channels, talk shows are no longer the best stage from which to 
spread populist communication. Political actors instead prefer either social media channels or 
news media for their populist communication.  
This brings us to the most surprising and unexpected finding with regard to the comparison 
of types of media channels. As established in ARTICLE V, political actors have achieved great 
success in entering the news media with their populist statements. Contrary to our theoretical 
assumptions, news media are willing to include populist actors, their issues and their 
communication repertoires in their news reporting. How can it be explained that the 
supposedly interventionist news media contains such high degrees of populism statements by 
political actors? First, populist issues and populist actors meet the selection criteria of 
traditional news media because their often controversial, emotion-evoking, dubious, and 
polarizing messages that contain per se high news values (Mazzoleni, 2008). Second, populist 
actors often take extreme positions on hotly debated issues for which they claim issue 
ownership and problem-solving competence (e.g., the migration crisis) which results in high 
news values and media actors even feeling obligated to report about them for reasons of 
balance (Esser et al., 2017).  Third, journalists pay very close attention to what populist 
politicians argue on other media channels – especially on social media – and incorporate those 
arguments into their newspaper articles (Rogstad, 2016). Fourth, populist politicians do not 
use social media solely “to bypass” traditional news media but above all “to influence” the 
news media agenda with their posts and tweets – as Trump exemplified in the 2016 
presidential election campaign (Chadwick, 2017, p. 263). This influence is even more fertile 
the more an individual Tweet by a political actor is successful in the network and receives 
many retweets  (Wells et al., 2016). Fifth, the news media may only report about populist 
politicians and their messages to criticize and deconstruct them. My own qualitative 
observation of the news article in ARTICLE V supports Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, and Wirth’s 
(2018a) conclusion that most news outlets actively oppose populist actors by negatively 
evaluating or challenging them. Finally, populism is a buzzword and a highly debated issues 
across all international media outlets. Populist parties are successful in winning elections: their 
issues are fueled by financial, migration or transnational crises and cannot simply be ignored 
by media actors, who must fulfill their professional role as an information provider. To 
conclude and answer the second research question (RQ2), although social media channels – 
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especially Facebook – provide several favorable opportunity structures for populist 
communication, statements in the news media still contain the highest degrees of populism.  
Second, types of party/politician were investigated. The aim in regard to party and 
politician properties was to theoretically identify the characteristics of political actors that 
have a high affinity with populist communication and empirically test whether political actors 
who have these attributes ascribed employ populist communication to a higher degree. I 
demonstrated that members of extremist (tested in Articles II-IV), opposition (ARTICLE II), 
challenger (ARTICLE IV) and populist parties (ARTICLE V), as expected, utilize higher levels of 
populist communication. On the individual level, politicians with a backbencher role tend to 
use more populism than frontrunners holding a key position in government or their own party 
(ARTICLE V). I found strong support for all five properties across all investigated countries. One 
exception is that of Italian and French extremist parties, as we identified a linear increase of 
populist communication from left to right-wing parties in Southern Europe. I speculate that 
the low degrees of populism by extreme left-wing parties is influenced by the disillusionment 
of Italian and French left-wing parties since the 1960s. If the five party components are 
compared, the data show that being a member of a populist party along with having a 
challenger and/or opposition status, is especially likely to result in widespread populist 
communication. Party extremism (at least in Southern Europe) is not as influential for the 
usage of populist communication. The ultimate effect of backbenchers is rather limited, which 
could be mainly explained by our data sampling strategy for ARTICLES IV and V, which started 
with politicians appearing in political talk shows. Nevertheless, I find clear support for the 
proposition that all political actors incorporated one or more of the properties proposed in 
the third research question (RQ3), resulting in a higher utilization of populist communication 
compared to other mainstream, moderate, governing, established, non-populist, and/or 
influential party members.  
Finally, I consider the type of issue. In the literature and global media agenda, populist 
actors are often strongly associated with certain specific political policies or issues. The main 
goal of the fourth research question (RQ4) therefore was to theoretically identify political 
issues that have a high affinity with populism and empirically test whether populist issues 
contain more populist communication elements in its elaboration than non-populist issues. In 
ARTICLE V, I find strong support for this assumption across all investigated media channels and 
included countries. If international political actors discuss one of the five issues with a high 
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connection to populism – immigration, regionalism, corruption and crime, European 
integration, and economic hardship – the degree of populism in these statements is 
comparatively much higher. These five political topics not only have a theoretical relation to 
populism but also are typical issues that are “owned” by populist actors. Having issue 
ownership over a political policy allows parties to focus and build their campaigns on these 
issues, consciously ignoring other political topics (Petrocik, 1996). The greater the media 
attention to owned issues, the more successful the party is in the election and its vote 
maximizing strategy (Thesen, Green-Pedersen, & Mortensen, 2017). Populist actors may 
deliberately mobilize these populist issues, fueling them with populist messages and styles to 
be effective in their communication strategy. Because several political issues, such as 
migration or Euroscepticism, are occupied by populist actors and follow a clear narrative, 
other mainstream political actors may even argue in a similar vein when addressing these 
specific populist affine issues.  To conclude and answer research question four (RQ4), 
discussing political issues that resonate well with populism indeed results in a higher populist 
communication compared to the mobilization of political topics, such as welfare or education.  
To summarize the findings, I have demonstrated that all variables that have a high affinity 
with populism on all three investigates types resulted in a higher usage of both populist key 
messages and populist style elements. This result leads to the overall conclusion, that certain 
political issues, specific party properties and channel characteristics provide excellent 
opportunity structures for populism. However, these different types are not isolated from one 
another. Crucial for explaining the spread of populism is the fact that multiple conditions on 
all levels and various opportunity structures must be jointly and simultaneously observed. 
ARTICLE V in particular demonstrated that a high spread of populist communication depends 
on the interaction effect of influential and populism affine factors. For example, populist 
communication on Facebook is especially relevant when talking about a political issue that has 
an affinity with populism or members of populist parties. In contrast backbenchers employ a 
different digital strategy and turn to Twitter to spread their populist messages. The first step 
of this dissertation identified several crucial factors at three different context levels that 
explain the rise of populist communication in the media. Populist communication in single 
speech acts or statement is a fragmented phenomenon and only the entire communication 
strategy of an individual actor shows a more complete picture. Moreover, the combination of 
certain niche aspects is particularly likely to allow populist communication to display its full 
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potential. The combination of talking about issues with an affinity for populism on Facebook 
or following a backbencher on Twitter may explain why populism is omnipresent in news 
coverage. These might be exactly the posts and tweets that one remembers and thinks about 
when discussing the potential of populist communication and its omnipresence in the media.  
5.2 Theoretical, methodological and practical implications 
The above-discussed key findings have implications that I would like to address. Starting 
with the theoretical findings, I stress four crucial points. First, I provide the definition and 
empirical operationalization of populist communication as a co-occurrence of both messages 
and styles in a clear progression of populism research from a communication science 
perspective. By jointly analyzing two of the core concepts and traditions of populism 
combined, I provide an excellent measurement for grasping the phenomenon holistically. In 
particular, the actor and media perspective taken by this project allows us to compare 
different degrees of populist communication. I believe that this approach is much more fruitful 
and effective than analyzing populism as a binary concept or only focusing on one strain of 
the two-folded concept. A politician, a party or a media actor is not just populist or not populist 
– he/she is more or less populist in communication, which is a matter of degree, depending 
on various relevant factors. Second, incorporating Mudde’s (2004) argument of a populist 
Zeitgeist, the definition and measurement of populist communication as I promote it 
demonstrate that populism is not a black-and-white phenomenon, and many gray layers lie 
between it. My project proves that it is not only commonly known and labeled populist actors 
who use the successful populist communication strategy. To some extent, each and every 
political actor in our studies utilized some populist communication elements. As ARTICLE III has 
demonstrated focus some more on the advocative aspects of populism (in this case left-wing 
Swiss parties) others (right-wing Swiss parties) incorporate the conflictive, anti-elitism 
aspects. Independent of how messages and styles are combined, I agree with Mudde (2004) 
and argue that in the digital media and politic landscape, a populist Zeitgeist does still exist 
and displays itself in the communication strategies of all political actors. A third theoretical 
implication is the surprising result that populist communication is not only highly relevant and 
prevalent in social media communication: professional journalists also include these 
statements and issues in their day-to-day news coverage. I have already discussed some 
explanations for this phenomenon. Crucial in my view is how populist content and form are 
moderated by journalists and embedded in news articles. We know from our own data and 
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from Wettstein et al. (2018a) that populist statements are often critically contested by media 
or political actors. Even if the main goal of populist actors is to receive any news coverage 
according to the principle “there is no such thing as bad publicity”, journalists have the 
opportunity to classify, critically discuss, challenge and moderate populism in their news 
coverage. Of course, this could backfire and play into the hands of populist actors, who take 
every opportunity to blame the corrupt, dishonest, and fake news producing press for bad 
coverage. Trump has mastered this playbook, and several direct attacks on the media can be 
found in his Twitter feed. Even if the critical evaluation of populism in the news media poses 
a risk, it is important to have a control mechanism and to prevent news coverage from 
reaching the public unfiltered and uncommented. On social media this critical classification by 
media actors does not occur. On the contrary, research has even demonstrated that populist 
messages spread on social media result in higher popularity cues (Bobba, 2018), which means 
that if political actors use elements of populism in their Facebook and Twitter statements, 
they are more likely to receive likes, shares, or retweets. Higher popularity indicators of 
statements in turn influence how the statements are processed by algorithms and open the 
content of the Facebook post or tweet to a much wider audience. By liking, sharing or 
retweeting, the network of a political actors is enlarged and enables him not only to reach his 
own followers (primary audience) but also spread his messages to a secondary audience 
(Jacobs & Spierings, 2016; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015). A high level of response within the 
primary audience thus increases the chance that user groups from remote user communities 
(secondary audience) will also see the statement and (at best) even react to it. During election 
campaigns, this approach via the primary audience to the secondary audience offers political 
actors a promising option to reach not only their own voter base but also (and above all) to 
reach a new potential electorate indirectly via recommendations from their social media 
network (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). If populism fosters this process by pushing the popularity 
indicators and widening the secondary audience potential, populist online communication is 
not without its risks. This brings me to my final theoretical implication and the question of 
whether social media is a catalyst for populist communication. As we have seen, populist 
communication and social media channels are closely linked and the opportunity structures 
of Twitter and Facebook can be beneficial for the spread of populist statements. As my 
research has shown, social media are not the only media promoting populism and in my 
opinion, social media channels are merely an additional tool or media channel that political 
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actors can use to communicate. Surely Twitter, Facebook and other digital media have 
systematically and fundamentally changed the media landscape. Political systems and political 
actors can no longer neglect them. However, I would not go so far as to argue that social media 
are the only reason for the current rise and success of populist actors around the globe. I 
would instead argue that social media channels offer a great potential and if used 
professionally and correctly, can make a huge difference in a politician’s campaign strategy. 
Former US president Barack Obama, Donald Trump or the Spanish movement Podemos are 
three examples that have used social media channels very successfully in their election 
campaigns and have fully exploited the opportunities and potentials of new digital media 
channels. One clear advantage of social media channels is the possibility to test and scale new 
communication efforts or strategies effectively and in a timely manner. Networks’ reactions 
may be used as a proxy for public opinion and allow politicians to contrast and test different 
campaign strategies, slogans or general communication efforts against each other to identify 
the most successful ones. However, social media are still just a communication tool and may 
only be influential within the right combination of communication strategies, including various 
communication channels. To summarize the potential of social media, I would argue that 
mainstream media still set the agenda, but social media can surely be vehicles to influence 
them in crucial aspects (e.g., Schroeder, 2017).  
In addition to theoretical implications, I highlight certain methodological aspects. The 
measurement of populist communication presented by the entire NCCR populism project is 
an important contribution to the field of populist communication research. Along with the 
established measurement of populism as an ideology with three dimensions (people-
centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring sovereignty), my project identified and systematized style 
elements used by political actors that have a high affinity with populist communication. In 
ARTICLE IV, I theoretically argue why the seven identified communication styles have an affinity 
with populism, systematizing them along three dimensions (negativity, emotionality, and 
sociability) and show in the multilevel analysis that messages and styles tend to go together. 
By analyzing the combination and co-occurrence of both messages and styles, populist 
communication by political actors can be entirely investigated and help us to fully understand 
the rise and omnipresence of populism in the media. As a second methodological implication, 
I highlight the importance of multi-channel studies within the field of political communication 
in general and especially in populist communication research. By comparing four intensively 
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used channels by politicians, I was able to demonstrate the importance of traditional news 
channels in the spread of populist communication. Without investigating single channels in 
isolation, this comparison and important finding could not have been detected. Finally, I argue 
that a multi-actor approach is extremely useful, as we have seen that it is not only alleged 
populists or right-wing actors who utilize populist communication elements in their messages. 
By neglecting moderate, mainstream and governing parties, the actual degree of populist 
communication in comparison to heavy users could not be analyzed. Furthermore, this 
approach allowed me to find evidence of a populist Zeitgeist by including actors from across 
the political spectrum and demonstrating that all of them use some degree of populist 
communication.  
The overall findings also have practical implications. Populist communication is used by all 
political actors and appears in all media channels to a certain degree. Some actors are 
extremely successful with their populist communication strategy: they receive a great deal of 
attention, set the agenda and highlight issues, win votes, and play a major role within their 
media and political systems. From the viewpoint of individual political actors, it could make 
sense to jump on the bandwagon of success and implement populism in their communication 
portfolio. If the implementation of a populist communication strategy is worthwhile for every 
political actor however is an empirical question that is not investigated within this dissertation 
project. Nevertheless, the effects of populist communication on citizens should be 
investigated further. From the audience perspective, the results indicate that we all encounter 
populist communication regardless of which media we consume. The principle that citizens 
first and foremost should consume news and be informed is important. However, as the dose 
of populist communication they receive relates to their media preferences, they should be 
aware of their media diet, consume different media and channel types at the same time and 
above all be critical news media consumers. A balanced mixture of both traditional and digital 
media could help citizens to be well-informed and base their democratic decisions on a 
profound and solid basis. As populism itself is both a threat and corrective for democracies, it 
is normatively not a dangerous or alarming result, that we find populist communication to be 
present in the media or circulated by all political actors from time to time. Nevertheless, the 
findings should attract the attention of legislators and governments. Important aspects might 
be the strengthening of media literacy from early on in the education sector. Especially 
younger citizens, whose media diet is predominantly digital orientated, might be affected by 
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critical, anti-elitist and exclusionist populist communication and an early education in a 
conscientious media use might attenuate the influence of populist sentiments and promote a 
critical and responsible media consumption. Another crucial aspect could be the promotion 
of (press) subsidies to ensure media diversity in a country. As especially professional news 
media are able to embed, critically reflect and classify political statements, the maintenance 
of these high-quality media channels could be beneficial for both well-informed citizens and 
well-functioning democracies. A third strategy legislators might consider are investments in 
data protection and fact checking services. An independent and reliable organization 
providing a classification of digital uncontrolled and unfiltered spread statements and news 
might enable citizens to inform themselves about current political processes and allow them 
to form their own opinion based on trustworthy information services.  
5.3  Limitations and future research  
Although this dissertation project contributed in several aspects to the field of populist 
communication research, the studies embedded are not without their limitations. First to 
compare communications by individual political actors across different media channels, a 
complicated sampling procedure with individual matching on the micro level was established 
in ARTICLES IV-V, starting with the appearance of political actors on political talk shows and 
analyzing the news and social media statements of these politicians. This procedure ensured 
the comparability of communication on all channel types and thus avoided ecological fallacies. 
This sampling strategy strength at the same time resulted in a skewed sample, as populist 
actors and especially backbenchers were underrepresented because politicians who do not 
hold a key position or do not generally receive a large amount of media attention are not 
invited to be guests on political talk shows. Moreover, social media affine political actors who 
willingly circumvent traditional news media, might not even accept talk show invitations and 
focus exclusively on their Facebook or Twitter communication are excluded. This limitation on 
the actor level is further complemented by a rather limited sample size of included countries, 
parties, or communication channels. Time periods are another limitation, as only routine time 
without any national elections were investigated in all five studies. The investigation of 
election times in which political actors fight even more about the media and citizens’ attention 
to win or maximize votes could provide further insights, as populist communication could be 
different and even more pronounced during election campaigns. In particular, both debates 
and discussions on talk shows and social media could be enriched and loaded with more 
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populist communication elements. A third limitation concerns the restriction on two political 
issues – labor market and migration – in news media content. This limitation could not only 
partially explain the higher occurrence of populist communication in newspapers but also 
challenges comparability with other communication channels. A wider news media sample in 
terms of political issues or the same restriction of issues across all channels could have 
prevented that problem. A fourth limitation is the fact that only written statements by 
politicians were included in the social and news media analysis. Including posted links or 
retweets, and especially analyzing pictures or videos, would complement the picture of the 
degree of populist messages and styles across media channels. In particular visual elements 
of populist communication, such as outfits, gestures and facial expressions or charisma, could 
be more closely analyzed in a project, including (audio-) visual material. The single analysis of 
politicians’ (direct and indirect) statements must be considered as another limitation. We 
know little about how these statements are integrated into the news media and if they are 
neutrally transmitted, negatively evaluated, challenged, or attenuated or even amplified by 
other media or political actors. Moreover, I did not test the effects of these statements on 
citizens by analyzing, for example, their reactions in the form of popularity cues on social 
media or their second-screen behavior by analyzing specific hashtags relating to talk show 
episodes. I further neglected comment sections and reactions in the news media, which leads 
to the final limitation of my dissertation: my studies are restricted to content analysis 
methods. Multi-method research and especially a combination with survey-based methods, 
such as interviews with journalists, campaign managers, communication strategist or citizens, 
could widen our understanding of the effects, aims and motives of populist communication 
by political actors in the media.  Overall, the findings represent a specific sample and any 
generalization must be drawn carefully.  
Despite these shortcomings, I am convinced that this dissertation makes an important 
contribution to the relatively undeveloped field of comparative populist communication 
research. Hopefully, it will help inform our understanding of the developments and trends in 
populist communication across news media and political systems, communication channels 
types, political actors and may provide a point of reference for researchers seeking to 
investigate additional aspects of populist communication.   
This brings me to recommendations for future research endeavors. Let me start with a 
quote by de Vreese et al. (2018, p. 11):  “As populism, for better and worse, is thriving (with 
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an increase on both the political supply and demand side), research on populism is also likely 
to thrive”. I could not agree more with this quote and believe that populist communication 
will play a major role in both political and communication science in the future. In the subfield 
of populist communication in which my dissertation is located, my work deals with the 
comparative analysis of populist communication by political actors in the media. Within this 
specific area at least seven future research projects are desirable. First, I highlight the 
importance of multi-channel studies in a comparative setting. One can only identify specific 
communication strategies by political actors by comparing their entire communication plan. 
Especially within populist communication, media channels matter and should be broadly 
included. In addition to talk shows, news media and social media, studies should include 
channels that are more in control of political actors and analyze and compare political party 
broadcasts, campaign posters, party websites, political speeches and press releases. At the 
same time, media over which political actors have less control, such as TV newscasts, satire 
programs, late night shows or online news media play a crucial role and should therefore be 
integrated into future research projects. Additionally, digital media possibilities, such as blogs, 
search engines or other social media networks like YouTube, Instagram or Snapchat, should 
be part of future research projects. It would be interesting to investigate, how internet specific 
phenomenon’s like memes, hashtags or shitstorms relate to populist communication, how 
political actors use them and what effect the have on citizens. Memes for example could be 
especially important for populist communication, as they allow the criticism of elites in a 
humorous way and have to potential to go viral. One example would be the wrestling meme 
showing Trump beating up CNN. Additionally, an investigation of politicians and political 
parties’ YouTube channels could provide interesting insight into the use of populist 
communication in audio-visual channels that are fully controlled by political actors. Second, 
the potential of explanation factors on the individual level of actors has not been exhausted. 
It would be interesting to investigate how, for example, the online affinity of political actors 
in terms of their multiple and intensive digital media use influences their degree of populist 
communication. One could expect that the more online affinity a politician has, the more 
platforms he uses and the wider his digital network, the more familiar he will be with 
successful online communication strategies and the more he will utilize populism in his 
communication. Additional socioeconomic variables, such as age, gender and education, could 
be worth analyzing. Third, populist communication research focuses on either Western 
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democracies or Latin American countries. I call for studies to go beyond the usual suspects, to 
go beyond the West and to include political actors from Eastern or Southern Europe, Asia or 
Africa. A large comparative study in term of the scope of included countries could provide 
essential insight into how different media and political systems foster or hinder populist 
communication in the media and compare different modes of operation. A fourth potential 
research project could implement the comparison of different communication cycles. We 
know that political communication is different in election vs. routine time periods. It is 
therefore surprising that populism research always focuses on a single special time period. 
The comparison of communication practices by political actors within both periods could be 
extremely fruitful. I would expect that degrees of populist communication vary between these 
two periods and that populism is especially prevalent during elections. A fifth research gap 
concerns political issues. In addition to categorizing political issues as populist and non-
populist, research should provide a deeper investigation of which political issues are often 
loaded with populist communication elements. Do other political issues than those 
theoretically linked to populism have a high affinity with these communication practices, and 
how do commonly known populism affine issues differ from one another in their degree of 
populist communication? It would also be interesting to compare different issue agendas and, 
for example, to investigate whether crises (e.g., migration or financial crises) are a fertile 
ground for populist communication to flourish. Sixth, the effect and influence that populist 
communication by political actors has on citizens, journalist or other political actors is 
essential. This investigation could be performed via content analysis research, by investigating 
citizens’ comments after news articles or their social media reactions (popularity cues) to 
populist statements. One could also determine how media actors address embedded populist 
statements more carefully and determine how often Facebook posts or tweets by political 
actors are implemented or even are the triggers for news media articles. Research in this area 
could further shed light on the questions of which type, of Facebook and Twitter statements 
end up in the media and their relation to populism. One could expect that tweets or posts that 
are successful in terms of likes, shares and comments and receive high attention could be 
deliberately chosen by media actors for inclusion in their news articles. Because the business 
models of digital news media have changed and they must increasingly rely on clicks and high 
consumer traction, it could be lucrative for media actors to incorporate successful social media 
statements into their news articles in the hope of similar user reactions. Furthermore, 
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statements that receive many social media reactions might be exactly those that include 
populist communication messages and styles. As a final proposal, I call for multiple method 
studies combining content analysis, document analysis, survey and/or experimental data. This 
multi-method combination would allow for a combined analysis of coherent research 
questions and would bring populist communication research an important step closer to 
describe the entire phenomenon. I hope and believe that the findings and contributions of my 
dissertation will serve as a solid foundation for future research in the field of populist 
communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
59 
 
6. References 
Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Reinemann, C., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. (Eds.). (2017). Populist 
Political Communication in Europe. New York: Routledge. 
Abts, K., & Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus Democracy. Political Studies, 55(2), 405–
424. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00657.x   
Akkerman, A., Mudde, C., & Zaslove, A. (2013). How Populist Are the People? Measuring 
Populist Attitudes in Voters. Comparative Political Studies, 47(9), 1324–1353. 
doi:10.1177/0010414013512600   
Akkerman, T. (2003). Populism and Democracy: Challenge or Pathology? Acta Politica, 38(2), 
147–159. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500021   
Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain and 
the Netherlands. Journalism, 12(8), 931–945. doi:10.1177/1464884911415972   
Akkerman, T., Lange, S. L. d., & Rooduijn, M. (2016). Radical right-wing populist parties in 
Western Europe: Into the mainstream? Extremism and Democracy. New York: Routledge. 
Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (Eds.). (2008). Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of 
Western European democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Aslanidis, P. (2015). Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective. Political 
Studies, 64(1), 88–104. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12224   
Arzheimer, K., & Carter, E. (2006). Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist 
party success. European Journal of Political Research, 45(3), 419–443. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.x 
Baldwin-Philippi, J. (2015). Using technology, building democracy: Digital campaigning and 
the construction of citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel, A., Luther, K. R., & Sitter, N. (2010). If You Can't Beat 
Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the 
Populist Radical Right in Western Europe. Political Studies, 58(3), 410–426. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00783.x   
Bale, T., van Kessel, S., & Taggart, P. (2011). Thrown around with abandon? Popular 
understandings of populism as conveyed by the print media: a UK case study. Acta 
Politica, 46(2), 111–131. 
Bartlett, J. (2014). Populism, social media and democratic strain. In G. Lodge & G. Gottfried 
(Eds.), Democracy in Britain: Essays in honour of James Cornford (pp. 91–96). London: 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Baym, G. (2013). Political Media as Discursive Modes: A Comparative Analysis of Interviews 
with Ron Paul from Meet the Press, Tonight, The Daily Show, and Hannity. International 
Journal of Communication, 7, 489–507. 
Berclaz, J., & Giugni, M. (2016). Specifying the concept of political opportunity structures. In 
M. Kousis & C. Tilly (Eds.), Economic and political contention in comparative perspective 
(pp. 15–32). London: Routledge. 
Bernhard, L. (2017). Three Faces of Populism in Current Switzerland: Comparing the Populist 
Communication of the Swiss People's Party, the Ticino League, and the Geneva Citizens’ 
Movement. Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 509–525. doi:10.1111/spsr.12279   
Betz, H.-G. (2002). Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing 
Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracies 
and the populist challenge, pp. 197–213. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
REFERENCES 
60 
 
Bimber, B. (1998). The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community, and 
Accelerated Pluralism. Polity, 31, 133–160. https://doi.org/10.2307/3235370 
Blank, G., & Lutz, C. (2017). Representativeness of Social Media in Great Britain: Investigating 
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Pinterest, Google+, and Instagram. American Behavioral 
Scientist, 61(7), 741–756. doi:10.1177/0002764217717559   
Blassnig, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2018). Populism in Online Election 
Coverage. Journalism Studies, 1–20. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2018.1487802   
Blumler, J. G. (2013). The Fourth Age of Political Communication. Workshop on Political 
Communication Online, the Free University of Berlin. Retrieved from 
http://www.fgpk.de/en/2013/gastbeitrag-von-jay-g-blumler-the-fourth-age-of-political-
communication-2/  
Block, E., & Negrine, R. (2017). The Populist Communication Style: Toward a Critical 
Framework. International Journal of Communication, 11, 178–197. 
Bobba, G. (2018). Social media populism: features and ‘likeability’ of Lega Nord 
communication on Facebook. European Political Science, 1-13. doi:10.1057/s41304-017-
0141-8   
Bobba, G., Cremonesi, C., Mancosu, M., & Seddone, A. (2018). Populism and the Gender 
Gap: Comparing Digital Engagement with Populist and Non-populist Facebook Pages in 
France, Italy, and Spain. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 1-18. 
doi:10.1177/1940161218787046   
Bobba, G., & McDonnell, D. (2016). Different Types of Right-Wing Populist Discourse in 
Government and Opposition: The Case of Italy. South European Society and Politics, 21(3), 
281–299. doi:10.1080/13608746.2016.1211239   
Bode, L., & Vraga, E. K. (2017). Studying Politics Across Media. Political Communication, 9(2), 
1–7. doi:10.1080/10584609.2017.1334730   
Bos, L., & Brants, K. (2014). Populist rhetoric in politics and media: A longitudinal study of the 
Netherlands. European Journal of Communication, 29(6), 703–719. 
doi:10.1177/0267323114545709   
Bos, L., van der Brug, W., & de Vreese, C. H. (2011). How the Media Shape Perceptions of 
Right-Wing Populist Leaders. Political Communication, 28(2), 182–206. 
doi:10.1080/10584609.2011.564605   
Boukes, M., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2016). Politician Seeking Voter: How Interviews on 
Entertainment Talk Shows Affect Trust in Politicians. International Journal of 
Communication, 10, 1145–1166. 
Bracciale, R., & Martella, A. (2017). Define the populist political communication style: The 
case of Italian political leaders on Twitter. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 
1310–1329. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328522   
Caiani, M., & Della Porta, D. (2011). The elitist populism of the extreme right: A frame 
analysis of extreme right-wing discourses in Italy and Germany. Acta Politica, 46(2), 180–
202. doi:10.1057/ap.2010.28   
Canovan, M. (1982). Two Strategies for the Study of Populism. Political Studies, 30(4), 544–
552. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1982.tb00559.x   
Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political 
Studies, 47(1), 2–16. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00184   
Chadwick, A. (2017). The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power (second edition). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
REFERENCES 
61 
 
Cranmer, M. (2011). Populist Communication and Publicity: An Empirical Study of Contextual 
Differences in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review, 17(3), 286–307. 
doi:10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02019.x   
Davis, A. (2009). Journalist-source relations, mediated reflexivity and the politics of politics. 
Journalism Studies, 10(2), 204–219. doi:10.1080/14616700802580540   
Davis, A. (2010). New media and fat democracy: The paradox of online participation1. New 
Media & Society, 12(5), 745–761. doi:10.1177/1461444809341435   
de Vreese, C. H. Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Reinemann, C., & Stanyer, J. (2018). Populism as an 
Expression of Political Communication Content and Style: A New Perspective. The 
International Journal of Press/Politics, 1-16. doi:10.1177/1940161218790035   
Denton, R. E. (1998). The 1996 presidential campaign. A communication perspective. 
Westport: Praeger. 
Diamantopoulos, A., Riefler, P., & Roth, K. P. (2008). Advancing formative measurement 
models. Journal of Business Research, 61(12), 1203–1218. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2008.01.009   
Eisinger, P. K. (1973). The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities. American 
Political Science Review, 67(01), 11–28. 
Elmelund-Præstekær, C. (2011). Mapping Parties’ Issue Agenda in Different Channels of 
Campaign Communication: A Wild Goose Chase? Javnost - The Public, 18(1), 37–51. 
doi:10.1080/13183222.2011.11009050   
Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Populism and social media: how 
politicians spread a fragmented ideology. Information, Communication & Society, 20(8), 
1109–1126. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697   
Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., & Larsson, A. O. (2017). Populist online communication: Introduction 
to the special issue. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1279–1292. 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525   
Enli, G., & Rosenberg, L. T. (2018). Trust in the Age of Social Media: Populist Politicians Seem 
More Authentic. Social Media + Society, 4(1), 1-11. doi:10.1177/2056305118764430   
Enli, G., & Simonsen, C.-A. (2017). ‘Social media logic’ meets professional norms: Twitter 
hashtags usage by journalists and politicians. Information, Communication & Society, 
21(8), 1081–1096. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1301515   
Entman, R. M. (2003). Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11. 
Political Communication, 20(4), 415–432. doi:10.1080/10584600390244176   
Epstein, B. (2018). The only constant is change: Technology, political communication, and 
innovation over time. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Ernst, N., Blassnig, S., Büchel, F., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2019). Populists prefer social media 
over talk shows. An analysis of populist messages and stylistic elements across six 
countries. Social Media + Society, 1–14. 
Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Extreme parties and 
populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries. Information, 
Communication & Society, 20(9), 1347–1364. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1329333   
Ernst, N., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Bipolar Populism? The Use of Anti-Elitism and 
People-Centrism by Swiss Parties on Social Media. Swiss Political Science Review, 23(3), 
253–261. doi:10.1111/spsr.12264   
Ernst, N., Esser, F., Blassnig, S., & Engesser, S. (2019). Favorable Opportunity Structures for 
Populist Communication: Comparing Different Types of Politicians and Issues in Social 
Media, Television and the Press. International Journal of press/politics 24(2), 165–188. 
doi:10.1177/1940161218819430 
REFERENCES 
62 
 
Esser, F. (2008). Dimensions of Political News Cultures: Sound Bite and Image Bite News in 
France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 13(4), 401–428. doi:10.1177/1940161208323691   
Esser, F., Stępińska, A., & Hopmann, D. N. (2017). Populism and the Media: Cross-National 
Findings and Perspectives. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. de 
Vreese (Eds.), Populist Political Communication in Europe (pp. 365–380). New York: 
Routledge. 
Esser, F., & Strömbäck, J. (2014). A paradigm in the making: Lessons for the future of 
mediatization research. In F. Esser & J. Strömbäck (Eds.), Mediatization of 
Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies (pp. 223–242). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Esser, F., & Strömbäck, J. (Eds.). (2014). Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the 
Transformation of Western Democracies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Ferree, M. M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (2002). Shaping abortion discourse: 
Democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Fisher, C., Marshall, D., & McCallum, K. (2018). Bypassing the press gallery: From Howard to 
Hanson. Media International Australia, 167(1), 57–70. doi:10.1177/1329878X18766077   
Gainous, J., & Wagner, K. M. (2014). Tweeting to power: The social media revolution in 
American politics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gamson, W. A., & Meyer, D. S. (1996). Framing political opportunity. In D. McAdam, J. D. 
McCarthy, & M. N. Zald (Eds.), Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings (pp. 275–290). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gans, H. J. (1979). Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, 
Newsweek, and Time. New York: Pantheon. 
Gerbaudo, P. (2015). Populism 2.0. In D. Trottier & C. Fuchs (Eds.), Social media, politics and 
the state. Protests, revolutions, riots, crime and policing in the age of Facebook, Twitter 
and YouTube (Vol. 16, pp. 16–67). New York: Routledge. 
Gerbaudo, P. (2018). Social media and populism: An elective affinity? Media, Culture & 
Society, 40(5), 745–753. doi:10.1177/0163443718772192   
Giugni, M. (2011). Political opportunity: still a useful concept? In M. P. Hanagan, & C. Tilly 
(Eds.), Contention and trust in cities and states (pp. 271–283). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Gonawela, A., Pal, J., Thawani, U., van der Vlugt, E., Out, W., & Chandra, P. (2018). Speaking 
their Mind: Populist Style and Antagonistic Messaging in the Tweets of Donald Trump, 
Narendra Modi, Nigel Farage, and Geert Wilders. Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW) 27(3), 293–326. doi:10.1007/s10606-018-9316-2   
Groshek, J., & Engelbert, J. (2013). Double differentiation in a cross-national comparison of 
populist political movements and online media uses in the United States and the 
Netherlands. New Media & Society, 15(2), 183–202. doi:10.1177/1461444812450685   
Groshek, J., & Koc-Michalska, K. (2017). Helping populism win? Social media use, filter 
bubbles, and support for populist presidential candidates in the 2016 US election 
campaign. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1389–1407. 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1329334   
Haller, A. (2015). How to deal with the Black Sheep? An evaluation of journalists’ reactions 
towards intentional selfscandalization by politicians. Journal of Applied Journalism & 
Media Studies, 4(3), 435–451. doi:10.1386/ajms.4.3.435_1   
REFERENCES 
63 
 
Hameleers, M., & Schmuck, D. (2017). It’s us against them: A comparative experiment on the 
effects of populist messages communicated via social media. Information, Communication 
& Society, 20(9), 1425–1444. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328523   
Hawkins, K. A. (2009). Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative 
Perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), 1040–1067. 
doi:10.1177/0010414009331721   
Hawkins, K. A. (2010). Venezuela’s Chavismo and populism in comparative perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Heiss, R., & Matthes, J. (2017). Who ‘likes’ populists? Characteristics of adolescents following 
right-wing populist actors on Facebook. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 
1408–1424. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328524   
Herkman, J. (2017). The life cycle model and press coverage of Nordic populist parties. 
Journalism Studies, 18(4), 430–448. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2015.1066231   
Hobolt, S. B., & Tilley, J. (2016). Fleeing the centre: The rise of challenger parties in the 
aftermath of the euro crisis. West European Politics, 39(5), 971–991. 
doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1181871   
Ionescu, G., & Gellner, E. (1969). Populism: Its meanings and national characteristics. 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Jacobs, K., & Spierings, N. (2016). Social Media, Parties, and Political Inequalities. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jacobs, K., & Spierings, N. (2018). A populist paradise? Examining populists’ Twitter adoption 
and use. Information, Communication & Society, 1–16. 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2018.1449883   
Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical 
study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 
46(3), 319–345. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x   
Jones, J. P. (2010). Entertaining Politics: Satiric Television and Political Engagement. 
Communication, Media, and Politics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Kalsnes, B., Larsson, A. O., & Enli, G. S. (2017). The social media logic of political interaction: 
Exploring citizens’ and politicians’ relationship on Facebook and Twitter. First Monday, 
22(2). doi:10.5210/fm.v22i2.6348   
Kaltwasser, C. R. (2012). The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy. 
Democratization, 19(2), 184–208. doi:10.1080/13510347.2011.572619   
Kang, T., Fowler, E. F., Franz, M. M., & Ridout, T. N. (2017). Issue Consistency? Comparing 
Television Advertising, Tweets, and E-mail in the 2014 Senate Campaigns. Political 
Communication, 35(1), 32–49. doi:10.1080/10584609.2017.1334729   
Karpf, D. (2017). Analytic activism. Digital listening and the new political strategy. Corby: 
Oxford University Press. 
Keller, T. R., & Kleinen-von Königslöw, K. (2018). Followers, Spread the Message! Predicting 
the Success of Swiss Politicians on Facebook and Twitter. Social Media + Society, 1-11. 
doi:10.1177/2056305118765733   
Kessler, S. H., & Lachenmaier, C. (2017). Ohne Belege in den Talkshow-Olymp: Belegmuster 
und Akteure in Polit-Talkshows zur Griechenlandkrise. M&K Medien & 
Kommunikationswissenschaft, 65(1), 64–82. doi:10.5771/1615-634X-2017-1-64   
Kitschelt, H. P. (1986). Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear 
Movements in Four Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 16(1), 57–85.  
REFERENCES 
64 
 
Klinger, U. (2013). Mastering the Art of Social Media: Swiss parties, the 2011 national 
election and digital challenges. Information, Communication & Society, 16(5), 717–736. 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2013.782329   
Klinger, U., & Svensson, J. (2015). The emergence of network media logic in political 
communication: A theoretical approach. New Media & Society, 17(8), 1241–1257. 
doi:10.1177/1461444814522952   
Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). Contested citizenship: Immigration 
and cultural diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Koopmans, R., & Olzak, S. (2004). Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right‐Wing 
Violence in Germany. American Journal of Sociology, 110(1), 198–230. 
Koopmans, R., & Muis, J. (2009). The rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the 
Netherlands: A discursive opportunity approach. European Journal of Political Research, 
48(5), 642–664.  
Krämer, B. (2017). Populist online practices: The function of the Internet in right-wing 
populism. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1293–1309. 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328520   
Kreiss, D. (2014). Seizing the moment: The presidential campaigns’ use of Twitter during the 
2012 electoral cycle. New Media & Society, 18(8), 1473–1490. 
doi:10.1177/1461444814562445   
Kriesi, H. (2013). Conceptualizing the populist challenge. Johns Hopkins University, Bologna. 
Kriesi, H. (2014). The Populist Challenge. West European Politics, 37(2), 361–378. 
doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.887879   
Kriesi, H. (2018). Revisiting the populist challenge. Politologický casopis; Czech journal of 
political science, 25(1), 5–27. 
Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. (1992). New social movements and 
political opportunities in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 22(2), 
219–244. 
Lilleker, D. G., & Koc-Michalska, K. (2013). Online Political Communication Strategies: MEPs, 
E-Representation, and Self-Representation. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 
10(2), 190–207. doi:10.1080/19331681.2012.758071   
March, L. (2017). Left and right populism compared: The British case. The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 19(2), 282–303. doi:10.1177/1369148117701753   
Marcinkowski, F., & Steiner, A. (2014). Mediatization and political autonomy: A systems 
approach. In F. Esser & J. Strömbäck (Eds.), Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the 
Transformation of Western Democracies (74–89). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the Media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), 
Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of Western European democracy (pp. 49–64). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mazzoleni, G. (2014). Mediatization and Political Populism. In F. Esser & J. Strömbäck (Eds.), 
Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies 
(pp. 42-56). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Meeks, L. (2016). Gendered styles, gendered differences: Candidates’ use of personalization 
and interactivity on Twitter. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 13(4), 295–310. 
doi:10.1080/19331681.2016.1160268   
Meguid, B. M. (2005). Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party 
Strategy in Niche Party Success. The American Political Science Review, 99(3), 347–359. 
Mény, Y., & Surel, Y. (2002). Democracies and the populist challenge. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
REFERENCES 
65 
 
Mény, Y., & Surel, Y. (2002). The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel 
(Eds.), Democracies and the populist challenge, pp. 1–21. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and 
Representation. Standford, California: Standford University Press. 
Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 542–563. 
doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x   
Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2012). Populism in Europe and the Americas. Threat or 
corrective for democracy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Müller-Rommel, F. (1998). The new challengers: Greens and right-wing populist parties in 
western Europe. European Review, 6(02), 191–202. doi:10.1017/S1062798700003227   
Nulty, P., Theocharis, Y., Popa, S. A., Parnet, O., & Benoit, K. (2016). Social media and 
political communication in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament. Electoral 
Studies, 44, 429–444. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.04.014   
Paletz, D. L. (2002). The media in American politics: Contents and consequences (2. ed.). New 
York: Longman. 
Pappas, T. S. (2016). Modern Populism: Research Advances, Conceptual and Methodological 
Pitfalls, and the Minimal Definition. Oxford: Oxford Research Encyclopedias. 
Parmelee, J. H., & Bichard, S. L. (2012). Politics and the Twitter revolution: How tweets 
influence the relationship between political leaders and the public. Lexington studies in 
political communication. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 
Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. 
American Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 825–850. doi:10.2307/2111797   
Poier, K., Saywald-Wedl, S., & Unger, H. (2017). Die Themen der "Populisten": Mit einer 
Medienanalyse von Wahlkämpfen in Österreich, Deutschland, der Schweiz, Dänemark und 
Polen. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Postill, J. (2018). Populism and social media: A global perspective. Media, Culture & Society, 
40(5), 754–765. doi:10.1177/0163443718772186   
Priester, K. (2007). Populismus: Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen. Frankfurt a. M: 
Campus. 
Rogstad, I. (2016). Is Twitter just rehashing? Intermedia agenda setting between Twitter and 
mainstream media. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 13(2), 142–158. 
doi:10.1080/19331681.2016.1160263   
Römmele, A. (2003). Political Parties, Party Communication and New Information and 
Communication Technologies. Party Politics, 9(1), 7–20. doi:10.1177/135406880391002   
Rooduijn, M. (2014). The Mesmerising Message: The Diffusion of Populism in Public Debates 
in Western European Media. Political Studies, 62(4), 726–744. doi: 10.1111/1467-
9248.12074 
Rooduijn, M., & Akkerman, T. (2017). Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in 
Western Europe. Party Politics, 23(3), 93–204. doi:10.1177/1354068815596514   
Rooduijn, M., de Lange, S. L., & van der Brug, W. (2014). A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic 
contagion by populist parties in Western Europe. Party Politics, 20(4), 563–575. 
doi:10.1177/1354068811436065   
Rooduijn, M., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of 
Content Analysis. West European Politics, 34(6), 1272–1283. 
doi:10.1080/01402382.2011.616665   
REFERENCES 
66 
 
Schmidt, F. (2017). Drivers of Populism: A Four-country Comparison of Party Communication 
in the Run-up to the 2014 European Parliament Elections. Political Studies, 66(2), 459–
479. doi:10.1177/0032321717723506   
Schroeder, R. (2017). Towards a theory of digital media. Information, Communication & 
Society, 21(3), 323–339. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1289231   
Schulz, A. (2018). Where populist citizens get the news: An investigation of news audience 
polarization along populist attitudes in 11 countries. Communication Monographs, 1–25. 
doi:10.1080/03637751.2018.1508876   
Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2017). Measuring 
Populist Attitudes on Three Dimensions. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 
1–11. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edw037   
Sellers, P. (2011). Cycles of Spin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sjöblom, G. (1969). Party Strategies in a Multiparty System. Lund: Student-litteratur. 
Smith, J. M. (2010). Does Crime Pay? Issue Ownership, Political Opportunity, and the Populist 
Right in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 43(11), 1471–1498. 
doi:10.1177/0010414010372593   
Sorensen, L. N. (2017). Populism in Communications Perspective: Concepts, Issues, Evidence. 
In R. Heinisch, C. Holtz-Bacha, & O. Mazzoleni (Eds.), Political populism. A handbook 
(pp. 137–151). Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Spierings, N., Jacobs, K., & Linders, N. (2018). Keeping an Eye on the People: Who Has Access 
to MPs on Twitter? Social Science Computer Review, 1-18. 
doi:10.1177/0894439318763580   
Stanyer, J., Salgado, S., & Strömbäck, J. (2017). Populist Actors as Communicators or Political 
Actors as Populist Communicators: Cross-National Findings and Perspectives. In T. 
Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. de Vreese (Eds.), Populist Political 
Communication in Europe (pp. 353–364). New York: Routledge. 
Stewart, J. A. (2018). In Through the Out Door: Examining the Use of Outsider Appeals in 
Presidential Debates. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 48(1), 93–109. 
doi:10.1111/psq.12433   
Stier, S., Posch, L., Bleier, A., & Strohmaier, M. (2017). When populists become popular: 
Comparing Facebook use by the right-wing movement Pegida and German political 
parties. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1365–1388. 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328519   
Stockemer, D., & Barisione, M. (2017). The ‘new’ discourse of the Front National under 
Marine Le Pen: A slight change with a big impact. European Journal of Communication, 
32(2), 100–115. doi:10.1177/0267323116680132 
Strömbäck, J., & Esser, F. (2009). Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism. 
In K. Lundby (Ed.), Mediatization. Concept, changes, consequences. Shaping Politics: 
(pp. 205–223). New York: Peter Lang. 
Strömbäck, J., & Esser, F. (2017). Political Public Relations and Mediatization: Political Public 
Relations and Mediatization: The Strategies of News Management. In P. van Aelst & S. 
Walgrave (Eds.), How Political Actors Use the Media: A Functional Analysis of the Media’s 
Role in Politics (pp. 63–83). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Stromer-Galley, J. (2014). Presidential Campaigning in the Internet Age. Corby: Oxford 
University Press. 
Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
REFERENCES 
67 
 
Taggart, P. (2017). Populism in Western Europe. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, 
& P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (pp. 248–263). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Thesen, G., Green-Pedersen, C., & Mortensen, P. B. (2017). Priming, Issue Ownership, and 
Party Support: The Electoral Gains of an Issue-Friendly Media Agenda. Political 
Communication, 34(2), 282–301. doi:10.1080/10584609.2016.1233920   
Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. 
Vaccari, C., & Valeriani, A. (2015). Follow the leader! Direct and indirect flows of political 
communication during the 2013 Italian general election campaign. New Media & Society, 
17(7), 1025–1042. doi:10.1177/1461444813511038   
van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (2016). Information and Arena: The Dual Function of the News 
Media for Political Elites. Journal of Communication, 66(3), 496–518. 
doi:10.1111/jcom.12229   
van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (Eds.). (2017). How Political Actors Use the Media: A Functional 
Analysis of the Media’s Role in Politics. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (2017). Information and Arena: The Dual Function of the News 
Media for Political Elites. In P. van Aelst & S. Walgrave (Eds.), How Political Actors Use the 
Media: A Functional Analysis of the Media’s Role in Politics (pp. 1–17). Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
van Kessel, S. (2015). Populist parties in Europe: Agents of discontent? Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
van Kessel, S., & Castelein, R. (2016). Shifting the blame. Populist politicians’ use of Twitter 
as a tool of opposition. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 12(2), 594–614. 
Waisbord, S., & Amado, A. (2017). Populist communication by digital means: Presidential 
Twitter in Latin America. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1330–1346. 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328521   
Walter, A. S., & Vliegenthart, R. (2010). Negative Campaigning across Different 
Communication Channels: Different Ball Games? The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 15(4), 441–461. doi:10.1177/1940161210374122   
Ware, A. (2002). The United States: Populism as Political Strategy. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel 
(Eds.), Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 101–119). New York: Palgrave. 
Weber, E. (2017). Populist parties in Switzerland. And their integration into the 
establishment. Conference Paper. NCCR Democracy Final Workshop, pp. 1–29. 
Wells, C., Shah, D. V., Pevehouse, J. C., Yang, J., Pelled, A., Boehm, F., . . . Schmidt, J. L. 
(2016). How Trump Drove Coverage to the Nomination: Hybrid Media Campaigning. 
Political Communication, 33(4), 669–676. doi:10.1080/10584609.2016.1224416   
Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S., & Wirth, W. (2018a). News Media as 
Gatekeepers, Critics, and Initiators of Populist Communication: How Journalists in Ten 
Countries Deal with the Populist Challenge. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 1-
20. doi:10.1177/1940161218785979   
Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Büchel, F., Schemer, C., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., . . . Wirth, W. (2018b). 
What Drives Populist Styles? Analyzing Immigration and Labor Market News in 11 
Countries. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 1–21. 
Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept - Populism in the Study of Latin American 
Politics. Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. doi:10.2307/422412   
Weyland, K. (2017). Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, 
P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (pp. 1–28). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
REFERENCES 
68 
 
Wirth, W., Esser, F., Wettstein, M., Engesser, S., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., . . . Schemer, C. (2016). 
The appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: A theoretical model and research 
design for analyzing populist political communication. Zürich: NCCR Democracy, Working 
Paper No. 88, pp. 1–60. Retrieved from http://www.nccr-
democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/wp88  
Wirz, D. S. (2018). Persuasion Through Emotion? An Experimental Test of the Emotion-
Eliciting Nature of Populist Communication. International Journal of Communication, 12, 
1114–1138. 
Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. London: 
Sage. 
Wolfsfeld, G. (2011). Making sense of media and politics: Five principles in political 
communication. London: Routledge. 
Zulianello, M., Albertini, A., & Ceccobelli, D. (2018). A Populist Zeitgeist? The Communication 
Strategies of Western and Latin American Political Leaders on Facebook. The International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 1-19. doi:10.1177/1940161218783836   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
69 
 
Appendix 
Personal performance record related to cumulative thesis 
Teaching Activities at the IKMZ 
Fall semester 2018 and spring semester 2019: research seminar (under graduate level): 
Populistische Kommunikation im digitalen Zeitalter and supervision of Bachelor theses at 
Department of Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich (co-teaching with 
S. Blassnig) 
 
Fall semester 2017: lecture (undergraduate level): Grundlagen der  Publizistik- und 
Kommunikationswissenschaft I und II at the Department of Communication and Media 
Research, University of Zurich (co-teaching with F. Esser, B. Fretwurst & S. Blassnig) 
 
Fall semester 2016 and spring semester 2017: research seminar (under graduate level): 
Erfolgreiche Populisten in ganz Europa: Welche Rolle übernehmen die Medien? and 
supervision of Bachelor theses at Department of Communication and Media Research, 
University of Zurich (co-teaching with S. Blassnig). 
 
Spring semester 2016: research course (undergraduate level): Social Media in der politischen 
Kommunikation at the Department of Communication and Media Research, University of 
Zurich (co-teaching with D. Steppat) 
 
Fall semester 2015 and spring semester 2016: research seminar (under graduate level): Wie 
viel Social Media braucht die Politik? and supervision of Bachelor theses at Department of 
Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich (co-teaching with D. Steppat) 
 
Spring semester 2015: research course (undergraduate level): Medialisierung der Politik at the 
Department of Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich 
 
Fall semester 2014: lecture (undergraduate level): Grundlagen der Publizistik- und 
Kommunikationswissenschaft I und II at the Department of Communication and Media 
Research, University of Zurich (co-teaching with F. Esser) 
 
Spring semester 2014: lecture (undergraduate level): International Comparative Media 
Research: An Overview at the Department of Communication and Media Research, 
University of Zurich (co-teaching with F. Esser) 
 
Fall semester 2013: seminar (graduate level) “Transnationale Nachrichtenlogik?” at the 
Department of Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich (co-teaching with 
F. Esser) 
 
Supervision of several master's and bachelor theses 
 
APPENDIX 
70 
 
Contributions at conferences 
Favorable Opportunity Structures for Populist Communication: Comparing Different Types of  
Politicians and Issues in Social Media, Television and the Press. ICA Conference, 
Washington DC, May 24-28 2019 
 
Populism as a Trigger for Reader Comments: Populist News Articles Lead to Populist Audience  
Reactions. ICA Conference, Washington DC, May 24-28 2019 (presented by S. Blassnig) 
 
Does populist communication make politicians more popular on Facebook and Twitter? A six-
country analysis. ICA Conference, Washington DC, May 24-28 2019 (presented by S. 
Blassnig) 
 
Mehr Likes durch populistische Kommunikation? Eine Analyse von Facebook-Reaktionen im 
deutschen und österreichischen Wahlkampf 2017. DGPuK Conference, Münster, May 9-11 
2019 (presented by A. Staender) 
 
The effect of populist communication on social media popularity indicators: How political 
leaders use populist key messages on Facebook and Twitter. ECREA Conference, Lugano, 
November 31-3 2018 (presented by S. Blassnig) 
 
Where populists prefer to spread their messages. An analysis of social media and talk shows 
in six countries. ICA Conference, Prag, May 24-28 2018 
 
Populism in Online News: How Politicians, Journalists, and Readers Disseminate Populist 
Messages during Election Times. ICA Conference, Prag, May 24-28 2018 (presented by S. 
Blassnig) 
 
How Right-Wing Populist Communication Influences Cognitions and Emotions towards 
Immigrants: Evidence from a Cross-National Panel-Survey. ICA Conference, Prag, May 24-
28 2018 (presented by D. Wirz) 
 
Populisten in den Medien. Eine Framinganalyse der AfD und FPÖ in deutschen und 
österreichischen Qualitäts- und Boulevardmedien. DGPuK’s Political Communication 
Section Interim Conference, Fribourg, February 8-10 2018 (presented by R. Schwab & J. 
Haslach) 
 
Populistische Krisen-Rhetorik: Wie Emotionalisierung und Dramatisierung von populistischen 
Inhalten deren Wirkung verstärkt. DGPuK’s Political Communication Section Interim 
Conference, Fribourg, February 8-10 2018 (presented by D. Wirz) 
 
Political Talk Show or Social Media – Which channel benefits the populist message? ECREA’s 
Political Communication Section Interim Conference, Zürich, November 22-23 2017 
 
Extreme parties and populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries. ICA 
Conference, San Diego, June 25-29 2017 
 
APPENDIX 
71 
 
Populism in the Press: A Comparative Analysis of Ten Western Democracies. ICA Conference, 
San Diego, June 25-29 2017 (presented by S. Engesser) 
 
Privatization and Negativity in the British and Swiss Election Campaign 2015. A Question of 
Professionalization? SGKM Conference, Chur, April 28-29 2017 (presented by M. Baumann 
& J. Broummana) 
 
Wettbewerb um Aufmerksamkeit im Social Web: eine empirische Untersuchung der Resonanz 
von Facebook-Beiträgen im Schweizer Wahlkampf 2015. DGPuK Conference, Düsseldorf, 
March 30-31 2017 (presented by A. Staender) 
 
Populist Communication Strategies in News Media in Four European Democracies. ICA 
Preconference, Fukuoka, June 9-13 2016 
 
Populismus in der politischen Kommunikation: Erkenntnisse aus Deutschland, Österreich und 
der Schweiz. DGPuK Conference, Leipzig, March 30-31 2015 (presented by S. Engesser) 
 
Social Media as Political Instrument. ICA Conference, San Juan Puerto Rico, May 21-25 2015 
(presented by S. Engesser) 
 
Populism and the Media forming an Unholy Alliance: An integrative Framework. ICA 
Conference, Seattle, May 22-25 2014 (co-presented with D. Wirz) 
 
Effects of Repeatedly Presented Attacking Campaigning Poster. ICA Conference, Seattle, May 
22-25 2014. 
 
Further Publications 
Blassnig, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2018). Populism in Online Election 
Coverage. Journalism Studies, 1–20.  
 
Blassnig, S., Büchel, F., Ernst, N., & Engesser, S. (2018). Populism and Informal Fallacies: An 
Analysis of Right-Wing Populist Rhetoric in Election Campaigns. Argumentation, 1-30. 
 
Blassnig, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., & Engesser, S. (2018). Populist Communication in Talk Shows 
and Social Media: A Comparative Content Analysis in Four Countries. Studies in 
Communication - Media (SCM), 7(3), 338-363. 
 
Ernst, N., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Switzerland: Favourable Conditions  
for Growing Populism. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. de Vreese 
(Eds.), Populist Political Communication in Europe (pp. 151–164). New York: Routledge. 
 
Ernst, N., Kühne, R., & Wirth, W. (2017). Effects of Message Repetition and  
Negativity on Credibility Judgments and Political Attitudes. International Journal of 
Communication, 3265–3285. 
 
APPENDIX 
72 
 
Staender, A., Ernst, N., Steppat, D. (2019). Was steigert die Facebook-Resonanz? Eine Analyse 
der Likes, Shares und Comments im Schweizer Wahlkampf 2015. Studies in Communication 
| Media. 
  
Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Büchel, F., Schemer, C., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., Ernst, N., Engesser, S., 
Müller, P., & Wirth, W. (2018). What Drives Populist Styles? Analyzing Immigration and 
Labor Market News in 11 Countries. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 1-21. 
 
Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S., & Wirth, W. (2018). News Media as 
Gatekeepers, Critics, and Initiators of Populist Communication: How Journalists in Ten 
Countries Deal with the Populist Challenge. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 1-
20. 
 
Wirth, W., Esser, F., Wettstein, M., Engesser, S., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., Ernst, N. . . . Schemer, C. 
(2016). The appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: A theoretical model and research 
design for analyzing populist political communication. Zürich: NCCR Democracy, Working 
Paper No. 88, pp. 1-60. Retrieved from http://www.nccr-
democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/wp88 
 
Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Wirth, W. 
(2018). The Effects of Right-Wing Populist Communication on Emotions and Cognitions 
toward Immigrants. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 1-21. 
 
Awards 
June 2017: "Best Paper Award" by the International Communications Association for Paper 
"Populism in the Press: A Comparative Analysis of Ten Western Democracies". (together 
with Sven Engesser, Florin Büchel & Frank Esser) 
 
February 2018: “Best Paper Award” by the Political Communication Division of the German 
Communication Association (DGPuK): Populist Crisis Rhetoric: How Emotionalization and 
Dramatization of Populist Content Amplify its Effects (together with D. Wirz, A. Schulz, M. 
Wettstein, C. Schemer, P. Müller, & W. Wirth) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
73 
 
Author’s own contributions for co-authored publications 
 
ARTICLE I     
Title: Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology 
Researchers involved: Sven Engesser (SE), Nicole Ernst (NE), Florin Büchel (FB), Frank Esser (FE) 
 
  
Limited  
Contribution 
Substantial 
Contribution 
Conceptualization (Main idea, theory) FE SE, NE 
Methodology (Design, Operationalization) FE SE 
Data Collection FE SE 
Data Analysis   SE, NE 
Writing (original draft preparation) SE, FE, FB NE 
Writing (review and editing) NE SE 
Conference presentations     
Visualization NE SE 
      
 
 
ARTICLE II     
Title: Extreme parties and populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries 
Researchers involved: Nicole Ernst (NE), Sven Engesser (SE) Florin Büchel (FB), Sina Blassnig (SB), 
Frank Esser (FE); Members of the NCCR Democracy Phase III, Module II (NCCR) 
 
  
Limited  
Contribution 
Substantial 
Contribution 
Conceptualization (Main idea, theory) FE, SE NE 
Methodology (Design, Operationalization)   NE, NCCR 
Data Collection   NE, NCCR 
Data Analysis   NE 
Writing (original draft preparation) SE, FE, FB, SB NE 
Writing (review and editing) SE, FE, FB, SB NE 
Conference presentations   NE 
Visualization   NE 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
APPENDIX 
74 
 
 
ARTICLE III     
Title: Bipolar Populism? The Use of Anti-Elitism and People-Centrism by Swiss Parties on Social 
Media 
Researchers involved: Nicole Ernst (NE), Sven Engesser (SE), Frank Esser (FE), Members of the 
NCCR Democracy Phase III, Module II (NCCR) 
     
  
Limited 
 Contribution 
Substantial 
Contribution 
Conceptualization (Main idea, theory) FE, SE NE 
Methodology (Design, Operationalization)   NE, NCCR 
Data Collection   NE, NCCR 
Data Analysis   NE 
Writing (original draft preparation) SE NE, FE 
Writing (review and editing) SE NE, FE 
Conference presentations     
Visualization   NE 
      
ARTICLE IV     
Title: Populists prefer social media over talk shows. An analysis of populist messages and 
stylistic elements across six countries 
Researchers involved: Nicole Ernst (NE), Sina Blassnig (SB), Sven Engesser (SE), Florin Büchel 
(FB), Frank Esser (FE), Members of the NCCR Democracy Phase III, Module II (NCCR) 
      
  
Limited  
Contribution 
Substantial 
Contribution 
Conceptualization (Main idea, theory) FE, FB, SB NE 
Methodology (Design, Operationalization)   NE, NCCR 
Data Collection   NE, NCCR 
Data Analysis  NE 
Writing (original draft preparation) SE, FE, SB NE 
Writing (review and editing) SE, SB NE, FE 
Conference presentations   NE 
Visualization   NE 
      
ARTICLE V     
Title: Favorable Opportunity Structures for Populist Communication: Comparing Different 
Types of Politicians and Issues in Social Media, Television and the Press 
Researchers involved: Nicole Ernst (NE), Frank Esser (FE), Sina Blassnig (SB), Sven Engesser (SE), 
Members of the NCCR Democracy Phase III, Module II (NCCR) 
    
  
Limited  
Contribution 
Substantial 
Contribution 
Conceptualization (Main idea, theory) SB, SE NE, FE 
Methodology (Design, Operationalization)   NE, NCCR 
Data Collection   NE, NCCR 
Data Analysis   NE 
Writing (original draft preparation) SE, SB NE, FE 
Writing (review and editing) SE NE, FE, SB 
Conference presentations   NE 
Visualization   NE 
APPENDIX 
75 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
76 
 
  
APPENDIX 
77 
 
Copies of individual publications of cumulative thesis 
ARTICLE I 
 
Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology 
 
ABSTRACT 
Populism is a relevant but contested concept in political communication research. It has been 
well-researched in political manifestos and the mass media. The present study focuses on 
another part of the hybrid media system and explores how politicians in four countries (AT, 
CH, IT, UK) use Facebook and Twitter for populist purposes. Five key elements of populism are 
derived from the literature: emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the 
people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the ‘heartland’. A qualitative text 
analysis reveals that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form on social media. Populist 
statements can be found across countries, parties, and politicians’ status levels. While a broad 
range of politicians advocate for the people, attacks on the economic elite are preferred by 
left-wing populists. Attacks on the media elite and ostracism of others, however, are 
predominantly conducted by right-wing speakers. Overall, the paper provides an in-depth 
analysis of populism on social media. It shows that social media give the populist actors the 
freedom to articulate their ideology and spread their messages. The paper also contributes to 
a refined conceptualization and measurement of populism in future studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., & Esser, F. (2017) Populism and social media: how  
politicians spread a fragmented ideology. Information, Communication & Society 20(8), 
1109-1126.  
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Information, Communication and Society on 08 
Jul 2016, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2016.120769
  
 
 
Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented 
Ideology 
 
Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Florin Büchel, Sina Blassnig, and Frank Esser 
Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research (IPMZ), University of Zurich, Switzerland 
 
 
Abstract 
Populism is a relevant but contested concept in political communication research. It has been 
well-researched in political manifestos and the mass media. The present study focuses on 
another part of the hybrid media system and explores how politicians in four countries (AT, 
CH, IT, UK) use Facebook and Twitter for populist purposes. Five key elements of populism are 
derived from the literature: emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the 
people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the “heartland”. A qualitative text 
analysis reveals that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form on social media. Populist 
statements can be found across countries, parties, and politicians’ status levels. While a broad 
range of politicians advocates for the people, attacks on the economic elite are preferred by 
left-wing populists. Attacks on the media elite and ostracism of others, however, are 
predominantly conducted by right-wing speakers. Overall, the paper provides an in-depth 
analysis of populism on social media. It shows that social media give the populist actors the 
freedom to uncontestedly articulate their ideology and spread their messages. The paper also 
contributes to a refined conceptualization and measurement of populism in future studies. 
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Almost half a century ago, Ionescu and Gellner (1969) perceived populism as a “spectre 
haunting the world” (p. 1) implicating something obscure, unnatural, and terrifying. In line 
with this negative characterization, populism, at least in Western Europe, was initially 
understood as a pathological form of democracy (Betz, 1994). Ten years ago, however, Mudde 
(2004) triggered a shift of perception by arguing that populism was not anomalous but had 
become “mainstream in the politics of Western democracies” (p. 542). Consequently, he 
coined the notion of a “populist zeitgeist” (p. 542). 
The spread of this ‘spirit of the time’ could be witnessed through the results of the 
European Election in 2014 when right-wing parties such as the French National Front, the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the Danish People’s Party accumulated the 
highest share of voters in their respective countries. Simultaneously, left-wing populist parties 
such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain have also been very successful. 
Outside of Europe, there has been a notable revival of left-wing populism in Latin 
America (Hawkins, 2010). With the emergence of the Tea Party and the Occupy movement, 
the public debate about populism flared up again in the US as well (Agarwal et al. 2014; Kumar, 
2011). But regardless of whether we speak of populism as disturbing ghost (‘spectre’) or 
popular spirit of the time (‘zeitgeist’) it retains its intangible nature and is hard to grasp by 
conceptual and empirical means (Canovan, 1999; Taggart, 2000). 
Populism in the media has been discussed theoretically (Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 
2003, 2008, 2014) and has been empirically analyzed in various communication channels, such 
as party and election manifestos (Rooduijn et al., 2014; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011), political 
speeches (Cranmer, 2011; Hawkins, 2010), the press (Akkerman, 2011; Bos et al., 2011; 
Herkman, 2015; Rooduijn, 2014), political party broadcasts (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), TV and 
radio newscasts (Bos, et al., 2011) and political talk shows (Cranmer, 2011). 
However, to draw a complete picture of the “hybrid media system” it is crucial to take 
social media into account as well (Chadwick, 2013; Chadwick et al. 2016). While the mass 
media adhere to professional norms and news values, social media serve as direct linkage to 
the people and allow the populists to circumvent the journalistic gatekeepers. In this way, 
social media provide the populists with the freedom to uncontestedly articulate their ideology 
and spread their messages. 
Numerous scholars have analyzed politicians’ use of Facebook and Twitter but they 
either have ignored the concept of populism or alluded to it only briefly (exceptions: Bartlett, 
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2014; Gerbaudo, 2014; Groshek & Engelbert, 2013). 
In terms of research design, most studies on populism have focused on single countries 
(exceptions: Akkerman, 2011; Rooduijn, 2014, Herkman, 2015). Scholars have also mainly 
followed a quantitative approach (exception: Hawkins, 2010), some of them even by drawing 
on ‘big data’ and computer-based analyses (e.g. Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). This is meritorious 
but also bears inherent problems, such as a potential lack of contextualization or 
overestimation of accuracy (boyd & Crawford, 2012). Some authors, for instance, counted 
mere references to ‘the people’ as indications of populism (e.g. Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; 
Rooduijn, 2014; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). Others did not clearly differentiate populism that 
advocates for the people and populism that attacks elites (e.g. Cranmer, 2011; Rooduijn, 2014; 
Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). 
The present paper aims at narrowing this research gap by pursuing the question how 
populism manifests itself in social media. In order to identify cross-national patterns, the study 
includes four European countries that have strong populist parties but different types of 
media systems (Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and UK). It employs a qualitative text analysis of 
typical Facebook and Twitter posts (for a similar ‘small data’ approach see: Freelon & Karpf, 
2015; Stephansen & Couldry, 2014). Besides exploring social media as a public stage for 
populist actors, the paper provides deeper insights into the definitional elements and 
empirical types of populism which may help refining the methodological instruments (e.g. 
search strings and codebooks) for future studies on the subject. 
Defining and Conceptualizing Populism 
One of the first attempts to conceive populism as a uniform phenomenon dates back 
to Shils (1956). Although populism has been part of the academic debate since then, it is still 
a contested concept and has been described as “notoriously vague term” (Canovan, 1999, p. 
3). 
The main reason why there is no universal definition of populism is the fact that it 
manifests itself differently depending on the contextual conditions (Priester, 2007). For 
instance, the cases of agrarian populism in the aftermath of the American Civil War, populism 
in Latin America or the Narodnik movement in Russia are very different from the relatively 
new populist movements and parties in contemporary Western democracies. Therefore, it is 
crucial to delimit the conceptual scope of this study, which is, the current political and media 
realities of Europe. Yet, even within these boundaries, populism can take on many forms and 
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facets. In order to include all these manifestations we argue that populism can be defined as 
a “set of ideas” (Hawkins, 2009, p. 1045; Priester, 2012, p. 1; Rooduijn, 2014, p. 3). 
One well-established definition of populism was introduced by Albertazzi and 
McDonnell (2008) who drew on Mudde (2004, p. 543). They conceive populism as  
ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and 
dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) 
the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice [italics 
added]. 
According to this definitions, populism can be understood as a ‘thin’ (less elaborate) 
ideology that gives protagonists the flexibility of enriching it with ‘full’ (more substantive) 
ideologies such as socialism, nationalism, or liberalism (Kriesi, 2014, p. 369; Mudde, 2004, p. 
544). The core of the populist base-line ideology consists of four key elements: popular 
sovereignty, pure people, corrupt elite, and dangerous others. An additional element which is 
not mentioned in the above definition but which is also crucial for the understanding of 
populism is the glorification of the heartland, an “idealized conception of the community” 
(Taggart, 2004, p. 274) or “retrospective utopia” (Priester, 2012, p. 2).  
We argue that a politician who uses these five ideological key elements engages in an 
illocutionary act of populism and, in this way, becomes a populist actor. In concrete terms, 
populist communication manifests itself by emphasizing the sovereignty to the people, 
advocating for the people, attacking elites, ostracizing others, and invoking the heartland. 
Emphasizing the Sovereignty of the People 
First of all, the populist ideology is centered on the people’s will and the absolute 
sovereignty of the people (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Shils, 1956). It is this 
demand for unrestricted popular power that distinguishes populist democracy from its 
constitutional and liberal counterparts (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Dahl, 1956).  
Following the populist argument, the elites are accused of having deprived the people 
of this right, rendering sovereignty the central subject of all subsequent disputes. The 
populists consider themselves the only ones able to restore the sovereignty of the people by 
replacing the elite and all other representative and intermediary institutions (p. 408). 
Advocating for the People 
Another key element of populism is advocacy for the people (Taggart, 2000, p. 91). 
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Usually, the people is characterized as a homogeneous (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) or 
monolithic group (e.g. Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) forming a social unity or community (e.g. 
Jansen, 2011). The people is supposed to be equipped with a catalogue of virtues (e.g. Taggart, 
2000) and described as inherently pure, good, and paramount (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 
2008). It is also been bestowed with the wisdom of the common man (Taggart, 2000). Populist 
actors try to maintain a close relation to the people. They regard the people’s needs and 
demands as inviolable, and they place it above everything else in society.  
Attacking the Elites 
The people are opposed to what is frequently subsumed under the label of “the elite” 
(Mudde 2004, p. 543). In fact, the elite’s very identity is based on this antagonism to the 
people, on being the people’s “enemy” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 5) or even “nemesis” 
(Mudde, 2004, p. 544). The elite is accused of betraying the people and of having an unjustified 
control over its rights, well-being, and progress (Jansen, 2011, p. 84). By abusing its power the 
elites have occupied, distorted, and exploited democracy (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 4; 
Betz & Johnson, 2004, p. 313).  
Therefore, the elite is thoroughly furnished with negative attributes: “corrupt” and 
“exploitative” (e. g. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 4), “selfish” and “arrogant” (Rooduijn 
2014, p. 6), or “unaccountable” and “incompetent” (Mény & Surel, 2002, p. 9). As the populist 
actor is eager to protect or restore the people’s sovereignty she or he maintains a negative 
relation to the respective elite. The populist thus attacks, accuses, or blames the elite for the 
malfunctions and grievances of democracy. 
Ostracizing Others 
Besides the elite, the “dangerous others” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; p. 3; Rooduijn 
2013, p. 7) are also contrasted to the people. Whereas the elite is considered as danger from 
above (vertical dimension), the others are perceived as a threat from outside or within the 
people (horizontal dimension) (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, p. 324). Accordingly, the others are 
not regarded as part of the elite but as unjustly favored by the elite or even as its partner in 
conspiracy against the people. 
Various population segments can be the target of populist resentment, such as 
immigrants, ethnic minorities, religious groups, criminals, etc. (Betz & Johnson 2004, p. 313; 
Rooduijn 2014, p. 7; Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 418). In any case, they are regarded as “a threat 
to and a burden on society” (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, p. 324). 
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Invoking the Heartland 
Populist actors may also invoke a longing for the so-called heartland. Taggart (2004) 
introduced this term as “idealized conception of the community” (p. 274). This territory of the 
imagination differs from ideal societies or utopias in two aspects: First, it is not directed at the 
future but at the past in an “attempt to construct what has been lost by the present” (Taggart, 
2000, p. 95). Second, it is not based on rational thoughts or historical facts but deeply-rooted 
emotions that may “not be necessarily either rationalized or rationalizable” (p. 95). Populists 
invoke the image of a virtual location which is occupied by the people, represents the “core 
of the community” and excludes the “marginal or the extreme” (p. 96).  
Priester (2012) provides “Middle America” (see also Taggart, 2000, p. 97) or “La France 
Profonde” as typical examples for the heartland. Popular icons of the heartland are the Boston 
Tea Party in the US, Guy Fawkes in the UK, Jeanne D’Arc in France, and Wilhelm Tell in 
Switzerland. In Germany, probably due to its negative and disrupted past, populist actors have 
faced difficulties to successfully invoke the heartland. 
Populism and Social Media 
A theoretical relation between populism and online communication was already 
established early in the history of the Internet (Bimber, 1998). Some scholars bestowed the 
Internet with the potential to “restructure political power in a populist direction” (p. 137) and 
to promote unmediated communication between politicians and citizens (p. 137). 
Among the politicians, the populists have been particularly interested in a close 
connection to the people (Canovan, 2002; p. 34; Krämer, 2014; p. 45; Kriesi, 2014, p. 363; 
Taggart, 2002, p. 67). As self-perceived advocates and mouthpieces of the people they require 
“direct, unmediated access to the people’s grievances” (Kriesi, 2014, p. 363). Canovan (2002) 
also identified a demand for a “short-cut that bypasses philosophical disputes and institutional 
niceties” (p. 34). While all media establish a connection to the people, social media provide 
the populists with a much more direct linkage. Bartlett (2014) also adds that “the short acerbic 
nature of populist messages works well in this medium” (p. 94). 
These pragmatic reasons for the use of social media by populist actors can be 
underscored by further theoretical considerations. In light of recent developments in political 
communication, Chadwick (2013) diagnosed a hybrid media system where “older and newer 
media logics” (p. 207) compete and complement each other. Building upon this idea of 
hybridity, Klinger and Svensson (2015, 2016) distinguished the mass media logic of 
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professional news outlets from the network logic of social media. While the former is based 
on professional gatekeepers and a relatively passive audience, the latter evolves from “like-
minded” (Klinger & Svensson, 2015, p. 1248) peer networks. In terms of content production, 
the mass media logic adheres to professional norms and news values and the network media 
logic follows the ideal of “attention maximation” (Klinger & Svensson, 2016, p. 29).    
Against this backdrop, it makes sense that populist actors pursue a hybrid 
communication strategy. On the one hand, they may address the mass media in order to 
distribute official statements to larger audiences. These messages have to comply to the mass 
media logic and may be modified by the journalist accordingly (Herkman, 2015). Besides, the 
journalists of the upmarket press are presumed to act as “paladins” of the elites and to 
attenuate or to criticize populist statements in their articles (Mazzoleni, 2003, 2008). 
Therefore, the populists may turn towards social media in order to circumvent the media 
institutions and journalistic gatekeepers. In this way, the populist messages do not have to 
follow the news values and are frequently more personal and sensationalistic in nature. While 
the first aspect of the hybrid communication strategy has been thoroughly investigated (e.g. 
Akkerman, 2011; Bos et al., 2011; Herkman, 2015; Rooduijn, 2014) this study sheds light on 
the second aspect of the strategy. 
Bennett and Segerberg (2012) contrasted a logic of collective action associated with 
formal organizations and collective identity to a logic of connective action involving 
personalized and inclusive content, such as “personal action frames” (p. 744), and social media 
as means of distribution. Popular examples for personal action frames are the ‘Put People 
First’ campaign in the London 2009 protests or the slogan ‘we are the 99 percent’ of the 
Occupy movement (p. 744). These frames are highly inclusive and align people with different 
personal backgrounds and motives under a common cause (p. 744). Personal action frames 
are not so much based on established social groups, memberships, and substantive ideologies 
but rather on “flexible political identifications” (p. 744). This fits very well to with the “thin” 
(Kriesi, 2014, p. 369; Mudde, 2004, p. 544) ideology and “chameleonic” (Taggart, 2004, p. 275) 
nature of populism. Therefore, we assume that populism on social media may manifest itself 
in the shape of a personal action frame. 
Method 
To investigate whether and how populism manifests itself on social media we 
conducted a qualitative text analysis of typical Facebook and Twitter posts. 
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Table 1. Sample of political actors   
     
Country  Party  Sample criterion  Name  Position 
AT SPÖ Status Laura Rudas Chairman 
AT SPÖ Status Werner Faymann Party leader 
AT SPÖ Activity Franz Voves Head of regional government 
AT SPÖ Activity Hannes Swoboda Group leader in EP 
AT SPÖ Activity Peter Kaiser Regional party leader 
AT FPÖ Status HC Strache Party leader 
AT FPÖ Status Herbert Kickl General secretary 
AT FPÖ Activity Andreas Mölzer MP 
AT FPÖ Activity Karl Schnell Regional party leader 
AT FPÖ Activity Udo Landbauer Youth party leader 
CH SP Status Christian Levrat Party leader 
CH SP Status Flavia Wasserfallen General secretary 
CH SP Activity Cedric Wermuth MP 
CH SP Activity Jacqueline Badran MP 
CH SP Activity Pascale Bruderer Wyss MP 
CH SVP Status Martin Baltisser General secretary 
CH SVP Status Toni Brunner Party leader 
CH SVP Activity Christoph Mörgeli MP 
CH SVP Activity Lukas Reimann MP 
CH SVP Activity Natalie Rickli MP 
GB Conserv. Status David Cameron Party leader 
GB Conserv. Status Grant Shapps Chairman 
GB Conserv. Activity Boris Johnson Mayor of London 
GB Conserv. Activity George Osborne Chancellor of the Exchequer 
GB Conserv. Activity Jeremy Hunt Health Secretary 
GB Labour Status Ed Miliband Party leader 
GB Labour Status Iain McNicol General secretary 
GB Labour Activity Andy Burnham Shadow Health Secretary 
GB Labour Activity Douglas Alexander Shadow Foreign Secretary 
GB Labour Activity Yvette Cooper Shadow Home Secretary 
GB UKIP Status Jonathan Arnott Chairman 
GB UKIP Status Nigel Farage Party leader 
GB UKIP Activity Paul Nuttall Deputy leader 
GB UKIP Activity Steven Woolfe National Executive Committee 
GB UKIP Activity Suzanne Evans City councillor 
IT M5S Status Beppe Grillo President 
IT M5S Status Enrico Maria Nadasi Secretary 
IT M5S Activity Alessandro Di Battista MEP 
IT M5S Activity Federico Pizzarotti Mayor of Parma 
IT M5S Activity Luigi Di Maio 
Vice President of the 
Chamber of Deputies 
IT PD Status Guglielmo Epifani Party leader 
IT PD Status Pier Luigi Bersani Party leader 
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IT PD Activity Cécile Kyenge Minister of Integration 
IT PD Activity Rosy Bindi Former Minister of Health 
IT PD Activity Walter Veltroni Former party leader 
IT PdL Status Angelino Alfano Secretary 
IT PdL Status Silvio Berlusconi President 
IT PdL Activity Daniele Capezzone MP 
IT PdL Activity Denis Verdini MP 
IT PdL Activity Maurizio Gasparri MP 
 
To increase the variance and to identify cross-national patterns we took four West 
European countries into account: Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and UK. On the one hand, these 
countries share strong typical populist parties (Aalberg et al. 2016; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015), 
such as the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the Five Star 
Movement (M5S) in Italy and the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP). On the other 
hand, the countries also represent different types of media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) 
with Austria and Switzerland belonging to the Democratic-Corporatist model, Italy as part of 
the Polarized-Pluralist model and the UK being associated to the Liberal model.  
We included the above mentioned populist parties (where we assume a pronounced 
and consistent motivation to use the five constituents outlined above) but also the dominant 
social democrat and conservative parties (that serve as a control group to check whether we 
see a spill-over to mainstream political actors). Within each party, two different groups of 
politicians were investigated: those occupying top positions in the party hierarchy (leaders, 
chairmen, and secretaries) and those with very active communication behavior and media 
presence such as vocal backbenchers and regular talk show guests (for an overview see: 
Table). We examined all official Facebook pages and Twitter accounts of the selected 
politicians during a period of six months (1 January – 30 June 2013). 
For the data analysis, we proceeded in three steps: First, we used the five ideological 
key elements identified in the theoretical part of this paper as heuristic categories and 
scanned the collected Facebook and Twitter content for all posts that fell into at least one of 
these categories. Second, we selected those posts which we regarded as typical cases for their 
respective category (Daniel, 2012, p. 90). Third, we subjected these posts to a hermeneutic 
text analysis (Kuckartz, 2014, p. 16) in order to illustrate how politicians utilized, modified, 
differentiated, and combined the five key ideological elements. 
Findings 
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Emphasizing the Sovereignty of the People 
The act of emphasizing the sovereignty of the people can assume two different shapes: 
a more abstract and a more concrete one. In the former variant, the speaker refers to the 
people as the theoretical origin of power in democracy as it is illustrated in the following post: 
«At the Congress of the Austrian Trade Union Federation, Federal Chancellor Werner 
Faymann reminds us: The law emanates from the people, and not – as some believe – 
from gold. [Original: Bundeskanzler Werner Faymann erinnert beim ÖGB- 
Bundeskongress daran: Das Recht geht vom Volk aus und nicht wie manche glauben: 
Das Recht geht vom Gold aus.]» (Laura Rudas, Social Democratic Party of Austria, 18 
June 2013, Facebook) 
In this case, the speaker also stresses the fact that the populist (in this case not the 
speaker herself but the leader of her party) has not forgotten the people’s right to sovereignty, 
in contrast to “some” others who think that “money” was the source of power instead. This 
undefined “some” may also be regarded as an implicit attack on the elites. 
In the latter variant, the speaker demands more power for the people and he explicitly 
promotes the implementation of direct democratic elements, such as popular votes:  
«Referendum Bill passes first Commons stage, bringing us one step closer to giving the 
British people a say on Europe» (David Cameron, British Conservative Party, 5 July 
2013, Twitter) 
It is an interesting finding that both of the above posts originate from representatives 
of mainstream parties – one social democratic and one conservative – and they were sent by 
(or at least relate to) the party leaders and heads of government. This proves that not only the 
typical populist actors emphasize the sovereignty of the people. 
Advocating for the People 
The act of advocacy is usually performed by stressing that the populist is a true 
representative of the people, as it is done in the following two posts:  
«I am putting Labour back where it should always have been, on the side of working 
people» (Ed Miliband, British Labour Party, 13 February 2013, Twitter) 
«This is why UKIP are the party for the hard working British people» (Nigel Farage, 
UKIP, 14 May 2013, Twitter) 
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In these cases, the people are characterized as “working” or even “hard working”. This 
feature targets the working class without excluding other segments of the population. It bears 
resemblance to a “personal action frame” such as the ‘Put People First’ campaign in the 
London 2009 protests (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 744) which is highly inclusive and allows 
a broad range of recipients to identify themselves with. In the cases at hand, both the social 
democratic Labour Party and the right-wing UKIP assert an almost identical claim. This 
demonstrates the versatility and thin nature of the populist ideology which can be used in 
different contexts and charged with more substantive ideologies. 
Sometimes, the speaker also uses a figure of speech (a special form of synecdoche 
known as “the whole for a part”) to replace “people” with the name of their home country, 
such as “Austria” in the following post: 
«With us, Austria comes first! [Original: Mit UNS kommt Österreich zuerst!]» (Heinz-
Christian Strache, Freedom Party of Austria, 15 May 2013, Twitter) 
Superficially, this may create the impression as if the populist stands up for the entire 
country and all its inhabitants. In fact, “Austria” does only refer to the people in the populist 
understanding of the word, excluding the elites and any potential ‘others’. Nonetheless, the 
slogan can be regarded as personal action frame and leaves it to the individual social media 
user to decide if he or she can identify with the populist concept of the country. 
Attacking the Elites 
When a speaker attacks the elite, she or he usually targets a particularly privileged or 
powerful segment of the population. However, the elite may be portrayed as occupying a 
distinct subsystem of society – such as politics, economics, law or media. 
Political elite. The most obvious type of elite is the political elite as it is attacked in the 
following two posts: In the first one, the speaker refers to the political elite in a more general 
sense as a separated “political class”. This already has a pejorative undertone to it, even more 
so in the German-language original version of the post, where the speaker specifically uses 
the French word “classe politique” to linguistically underline the social elevation of the elite. 
The political elite is accused of having organized a “coup” (against the people) and the populist 
party expresses its determination to “fight” it (and to restore popular sovereignty). 
«The SVP fights against coup of the political class. [Original: SVP kämpft gegen 
Staatsstreich der Classe politique.]» (Lukas Reimann, Swiss People’s Party, 15 March 
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2013, Twitter) 
In the second post, the political elite assumes a more concrete shape and is embodied 
by a series of political parties, namely almost all relevant national parties except for the 
populist party led by the speaker himself. These parties are accused of corruption and greed 
and of living not up to their own standards of transparency:  
«Look at the crystal palace of corruption and greed in which the self-proclaimed clean 
parties SPÖ, ÖVP, BZÖ, Stronach and Greens reside… [Original: In welchem Glaspalast 
von Korruption und Geldgier die selbsternannten Sauberparteien SPÖ, ÖVP, BZÖ, 
Stronach und Grüne sitzen…]» (Heinz-Christian Strache, Freedom Party of Austria, 29 
August 2013, Twitter) 
Economic elites. Another option for the populist actor is an attack on the economic 
elite as conducted in the following two posts:  
«Those who managed to reach the top in recent years haven’t been the best for a long 
time but rather the most greedy, most corrupt, and most shameless [Original: Jene, 
die es in den letzten Jahren bis nach ganz oben geschafft haben, sind schon lange nicht 
mehr die Besten, sondern die Gierigsten, Korrumpiertesten, Schamlosesten.]» (Cédric 
Wermuth, Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, 8 March 2013, Facebook) 
As already demonstrated for the political elite, the economic elite can be referred to 
in a general sense, here as those at the “top”. And as the political elite in the previous post, 
the economic elite is here described as being “corrupt” and “greedy”. 
Beside the general reference, it is also possible to target the economic elite more 
specifically. In the following post, the speaker refers to the participants of the World Economic 
Forum’s annual winter meeting in Davos. The speaker argues that this elite does not care for 
the people and that it does not assume its social responsibility to provide them with jobs. The 
people are characterized as “from the street”. Although this is actually an ambiguous 
formulation, it means rather “common” or “ordinary” than “homeless”.  
«Some report the elite (in Davos) is afraid of the street. But if they provided the people 
from the street with jobs they would not need to be afraid of them [Original: Manche 
berichten, die Elite (in Davos) habe Angst vor der Strasse. Aber sie sollte durch eine 
andere Wirtschaftspolitik die Menschen von der Strasse in die Arbeit bringen, dann 
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bräuchten sie keine Angst vor ihnen haben.]» (Hannes Swoboda, Social Democratic 
Party of Austria, 24 January 2013, Facebook) 
It is no coincidence that both of the above attacks on the economic elites have been 
posted by Social Democrats because it is highly compatible with their left-wing ideology 
including the critique of capitalism, and social equality.  
Legal elites. Beside the classic political and economic elites, populist actors also attack 
legal elites. In the following post, the speaker refers to the Swiss federal court’s decision to 
verify whether popular initiatives are in line with international law before admitting them to 
the popular vote. Questioning the sovereignty of the people as highest authority is regarded 
as a “coup” and “dictatorship of judges”:     
«Federal court positions international law above Federal Constitution. This is 
unconstitutional. A coup, a dictatorship of judges. [Original: Bundesgericht stellt 
Völkerrecht über Bundesverfassung. Das ist verfassungswidrig. Ein Staatsstreich, eine 
Richterdiktatur.]» (Christoph Mörgeli, Swiss People’s Party, 8 February 2013, Twitter) 
Supranational elites. The tension between national sovereignty and international 
institutions that was already implicitly touched upon in the previous post is pushed even more 
to the fore when supranational elites are attacked. In the following post the speaker accuses 
the EU officials in Brussels of earning inappropriate high salaries and squandering the people’s 
taxes. In this way, the EU officials are also located at the point of intersection between the 
political and the economic elite: 
«Unbelievable how taxpayer’s money is handled in Brussels. The EU officials earn 
top salaries and… [Original: Unglaublich, wie in Brüssel mit dem Geld der Steuerzahler 
umgegangen wird. Die EU-Beamten verdienen Traumgagen und...]» (Heinz-Christian 
Strache, Freedom Party of Austria, 27 August 2013) 
Media elites. Another act of populism is attacking the media elites. Particularly the 
national public service broadcasters are regarded as being part of the establishment by 
populist actors. In the following post, the speaker calls the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation 
“Red Radio” and accuses it of being heavily slanted towards the political left:     
«Austrians know that the Red Radio is far from being objective. [Original: Die 
Österreicher wissen, dass der Rotfunk von Objektivität weit entfernt ist.]» 
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(Heinz-Christian Strache, Freedom Party of Austria, 25 August 2013, Twitter) 
A public service broadcaster is also the target of the following post, when the speaker 
demands the abolition of the reduced pension age for the managers of the Swiss Broadcasting 
Corporation. These managers assume the role of a hybrid between the economic and media 
elite. They are explicitly contrasted to the “normal Swiss workers”: 
«What applies to the normal Swiss worker should also apply to the bosses of the Swiss 
Broadcasting Corporation: Pension age of 65 instead of 62 [Original: Was für den 
normalen Schweizer Büezer gilt, soll auch für die SRG-Chefs gelten: Rentenalter 65 
statt 62.] » (Natalie Rickli, Swiss People’s Party, 14 April 2013, Twitter) 
In summary, many posts that feature attacks on the elite are characterized by a 
relatively harsh tone. They include attributions of “corruption” and “greed”, as well as a 
special pejorative terminology (such as “coup”, “political class”, and “red radio”). It is unlikely 
that, in the mass media, the journalists would allow the populists to articulate themselves in 
this way without any critical intervention or further contextualization. This terminology, 
however, goes together well with the network logic of social media by increasing the attention 
of the followers and the potential virality of the posts.  
Ostracizing Others 
A typical case of ostracism is provided by the following post, where the speaker lists a 
series of groups that the populist actors do not regard as part of the people and intend to 
deport. These groups all share a foreign origin or religion:  
«HC Strache and the FPÖ will send criminal foreigners, fraudulent asylum seekers, 
extremist islamists and preachers of hate back to their home country! [Original: „HC 
Strache und die FPÖ werden kriminelle Ausländer, Asylbetrüger und extremistische 
Islamisten und Hassprediger in ihr Heimatland zurück schicken!]» (Heinz-Christian 
Strache, Freedom Party of Austria, 19 May 2013, Twitter) 
However, it is worth noting that the speaker seems to have carefully ensured that all 
groups are characterized as criminal offenders or at least as operating in the gray area of 
legality. This may have been a strategy to avoid being charged with sedition. 
Besides this very explicit case of ostracism, there are also much more implicit examples. 
Although the following post is formulated in a positive way it also entails its respective 
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negation meaning that there is no citizenship for non-integrated foreigners. This is a very 
subtle way of transporting populist ideology from one like-minded person to another without 
making oneself vulnerable to others:  
«Swiss citizenship only for well-integrated foreigners [Original: Schweizer Bürgerrecht 
nur für gut integrierte Ausländer.]» (Lukas Reimann, Swiss People’s Party, 5 March 
2013, Twitter) 
An even more sophisticated form of ostracism is established by accusing others of 
ostracism. In the following post, the speaker argues that the ‘others’ insulted the populist 
actors as “right-wing or extremist” but not without calling them “communist do-gooders” 
himself. Here, the discriminatory feature of the ‘others’ is not foreign origin or religion but 
political attitude: 
«Everything the left-wing and communist do-gooders don’t like is insulted as right-wing 
or extremist [Original: Alles was den linken und kommunistischen Gutmenschen nicht 
passt, wird als rechts und extremistisch verunglimpft.]» (Heinz-Christian Strache, 
Freedom Party of Austria, 21 May 2013, Twitter) 
Remarkably, the above presented acts of ostracizing others were performed by right-
wing populist actors, which is in line with their ideology that partly leans towards nationalism. 
Analogous to the attacks on the elite, the posts that ostracize others frequently include 
pejorative terms (such as “fraudulent” and “do-gooders”). Again, it appears unlikely that these 
messages would pass the gates of the mass media logic uncontestedly. However, the posts 
comply to the network media logic of “attention maximation” (Klinger & Svensson, 2016, p. 
29) and may exert suggestive power on like-minded social media users.    
Invoking the Heartland 
The heartland can be invoked with a single key word. In the following post, the speaker 
refers to the year “1291”, in which the Federal Charter and founding document of the Swiss 
Confederacy was issued. The Confederacy was initially founded to secure free trade, peace 
and independence for the communities of the Central Alps. Therefore, 1291 is widely regarded 
as a symbol for the autonomy and prosperity of Switzerland and the speaker makes use of this 
symbolic power. He implied that the achievements of 1291 were at risk because the Swiss 
government had decided to accept the European Court of Justice as final authority. As a 
countermeasure he suggested a popular vote to restore the sovereignty of the people:     
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«Unbelievable! What was 1291 actually good for? The Federal Council capitulates and 
wants foreign EU judges. Now we need a popular vote! [Original: Unfassbar. Wozu war 
eigentlich 1291 gut? Bundesrat kapituliert und will fremde EU-Richter. Jetzt aber 
Volkswahl!]» (Christoph Mörgeli, Swiss People’s Party, 17 May 2013, Twitter) 
The heartland can also be invoked by the mentioning of a person. The soldier Guy 
Fawkes was a central figure behind the so-called Gunpowder Plot in 1605, an attempt to blow 
up the British Parliament and kill King James due to the persecution of Catholicism under his 
rule. Throughout the centuries, Fawkes has served as icon and object of projection for various 
social movements. He has become an important part of British popular culture and the masks 
of both Anonymous and Occupy Wall Street were modelled after his face. When the UKIP 
welcomed Philip Fawkes, a distant descendant of Guy Fawkes, as a new member party leader 
Nigel Farage drew on this extensive cultural background: 
«Was Guy Fawkes the last man to enter Westminster with honest intentions? UKIP has 
its own Mr Fawkes, sharing the same lineage» (Nigel Farage, UKIP, 26 January 2013, 
Facebook) 
Combining the People and the Elite 
Whereas the previous posts each included a single ideological key element the following 
examples combine the people and the elite. The next post can be regarded as a cautious 
reminder that the political elite should represent the people:  
«In recent weeks the financial sector has concertedly attacked the implementation of 
the tax. Politicians need to defy the lobbyists and demonstrate that they take sides with 
the citizens. [Original: In den vergangenen Wochen hat es einen konzertierten Angriff 
des Finanzsektors gegen die Einführung der Steuer gegeben. Politiker müssen sich 
diesen Lobbyisten widersetzen und beweisen, dass sie auf der Seite der Bürgerinnen und 
Bürger stehen.]» (Werner Faymann, Social Democratic Party of Austria, 19 June 2013, 
Facebook) 
In the following two posts the speakers argue more aggressively that the political elite – 
be it the government or the mainstream parties – already does not represent the people 
anymore. Both speakers use a democratic-theoretical vocabulary referring to the “people’s 
will” and the “principles of the constitution”. Accordingly, this can be regarded as a 
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combination of popular sovereignty and attacks on the elite: 
«The people’s will truly does not count for the Federal Council. [Original: Der 
Volkswillen zählt beim Bundesrat wirklich nicht mehr.]» (Natalie Rickli, Swiss People’s 
Party, 26 June 2013, Facebook) 
 
«Austrian interests do not count anymore. SPÖ und ÖVP support this and have 
jettisoned the principles of our constitution by agreeing to the European Stability 
Mechanism and the Fiscal Stability Treaty [Original: Österreichische Interessen zählen 
nichts mehr. SPÖ und ÖVP unterstützen diesen Weg und haben mit dem Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus und dem Fiskalpakt die Grundsätze unserer Verfassung über 
Bord geworfen.]» (Karl Schnell, Freedom Party of Austria, 29 April 2013, Facebook) 
The next speaker omits the democratic-theoretical argument and introduces the 
populist actor instead. It starts with the argument that the populist movement is the true 
representative of the people. In this case, this includes the classic statement that the populist 
is neither left-wing nor right-wing but transcends all traditional political alignments. This is 
contrasted to the political elite which is characterized as uniform and harmful. Thus, we can 
regard this post as combination of advocacy for the people and attacks on the elite: 
«The Five Star Movement is not left-wing (nor right-wing). It is a movement of Italians. 
You don’t want to cooperate with those who ruined Italy. We don’t want to have them 
onboard. PD, SEL or PDL, one or another, for me they are all the same [Original: Il 
Movimento 5 Stelle non è di sinistra (e neppure di destra). E' un movimento di italiani. 
Non vuole fare ‘percorsi insieme’ a chi ha rovinato l'Italia. Pesi a bordo non ne 
vogliamo. Pd, Sel o Pdl, questi o quelli, per me pari sono.]» (Beppe Grillo, Five Star 
Movement, 19 May 2013, Facebook) 
The final post spans the full circle from popular sovereignty over attacks on the elite to 
advocacy for the people. It can be regarded as the most complete manifestation of populist 
ideology on social media we have encountered. This is even more remarkable when 
considering that the post was condensed in less than 140 characters as required by Twitter: 
«In these 20 years have we have fought for the sovereignty of the people and for 
preventing that it was mortified by the games of the palace [Original: In questi 20 anni 
abbiamo combattuto per primato sovranità popolare e per impedire che fosse 
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mortificato dai giochi di palazzo.]» (Angelino Alfano, People of Freedom, 3 June 2013, 
Twitter) 
The two final posts combine personal action frames (e.g. “movement of Italians” and 
“sovereignty of the people”) with colorful language (e.g. “ruined” and “mortified”). While the 
first element contributes to the inclusiveness of the post, the second one aims at raising 
emotions and increasing attention. In this way, the speakers use the network media logic to 
effectively spread their messages. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
It is a major finding of this study that populism manifested itself in a fragmented form 
on social media. Even though all five key definitional elements appeared across the posts and 
tweets under analysis, the elements were generally isolated from each other or clustered in 
pairs, at the most. We admit that this may have been partly due to Twitter’s restrictions to 140 
characters but it also applied to Facebook. Therefore, the fragmentation could be an empirical 
expression of populism’s “thin” nature (Kriesi, 2014, p. 369; Mudde, 2004, p. 544) and 
“inherent incompleteness” (Taggart, 2004, p. 275). 
We can offer three potential reasons why politicians may spread populist ideology in a 
fragmented form: First, the speakers may aim at reducing the ideology’s low level of 
complexity even further in order to make it more comprehensible for the social media users. 
Second, the politicians may keep the populist ideology ambiguous and malleable in order to 
benefit from the inclusiveness of a “personal action frame” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 
744). This means that the individual social media user can complement fragments of populist 
ideology with various additional ideological elements and tailor it to her or his specific political 
attitudes. Third, fragments of populism may, more easily than a full-fledged ideology, travel 
below the radar of political opponents and critical observers from one like-minded person to 
another. These three aims can be easier reached on social media without the interference of 
the mass media’s journalistic gatekeepers and filter mechanisms. 
We also found populist elements across countries, parties, and politicians’ status levels. 
These elements were included in posts from Austria, Italy, Switzerland and the UK. Even 
mainstream parties such as Labour and the Conservatives in the UK or the social democrats in 
Austria and Switzerland made populist statements. Populism was articulated by typical 
populist leaders, such as Nigel Farage, Heinz-Christian Strache, or Beppe Grillo, heads of states 
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(e.g. Werner Faymann and David Cameron), political celebrities such as Natalie Rickli, or vocal 
backbenchers like Lukas Reimann. 
In terms of individual ideological elements, the analysis revealed that by demanding 
sovereignty to the people politicians include aspects of democratic theory in their arguments. 
They either generally mention the people as the origin of power in democracy or they demand 
the implementation or enhancement of direct-democratic elements, such as popular votes. In 
this way the populists thrive on the tension between the “redemptive” and the “pragmatic” 
face of democracy (Canovan, 1999, p. 8). 
Besides, we showed that advocacy for the people is more than the mere mentioning of 
the word “people” as suggested by previous studies. It typically implies the populist actor 
perceiving himself as true representatives of the people. Sometimes the “people” are specified 
further with additional attributes or replaced by the name of the associated country. 
Furthermore, we illustrated that the elites attacked by populist actors may vary 
substantially, be them political, economic, legal, supranational, or media elites. However, 
there is empirical indication that the economic elite is preferably attacked by left-wing 
politicians while media elites are predominantly targeted by right-wing populists. Both is 
compatible to their respective ideologies and thus appears plausible. 
We demonstrated that the ostracism of others can be conducted either explicitly by 
openly denouncing certain social groups or indirectly by means of implicit negation and 
accusing others of ostracism. However, all these forms are predominantly propagated by right-
wing parties such as Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). This is 
in line with Jagers and Walgrave (2007) who found that, among the political parties in Belgium, 
only the extreme-right Vlaams Blok exercised this form of populism. 
Priester (2012) and Taggert (2004) considered the “heartland” a key element of 
populist ideology. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to capture the empirical 
invocation of the heartland in media content. Our analysis indicates that the heartland can be 
triggered by the mentioning of a single name or date depending on the cultural background. 
We conclude that the heartland may function as an ideological repository from which the 
populist may draw in order to enrich the thin ideology of populism with elements of 
nationalism, socialism, or liberalism. Therefore, the heartland may be crucial for a deeper 
understanding of populism and should be the subjected to further studies. 
Moreover, we identified combinations of ideological elements from the spheres of the 
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people and the elite. We could also come up with one example spanning the full circle of the 
populist argument from popular sovereignty over attacks on the elite to advocacy for the 
people. This proves that, in particular cases, it is also possible that relatively high doses of 
concentrated populist ideology are transmitted through social media. 
Overall, this study sheds light on an important part of the “hybrid media system” 
(Chadwick, 2013; Chadwick et al. 2016). When populist actors appear in the press or on TV, 
they have to comply to the mass media logic (Klinger and Svensson, 2015, 2016). They are 
usually subjected to journalistic routines and may be critically analyzed or negatively evaluated 
(Herkman, 2015). We could illustrate, however, that the network logic of social media gives 
the populists more freedom for the use of strong language when attacking the elites and 
ostracizing others. Social media also facilitate the use of “personal action frames” (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2013, p. 744) that evolve around the concept of “the people”, the notion to put a 
certain country “first”, or the inclusive “we”. Based on these findings, we conclude that social 
media are particularly well-suited to meet the communicative preferences of populist actors 
and that they provide them with a convenient instrument to spread their messages. We could 
even go so far and argue that populism thrives on the logic of connective action. Consequently, 
we suggest that further studies on populism should not only focus on the mass media part of 
the hybrid media system but should take social media account as well.  
  
 
 
20 
 
References 
Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Reinemann, C., Strömbäck, J., de Vreese, C. (Eds.) (2016). Populist political 
communication in Europe. Oxford: Routledge 
Abts, K. & Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus democracy. Political Studies, 55(2), 405– 424 
Agarwal, S. D., Barthel, M. L., Rost, C., Borning, A., Bennett, W. L., & Johnson, C. N. (2014). Grassroots 
organizing in the digital age: Considering values and technology in Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street. 
Information, Communication & Society, 17(3), 326-341. 
Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain and the 
Netherlands. Journalism, 12(8), 931–945 
Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: A new spectre for Western Europe. In D. Albertazzi 
& D. McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy 
(pp. 1–11). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Bartlett, J. (2014). Populism, social media and democratic strain. In G. Lodge & G. Gottfried (Eds.), 
Democracy in Britain: Essays in honour of James Cornford (pp. 91–96). London: Institute for Public 
Policy Research 
Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action. Information, Communication & 
Society, 15(5), 739-768 
Betz, H.-G. (1994). Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Betz, H.-G. & Johnson, C. (2004). Against the current – stemming the tide: The nostalgic ideology of the 
contemporary radical populist right. Journal of Political Ideologies, 9(3), 311–327 
Bimber, B. (1998). The Internet and political transformation: Populism, community, and accelerated 
pluralism. Polity, 31(1), 133–160. 
Bos, L., van der Burg, W., & de Vreese, C. H. (2011). How the media shape perceptions of right-wing 
populist leaders. Political Communication, 28(2), 182–206 
boyd, d., & Crawford, K. (2012). Critical questions for big data. Information, Communication, & Society, 
15(5), 662–679 
Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 
47(1), 2–16 
Canovan, M. (2002). Taking politics to the people: Populism as the ideology of democracy. In Y. Mény 
& Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 25–44). Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Chadwick, A. (2013). The hybrid media system: Politics and power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chadwick, A., Dennis, J. & Smith, A. P. (2016). Politics in the age of hybrid media: Power, systems, and 
Media logics. In A. Bruns, G. Enli, E. Skogerbø, A. O. Larsson, & C. Christensen (Eds.), The Routledge 
companion to social media and politics (p. 7–22). New York: Routledge 
Cranmer, M. (2011). Populist communication and publicity: An empirical study of contextual 
differences in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review, 17(3), 286-307. 
Dahl, R. A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Daniel, J. (2012). Sampling essentials: Practical guidelines for making sampling choices. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage 
Gerbaudo, P. (2014). Populism 2.0. In D. Trottier & C. Fuchs (Eds..), Social media, politics and the state: 
Protests, revolutions, riots, crime and policing in the age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (p. 16–
67). New York: Routledge 
Groshek, J., & Engelbert, J. (2013). Double differentiation in a cross-national comparison of populist 
political movements and online media uses in the United States and the Netherlands. New Media 
& Society, 15(2), 183–202 
Hallin, D. C. & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Hawkins, K. A. (2010). Venezuela’s Chavismo and populism in comparative perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Herkman, J. (2015). The life cycle model and press coverage of Nordic populist parties. Journalism 
Studies, DOI: 10.1080/1461670x.2015.1066231 
 
 
21 
 
Ionescu, G., & Gellner, E. (Eds.). (1969). Populism: Its meanings and national characteristics. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Jagers, J. & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of 
political parties' discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), 319–345. 
Jansen, R. S. (2011). Populist mobilization: A new theoretical approach to populism, Sociological 
Theory, 29(2), 75–96 
Freelon, D & Karpf, D. (2015). Of big birds and bayonets: Hybrid Twitter interactivity in the 2012 
Presidential debates. Information, Communication & Society, 18(4), 390-406 
Klinger, U., & Svensson, J. (2015). The emergence of network media logic in political communication: A 
theoretical approach. New Media & Society, 17(8), 1241-1257 
Klinger, U., & Svensson, J. (2016). Network media logic: Some conceptual considerations. In A. Bruns, 
G. Enli, E. Skogerbø, A. O. Larsson, & C. Christensen (Eds.), The Routledge companion to social media 
and politics (p. 23–38). New York: Routledge 
Krämer, B. (2014). Media populism: A conceptual clarification and some theses on its effects. 
Communication Theory, 24(1), 42–60 
Kriesi, H. (2014). The populist challenge. West European Politics, 37(2), 361–378 
Kuckartz, U. (2014): Qualitative text analysis: A guide to methods, practice and using software. Los 
Angeles: Sage. 
Kumar, A. (2011). The Tea Party movement: The problem of populism as a discursive political practice. 
Javnost – The Public, 18(4), 55–72 
Mazzoleni, G. (2003). The media and the growth of neo-populism in contemporary democracies. In G. 
Mazzoleni, J. Stewart, & B. Horsfield (Eds.), The media and neo- populism: A contemporary 
comparative analysis (pp. 1–20). Westport: Praeger 
Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty-first 
century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy (pp. 49– 64). Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Mazzoleni, G. (2014). Mediatization and political populism. In F. Esser & J. Strömbäck (Eds.), 
Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of Western Democracies (pp. 42–56). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mény, Y. & Surel, Y. (2002). The constitutive ambiguity of populism. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), 
Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 1–21). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 542–563 
Priester, K. (2007). Populismus: Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus. 
Priester, K. (2012). Wesensmerkmale des Populismus. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 62(5–6), 3–9 
Rooduijn, M. (2014). The mesmerising message: The diffusion of populism in public debates in Western 
European Media. Political Studies, 62(4), 726–744 
Rooduijn, M., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Measuring populism: Comparing two methods of content analysis. 
West European Politics, 34(6), 1272–1283 
Rooduijn, M., De Lange, S. L., & Van der Brug, W. (2014). A populist zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion 
by populist parties in Western Europe. Party Politics, 20(4), 563-575. 
Shils, E. A. (1956). The torment of secrecy: The background and consequences of American security 
policies. Glencoe: The Free Press 
Stephansen, H. C. & Couldry, N. (2014). Understanding micro-processes of community building and 
mutual learning on Twitter: A “small data” approach. Information, Communication & Society, 
17(10), 1212-1227. 
Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Taggart, P. (2002). Populism and the pathology of representative politics. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), 
Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 62-80). Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. Journal of Political 
Ideologies, 9(3), 269–288 
APPENDIX 
100 
 
ARTICLE II 
 
Extreme parties and populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries 
 
ABSTRACT 
Parties are adapting to the new digital environment in many ways; however, the precise 
relations between populist communication and social media are still hardly considered. This 
study compares populist communication strategies on Twitter and Facebook employed by a 
broad spectrum of left-wing, center, and rightwing political actors in six Western democracies. 
We conduct a semi-automated content analysis of politicians’ social media statements (N = 
1400) and find that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form and is mostly used by 
political actors at the extremes of the political spectrum (both right-wing and left-wing), by 
opposition parties, and on Facebook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S., & Esser, F. (2017) Extreme parties and  
populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries. Information, 
Communication & Society 20(9), 1347-1364. 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Information, Communication and Society on 29 
May 2017, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1329333 
  
Extreme Parties and Populism: An Analysis of Facebook and Twitter 
across Six Countries 
 
Nicole Ernst, Sven Engesser, Florin Büchel, Sina Blassnig, and Frank Esser 
Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research (IPMZ), University of Zurich, Switzerland 
 
 
Abstract 
Parties are adapting to the new digital environment in many ways; however, the precise 
relations between populist communication and social media are still hardly considered. This 
study compares populist communication strategies on Twitter and Facebook employed by a 
broad spectrum of left-wing, center, and right-wing political actors in six Western 
democracies. We conduct a semi-automated content analysis of politicians’ social media 
statements (N = 1400) and find that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form and is 
mostly used by political actors at the extremes of the political spectrum (both right-wing and 
left-wing), by opposition parties, and on Facebook. 
 
Keywords: Populist communication; Social Media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
1 
 
Over the past two decades, populist actors around the globe have made headlines. 
Mudde (2004) even argues that populism has become “mainstream in the politics of Western 
democracies” (p. 542). We are also living in digital times. Online media and social network 
platforms offer politicians new communication channels. In the emerging hybrid media 
system (Chadwick, 2013), political actors familiar with online and offline platforms gain a 
crucial advantage in party politics (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016).  
These new communication possibilities also affect populism. An excellent example is 
the case of the Spanish political movement Podemos that has challenged old media logic by 
intensively and successfully using digital media (Casero-Ripolles, Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016). 
Social media offer political actors another channel to promote themselves and actively, 
personally, and directly communicate with their electorate and provide politicians with 
unmediated and inexpensive access to voters (Golbeck, Grimes, & Rogers, 2010; Jacobs & 
Spierings, 2016). Social media as a channel fits the populist message by being non-hierarchical 
(Bartlett, 2014) and providing populist actors with the opportunity to circumvent traditional 
news channels (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017).  
Although scholars have intensively investigated the relationship between political 
populism and the mass media, as well as political actors on social media, the combination of 
populist communication and social media has rarely been investigated. Most of the extant 
research consists of case studies of single countries, predefined populist actors, or elections 
(Bartlett, 2014; Gerbaudo, 2015; Groshek & Engelbert, 2013; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). 
One exception is a qualitative study by Engesser, Ernst, Esser, and Büchel (2016) that 
investigates how politicians use social media for populist purposes. 
This study embraces a broader perspective by comparing populist communication 
strategies of a broad spectrum of left-wing, center, and right-wing political actors on two social 
media platforms (Twitter and Facebook) in six Western democracies (CH, DE, UK, US, IT & FR). 
This study investigates to what extend political actors use populist communication strategies 
on social media and which channel they prefer for populist communication. By identifying key 
aspects of populist political communication and investigating how populist communication 
strategies are used by various political actors on social media, we follow a communication-
centered approach (Stanyer, Salgado, & Strömbäck, 2017). We will show that populist 
communication strategies are mostly used by political actors at the edges of the political 
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spectrum (right-wing and left-wing) and by opposition parties. In terms of social media 
platforms, Facebook achieves higher populism values than Twitter. 
Defining Populism and Populist Communication Strategies 
At the end of the 20th century, populism was attributed with “constitutional 
ambiguity” (Taguieff, 1997, p. 11) and described as a “notoriously vague term” (Canovan, 
1999, p. 3). Accordingly, most definitions of populism suffered from “inherent 
incompleteness” (Taggart, 2004, p. 275). 
Nowadays, scientists widely agree upon the conceptualization of populism as a thin 
(and less elaborate) ideology (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 
2004; Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017) and as a “set of ideas” 
(Hawkins, 2009; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015; Taggart, 2000). Other authors have conceived 
of populism as a communication style (Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011; Canovan, 1999; 
Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt, 2016), a political strategy (Weyland, 2001), or an instrument 
for mobilization  (Jansen, 2011). We define populism as a thin ideology that, considers – from 
a Manichean point of view – society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups, “the good people” versus “the bad elite” and which postulates the 
ultimate und unrestricted sovereignty of the people (Wirth et al., 2016). 
Due to its ideological thinness, populism can be enriched with thicker and more 
substantive ideologies (Kriesi, 2014; Mudde, 2004) like nationalism, liberalism, or socialism. 
Depending on the supplemented ideologies, the notion of the people and the elite can vary. 
While right-wing populism tends to define the people as nation and is more likely to attack 
elites such as the current government or mass media, left-wing populism conceives the people 
as class and may denounce economic and religious elites (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Kriesi, 
2014). 
Populism maintains a complex relationship with democracy; scholars have described it 
both as a threat and a corrective (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Populism presents, 
independent from the perspective, a serious challenge to contemporary democracies, as it 
rejects crucial aspects of democracies like ‘checks and balances’ (Kriesi, 2014). Kriesi (2014) 
therefore argues that the populist vision of democracy is illiberal. However, populism 
challenges democracies from within the democratic system (Abts & Rummens, 2007), which 
clearly separates it from anti-system and extremist movements (Mudde, 2004).  
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Following this conceptualization, populism consists of three core concepts: the people, 
the elite, and popular sovereignty. However, when this thin ideology is communicated to the 
public, the populist actor himself becomes a crucial element. The populist actor claims to 
represent the people’s will, acts as their only true representative, and maintains a close 
relationship with the people. In fact, the populist actor transports the three core dimensions 
of populism into the public agenda by using a set of populist communication strategies. Based 
on the three theoretical core dimensions of populism and the existing literature discussing 
populist communication strategies (Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011; Cranmer, 2011; 
Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), nine populist communication strategies have been developed and 
assigned to one of the three core dimensions of populism (Wirth et al., 2016): 
The first dimension – people-centrism – consists of four strategies that advocate for 
the people. The populist actor can demonstrate his closeness to the people, stress their 
virtues, praise their achievements or describe them as a monolithic group. The second 
dimension – anti-elitism – combines three populist communication strategies that are all 
conflictive toward the elites. Populist actors discredit or blame the elite in their 
communication and detach the elite from the people. The last dimension of populism – 
restoring sovereignty – comprises two strategies. On the one hand, the populist actor 
demands popular sovereignty by advocating for the people’s sovereignty. On the other hand, 
the populist actor can also establish a negative and conflictive approach by denying the elite’s 
sovereignty. These nine populist communication strategies refer to the content of 
communication and are used to express support for a specific ideology.1 The relations 
between the core dimensions of populism are visualized in Figure 1.  
Social Media as a Platform for Populism 
Social media such as networking sites (e.g., Facebook) and microblogging services (e.g., 
Twitter) play a major role in the political communication strategies of contemporary parties 
(Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013). Unlike legacy media, social media are built upon the logic of 
virality, which compels political actors to communicate primarily those messages that users 
like, comment on, promote, and share within their networks (Klinger, 2013). It is not enough 
for political actors to maintain a social media account; they also need to be connected to many 
others because high numbers of Facebook friends and Twitter followers signal popularity.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Thin Populism 
 
While traditional “mass media logic” is based on professional gatekeepers and a 
relatively passive audience, “network media logic” evolves from interest-bound and like-
minded peer networks (Klinger and Svensson, 2015). Within these networks, politicians can 
communicate in two distinct ways (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015): By directly communicating to 
their followers and friends, politicians reach their “primary audiences” (p. 1026). This direct 
communication relates to the model of a one-step flow of communication introduced by 
Bennett and Manheim (2006). If this direct communication is re-circulated by their followers, 
politicians extend their network’s reach to a “secondary audience” (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015, 
p. 1026). Since this indirect communication is mediated by choices of the primary audience 
and not controlled by the politician itself, it follows the logic of the two-step flow of 
communication hypothesis (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). The potential of a secondary audience 
for political actors should not be underestimated, since followers of political actors are mainly 
active opinion leaders on Facebook (Karlsen, 2015) or people who have a high visibility on 
Twitter (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015). 
A theoretical relation between populism and online communication was already 
established in the late 1990s by Bimber (1998), who explored the Internet’s potential to 
“restructure political power in a populist direction” (p. 137) and the possibility of an 
“unmediated communication between citizens and the government” (p. 137). We argue that 
Bimber’s argument is still valid and that the four following points underline the positive effect 
and opportunity structures for populist communication on social media.  
First, populist actors require a “direct, unmediated access to the people’s grievances” 
(Kriesi, 2014, p. 363) because they are the self-perceived advocates and mouthpieces of the 
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people. Via social media, this direct connection to the people and the political actor’s followers 
is automatically given, due to the network characteristics. On social media, gatekeepers can 
neither select which messages are considered newsworthy, nor can journalists restrict and 
frame these messages (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Hence, unlike press releases, populist actors 
can spread their messages directly and unmediated by circumventing gatekeepers (Esser et 
al., 2017; Moffitt, 2016).  
Second, social media provide populist actors with the opportunity for a close 
connection to the people, a crucial element for populism to flourish (Kriesi, 2014; Taggart, 
2000). Social media allow populist actors to connect with their voters at a human level and 
possibly create stronger ties due to the lower barriers of interaction. Jacobs and Spierings 
(2016) describe these advantages of social media as “human-contact opportunity” (p. 23). 
Social media makes politicians – and populist actors in particular – more approachable, as 
social media can create a feeling of “social presence” (Kruikemeier, van Noort, Vliegenthart, 
& de Vreese, 2013), which results in a stronger and closer connection between populist actors 
and their followers.  
Third, social media enhance the potential of personalization by linking to an individual 
visualization of the private and personal life of the populist actor and by offering a look behind 
the scenes (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Here, populist actors have a higher degree of freedom 
to shape their messages and focus on personalized messages by writing about their personal 
lives, their feelings and emotions, and their competencies and professional activities (Golbeck 
et al., 2010).  
Finally, unlike any other media channel, social media offer the opportunity to connect 
with specific groups, “like-minded others”, or “kindred souls” (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016, p. 24). 
This target-group opportunity is especially fruitful for populist actors, as they can use harsh 
language to attack a common enemy within their network (Engesser et al., 2016). 
Taken together, the opportunities for direct and unmediated access by circumventing 
gatekeepers, the close connection to the people, high personalization possibilities, and the 
target-group opportunity render social media an especially convenient instrument for populist 
messages.  
Hypotheses 
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The aim of this study is to investigate to what extent political actors use populist 
communication strategies on social media and which channel they prefer for populist 
communication. To pursue these questions, three main hypotheses are formulated. 
Numerous studies, especially those with a focus on Western democracies, have 
considered radical right-wing parties or actors as populist. However, our definition of 
populism as a thin ideology and the chameleonic nature of populism (Taggart, 2000) imply 
that populism can be combined with various ideologies and should not be exclusively 
restricted to right-wing parties. European examples such as the Spanish movement Podemos 
(Casero-Ripolles et al., 2016) show that left-wing political actors successfully use populism in 
their communication. Especially in the context of social media, Engesser et al. (2016) 
demonstrate that populist communication via social media is not restricted to alleged right-
wing populist actors. 
Other studies were interested in whether parties to the ends of the political spectrum 
are more inclined to employ populist communication strategies than parties of the center are. 
The available studies that are comparative in nature are so far limited to content analyses of 
party manifestos (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015; Steenbergen & Weber, 2015), press releases 
(Bernhard, 2016), or interviews with MPs (Landerer, 2014); none examined social media. They 
indicate, however, that radical parties are more prone than moderate parties to challenge the 
current establishment, attack the elite, and glorify the people in their political communication 
strategies. In order to ascertain whether previous findings can also be applied to the social 
media sector, we will test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Political actors on the left and right fringes of the party spectrum use more populist 
communication strategies than moderate or centrist parties. 
Furthermore, we argue that having a public political office or being in opposition to the 
government influences the amount of populism in communication on social media. Mény and 
Surel (2002) argue that “populist parties are by nature neither durable nor sustainable parties 
of government” and “remain predominantly in opposition” (p. 18). In line with this argument, 
Heinisch (2003) notes that when right-wing populist parties enter government, their unique 
strengths turn into disadvantages. Even where governments include a right-wing populist 
party, or are supported by them (Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016), discrediting and 
blaming the alleged elites remains a core feature of populist actors. We also expect social 
media to be a favorite tool of the political opposition. As van Kessel and Castelein (2016) show, 
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populist parties mainly target incumbent mainstream parties and politicians via Twitter. 
Hence, the second hypothesis to be tested is: 
H2: Opposition parties use a greater amount of populist communication strategies than 
governing parties. 
Following Cranmer (2011), our third argument states that specific characteristics of a 
communication channel influence the degree of populist communication. Research on general 
political communication on social media usually does not differentiate between the various 
social media platforms. Empirical studies either investigate Twitter or Facebook in isolation, 
or summarize the two in one category, sometimes combined with further platforms such as 
YouTube. The results are then discussed as aggregated social media effects, with no distinction 
made between platform types. However, each social media platform has its own unique 
architecture, culture, and norms (Smith, Fischer, & Yongjian, 2012). The platforms also differ 
in terms of technical infrastructure, terminology, and appearance (Larsson, 2015). Moreover, 
users are fully aware of these differences and engage with the platforms differently (Yoo & Gil 
de Zúñiga, 2014). Especially when investigating populism, we argue that it is crucial to analyze 
whether the two most common and intensively used social media platforms, Facebook and 
Twitter, differ in the degree of populist communication. 
We expect that the use of populist communication strategies is higher for Facebook 
for the following four reasons. First, Facebook in general has more reciprocal message 
exchanges, which brings the users closer together and may enhance the quality of 
interpersonal communication (Yoo & Gil de Zúñiga, 2014) and foster social capital (Ellison, 
Vitak, Gray, & Lampe, 2014).  
Second, Facebook and Twitter are different in their levels of proximity, as only Twitter 
allows users to remain anonymous (Yoo & Gil de Zúñiga, 2014). Friending or liking someone 
on Facebook requires greater commitment than simply following a Twitter account. 
Therefore, the connection between Facebook users is generally more intensive, personal, and 
intimate. Populist actors benefit from this closer connection as it helps them to demonstrate 
their proximity to the people and potential voters.  
Third, Twitter is often described as primarily used for consuming and distributing 
professionally relevant information (Hermida, 2010). The average Twitter user is younger, 
better educated, more urban and higher in socio-economic status than the average 
population. Facebook, on the other hand, is more popular and socially mixed (Duggan, et al., 
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2015). Twitter is moreover widely used by journalist as a reporting (Vis, 2013) and research 
tool (Swasy, 2016). Due to Twitter’s stronger professional and purpose orientation, political 
actors may consider it less suitable for spreading blunt and emotional appeals than Facebook.  
Finally, Facebook has an advantage in that messages are not limited to 140 characters, 
which gives political actors the opportunity to make their case more effectively and 
elaborately. The unlimited space, in combination with the longer lifespan of Facebook posts, 
is the fourth factor expected to lead to higher levels of populist communication on Facebook. 
Hence, the third hypothesis reads as follows: 
H3: The extent of populist communication strategies is higher on Facebook than on 
Twitter. 
Method 
We conducted a semi-automated content analysis (Wettstein, 2014b) of Facebook 
post and Tweets by 88 leading politicians from six countries during a three-month period in 
2015 using the coding interface Angrist (Wettstein, 2014a). Twitter and Facebook were chosen 
because they are currently the two most popular services, especially for political actors 
(Larsson, 2015). 
Sample  
We selected six Western democracies (CH, DE, UK, US, IT, and FR) that are broadly 
similar in some but sufficiently different in other respects. The sample provides sufficient 
variability regarding parliamentary vs presidential systems, representative vs directional 
systems, consensus vs majoritarian systems, strong vs weak standing of populist parties (in 
parliament or public opinion), or higher vs lower consumption of social media for political 
information purposes (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; Newman, 
Fletcher, Levy, & Nielsen, 2017).  
As populism is a transnational phenomenon that can be found across borders, we are 
not focusing on comparing single nations but on comparing political parties and social media 
platforms. By comparing the relationships between party types (H1, H2) or platform types (H3) 
and populist communication, the consideration of our six countries serves as a robustness 
check to determine whether these relationships hold in different contexts. If we are able to 
confirm the relationships between our independent and dependent variables in this multitude 
of countries, it would raise the confidence in the validity and generalizability of our findings 
substantially. 
   
 
9 
 
For each country, we selected five parties: on the one hand, the four largest parties in 
parliament across the left-right spectrum; on the other hand, the most influential party 
commonly described as populist in the scientific literature. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the 29 selected parties. 
Table 1: Sample of Political Parties including Ideological Stance Score (CHES) 
Country 
Political stance 
Left Moderate left Center Moderate right Right 
CH 
Green Party of 
Switzerland 
Social Democratic 
Party of Switzerland b 
Christian 
Democratic 
People's Party b 
FDP.  
The Liberals b 
Swiss People's  
Party a b 
1.9 2.1 5.5 6.9 8.3 
DE 
Alliance'90/ 
The Greens 
Social Democratic 
Party of Germany b 
Union  
Party b 
Free Democratic 
Party 
Alternative for 
Germany a 
3.6 3.8 5.9 6.5 8.9 
FR 
Europe Ecology 
– The Greens 
Socialist  
Party b 
The Democratic 
Movement 
The  
Republicans 
National  
Front a 
3.1 3.8 5.9 7.7 9.6 
IT 
Federation of 
the Greens 
1.3 
Democratic Party b 
Civic  
Choice b 
5.4 
Forza  
Italia a 
6.7 
 
3.6 
Five Star Movement a 
4.7 
 
UK 
 
Green  
Party 
Labour  
Party Liberal Democrats Conservative Party
 b 
UK 
Independence 
Party a 
1.9 3.6 4.9 7.0 9.1 
 
USA 
 
Green  
Party 
Democratic  
Party b  
Republican  
Party 
Tea Party 
Movement a 
Note: a = party widely described as populist in the literature; M5S was prioritized over Lega Nord, due to its 
stronger social media affinity and because another right-wing populist party, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, was 
already part of the sample; b = governing party 
 
Within each party, politicians were selected according to two criteria: on the one hand, 
according to the highest hierarchical position in the country or party (head of government 
and/or party leader) in 2015; on the other hand, according to the highest social media 
resonance (most followers on Twitter) in January 2015. With regard to the first criterion, we 
accounted for the fact that party leaders can serve different functions in different political 
systems; with regard to the second criterion, only the number of Twitter followers was 
consulted to ensure equivalence across countries.2 Based on this selection procedure, the 
verified Facebook and Twitter profiles of 110 politicians were included in the sample (for 
details, see Table 4 in the online appendix). Party leaders or head of government without a 
social media account could not be considered.   
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The social media material was downloaded using the tool Facepager (Keyling & Jünger, 
2013) during a three-month period from September until November 2015. We selected a 
political routine-time period to ensure we captured debates on a variety of political issues. A 
partial exception was Switzerland where parliamentary elections were held in October; 
however, due to the Swiss direct democratic system, elections are considered less relevant 
than the numerous referenda and initiatives about the ‘really important’ issues (no public vote 
took place during sampling period). Included in the analysis are only Tweets and Facebook 
posts that include actual statements of a politician and are longer than eight characters. 
Simple retweets as well as Tweets or Facebook posts including only pictures, links, or videos 
were excluded from the analysis. This procedure provided a large universe of Facebook posts 
(N = 10,069) and Tweets (N = 28,761) from which we drew a randomized sample of not more 
than 50 Tweets and 50 Facebook posts per politician (if possible). This yielded an initial sample 
of 4,698 items.  
Of this initial sample, we processed only those Tweets and posts that included a 
veritable statement by a politician which contained either a position or an elaboration on a 
political issue or an evaluation or an attribution of a target actor (N = 1,440). We discarded 
the rest; we further excluded politicians with less than five statements in total. This led to a 
final sample of N = 845 Facebook posts and N = 555 Tweets sent out by 88 politicians. For 
testing the first two hypotheses, the data are aggregated on the level of politicians; for 
analyzing the third hypothesis, the data is calculated on the statement level without any 
aggregation.   
Units of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is a single statement made by a politician’s respective social media 
account (speaker) on a target actor or an issue. A social media statement can contain one or 
several of these statements by one speaker. Speaker, target actor, and issue are defined as 
follows: 
Speaker: A politician’s respective social media account is considered a speaker. 
Because retweets are excluded from the analysis, only statements that are written by the 
politicians have been included. 
Target actor: An actor characterized or evaluated by a speaker’s statement counts as 
target actor, such as other politicians, organizations, elites, the people, etc. The speaker 
himself can also be a target actor when he utters a statement about himself. 
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Issue: An issue is a subject area addressed by a speaker’s statement, such as an 
election, immigration, or security. 
Strategies that advocate for the people (people-centrism) or attack elites (anti-elitism) 
are measured at the level of the speaker’s statements about target actors. The strategies that 
protect sovereignty (restoring sovereignty) are coded as statements on issues.  
A team of intensively trained student coders reached acceptable levels of reliability. 
The average Brennan and Prediger’s kappa across all strategies is .83 (see online appendix, 
table 6)3. All coders had to pass an initial reliability test (137 statements) before being 
admitted to the coder pool. Additionally, a concealed reliability test (382 statements) was 
conducted during regular coding sessions. 
Operationalization 
Populist communication strategies. The nine populist communication strategies are 
operationalized using a broad set of categories (for details see online appendix, table 3). These 
variables can be regarded as formative measures, which means that a strategy is not required 
to be internally consistent in order to be reliable or valid (Diamantopoulos, Riefler, & Roth, 
2008). For each category, we code whether a given social media statement is present or not. 
A strategy is considered present if at least one of its respective categories is identified in a 
statement. The dependent variable – populism index – is present if at least one of the nine 
populist communication strategies is present. Original examples of populist statements are 
reported in table 5 in the online appendix.  
Party categories. The 88 politicians belonging to 29 different parties are first placed on 
a left and right spectrum using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2014). The 
parties are assigned to categories based on their score on the overall ideological stance (see 
Table 1). We had to assign the four US-American parties ourselves because the CHES data only 
include European countries. Additionally, we calculate an indicator of party extremism by 
centering the original CHES score. For each party score, we subtract the theoretical center of 
the scale (minus 5) and square each result to obtain a measure of party extremism. High levels 
on the scale identify parties – both left- and right-wing – at the extreme of the political 
spectrum; low levels characterize parties based at the center of the spectrum.4 Next to party 
ideology, a dummy for parties that were not in the government during the three-month time 
period (opposition party) and a dummy for Facebook is calculated. 
Findings 
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Sample Description 
Overall, the results reveal that roughly every tenth statement on Twitter and Facebook 
(10.6%) contains at least one populist communication strategy (Figure 2). Anti-elitist 
sentiments are slightly more prominent (6.4%) than strategies on the people-centrism 
dimension (4.3%), whereas strategies that protect popular sovereignty are almost absent 
(0.1%). A closer look at the strategies level reveals that blaming (4%) and discrediting elites 
(3.5%), describing a monolithic people (2.8%), and demonstrating closeness to the people 
(1.6%) are the most frequent strategies. 
Figure 2: Share of all Populist Communication Strategies (N = 1400) 
Note: The figure depicts the proportion of the nine populist communication strategies, the three sub-dimensions 
and an overall amount in percent. 
Hypotheses 
To test the three hypotheses, we conduct analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) using the 
populism index as the dependent variable. The independent variables vary respectively 
(extreme vs centrist party, opposition vs government party, Facebook vs Twitter) for each 
analysis. For the first two hypotheses, conducted at the level of political actors, a dummy 
controlling for national elections in Switzerland is included. For the third hypothesis, the 
length of all Twitter and Facebook statements is included as a control variable in the analysis. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that political actors placed on the left and right fringes of the 
party spectrum use more populist communication strategies than moderate or centrist parties 
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do. This hypothesis is supported (F(4, 83) = 2.88, p < .05, η2 = .123)5. Figure 3 plots the mean 
values of the different parties on the left-right scale for the populism index (for a detailed 
overview, see table 7 in the online appendix). As predicted, politicians belonging to right 
parties used populist communication strategies most frequently (M = .14, SD = .08), followed 
by moderate right (M = .11, SD = .10) and left parties (M = .10, SD = .08). Moderate left (M = 
.07, SD = .08) and center parties (M = .05, SD = .11) use almost no populist communication 
strategies in their social media communication. The use of populist communication is 
therefore stronger for politicians belonging to parties at the extremes of the political 
spectrum. Moreover, the analysis shows that all right-wing parties score higher on the 
populism index than left-wing parties. 
 
Figure 3: Use of Populist Communication Strategies by Parties on the Left-Right Scale 
 
Hypothesis 2 anticipates that opposition parties use a higher amount of populist 
communication strategies than governing parties do. This hypothesis is supported (F(1, 85) = 
8.58, p < .01, η2 = .092)6. As expected, overall populist communication via social media is 
higher for opposition parties (M = .11, SD = .09) than parties currently in government (M = .05, 
SD = .07). 
The third hypothesis predicts that the extent of populist communication strategies is 
higher on Facebook than on Twitter. The analysis reveals that indeed, overall populist 
communication is higher on Facebook (M = .13, SD = .33) than on Twitter (M = .07, SD = .26). 
Hence, the third hypothesis can be supported (F(1, 1394) = 10.20, p < .001, η2 = .007)7. 
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For the purpose of multivariate validation, we test the effects of all three independent 
variables on populist communication in a single OLS regression model. The analysis includes 
party extremism and dummies for opposition parties and Facebook. As the United States is 
not included in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, US parties are excluded from this analysis. The 
findings confirm that populist communication is higher for extreme (β = .061, p < .05) and 
opposition parties (β = .093, p < .001) as well as on Facebook (β = .085, p < .001)8. On statement 
level the explained variance of the model is rather small (R2 = 0.021). However, if the data is 
aggregated to higher levels, the explained variance increases to 12 percent at the level of 
politicians (R2 = 0.123) and 31 percent at the level of parties (R2 = 0.312). The regression 
analysis cross-validates the argument that populist communication is dependent on each of 
the included independent variables (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: OLS regression of populist communication strategies (N = 1205) 
  Populist communication strategies 
  b SE β Tolerance VIF 
Constant .019 .020    
Party extremism .003 .002 .061* .88 1.13 
Opposition party .059 .019 .093*** .89 1.11 
Facebook .054 .018 .085*** .98 1.02 
Adjusted R2 0.019*** 
Notes: OLS: ordinary least squares; SE: standard error. 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to investigate which political actors use populist 
communication strategies on social media and which social media platform they prefer. We 
define populism as a thin ideology with three core dimensions of populism (people-centrism, 
anti-elitism, and restoring sovereignty) as a starting point to deduce nine populist 
communication strategies. We theorized that four characteristics make social media highly 
compatible with populist communication: A direct access to the audience without journalistic 
interference, a close connection to the people, an infinite potential for personalization, and 
the possibility to target specific groups.  
We find evidence that an extreme party position and opposition status favor an 
increased use of populist communication on social media. Political actors placed on the left 
and right fringes of the party spectrum (both right- and left-wing fringe parties) draw on 
populist strategies more often than centrist parties do. This result supports the first 
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hypothesis. This pattern is consistent in Switzerland, Germany, US and the UK (with exception 
for the Green Party). In Southern Europe however, we identified a linear increase of populist 
communication from left to right-wing parties. We speculate that this is influenced by the 
disillusionment of Italian and French left-wing parties since the 1960s: However, future 
research should investigate this further. Consistent with previous results, right-wing parties 
use populism to a higher degree than left-wing parties; in our sample, the right-wing parties 
were usually those that are also labeled as populists. With regard to the discussion about 
populism as a “thin” ideology that is enriched with specific “thick” ideologies (Kriesi, 2014; 
Mudde, 2004), our findings indicate that in the analyzed Western democracies populism it is 
more often combined with elements of right-wing ideologies than left-wing ideas. However, 
our results also challenge a commonly held assumption – especially in the context of European 
Western democracies – that populism is only a right-wing phenomenon. Fringe parties located 
at the (far) left also use a great amount of populism in their social media communication. 
Our study further demonstrates – on the solid base of a six-country sample – that 
opposition parties use higher amounts of populist communication strategies on social media 
than government parties. This finding corroborates our second hypothesis and fits earlier 
findings that populist communication is mainly used for attacking and discrediting the political 
elite by simultaneously advocating for the people. The third important result of the study is 
the necessary differentiation between the two social media platforms and the conclusion that 
both fringe and opposition parties rely in particular on Facebook for their populist 
communication strategies. Facebook’s advantages include higher levels of proximity and 
reciprocity, unlimited space for messages, and its non-elite character. We can support our 
third hypothesis because Facebook seems to be the preferred channel for political actors to 
advocate for the people and blame or criticize elites. Switzerland is the only country that 
reports higher levels of populism on Twitter, which may be influenced by the occurrence of 
the national election. This Swiss finding also fits recent US experience where the 2016 
presidential election campaign also favored an avid Twitter user. Future studies should 
investigate if Facebook is still the preferred communication channel for populism after 2017 
and during election campaigns.  
Taken together, these comparisons demonstrate that populist communication is 
indeed affine to social media. Fringe and opposition parties use these channels to 
communicate directly with voters by bypassing the journalistic filters. They do so to get their 
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messages out that might be less visible in legacy media. Furthermore, the fact that the amount 
of populism is higher on Facebook is a further indicator that Facebook lends itself to 
establishing a close connection to specific target groups and to personalized communication. 
We further found that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form. The dimension 
of restoring sovereignty is almost absent, and the two existing core dimensions of populism 
hardly ever co-occur on social media. However, the finding that all analyzed statistical 
relations are robust across the dimensions of people-centrism and anti-elitism shows that 
these are both relevant dimensions that complement each other. Despite the fragmented 
empirical manifestation of populism, we argue that our strategy to identify three core 
dimensions of populism is a fruitful approach. Schulz et al. (2017) demonstrated that the 
three-dimension approach is essential for systemizing populist attitudes. Additionally, we 
were able to identify some statements that included both dimensions in one statement. 
Moreover, twenty percent of our investigated politicians combine at least two dimensions 
across all of their messages. This means that on the politicians’ level, social media users are 
confronted with both dimensions. 
Despite some exceptions, populism on social media is a fragmented phenomenon and 
the complete picture of the three core dimensions hardly ever occurs. This is in line with 
Engesser et al.’s (2016) results. They present three arguments: (1) politicians may reduce the 
complexity of the thin ideology to make it more comprehensive for their followers; (2) 
politicians may keep the populist ideology ambiguous and malleable to open the possibility 
that users can complement it with their own political attitudes; and (3) fragments of populism 
may travel more easily below the radar of political opponents and critical observers. 
Additionally, the question of why the dimension of restoring sovereignty is practically 
absent must be addressed. The absence may be explained by the fact that demanding popular 
sovereignty for the people or denying sovereignty of elites may be something that is essential 
for the ideology of populism but not communicated via the personal and extremely direct 
channels of social media. Although populist actors are aware of this important dimension, they 
may consciously decide not to communicate this part of the ideology. Moreover, the idea of 
restoring sovereignty may be captured to some extent within the other two dimensions. 
There are some limitations of this study that must be considered. One limitation is the 
rather low sample size in terms of selected countries, included parties, and platforms. 
Accordingly, the findings represent a specific sample of countries and parties and any 
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generalizations must be drawn carefully. Because the party sample includes more far right-
wing parties scoring high on the CHES score, it would be beneficial to include more far left 
parties in the sample such as the German “The Left”, the French “Left Front”, or the Italian 
“Communist Refoundation Party” to further investigate the use of populist communication by 
fringe parties. However, in the six selected countries, far left wing parties have low vote shares 
on the national level and mostly non-influential actors in the national political process.9 
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to include them in the analysis to examine if the 
identified U-curve withstands and even further increases on the left side. Adding additional 
social media platforms such as YouTube or online media like political blogs would shed some 
more light on the question of which is the favorite online channel for populism.  
A second limitation is the routine-time period without any elections. Populist 
communication might be different during election campaigns, and show a more complete 
picture of populism. Moreover, during the three-month period, migration was a highly 
debated issue. The discussion of the migration wave was fertile ground for populism, 
especially on the right-wing spectrum, which may explain the higher presence of populist 
communication compared to left wing parties during that time. Future studies should strive 
to sample both routine periods as well as election campaigns to compare populist 
communication across these different modes of operation. 
Another limitation is that only populist communication strategies have been 
investigated and potential populist style elements such as dramatization, or black and white 
rhetoric have been neglected. By not only focusing on the content of a communicated populist 
ideology and taking the way this content is communicated into account, a more complete 
picture of the populist communication could be presented.  
A final limitation is the fact that only written statements by politicians are analyzed. 
Including posted links, pictures, videos, or retweets might help to answer the question about 
the complete nature of populist communication on social media. Especially analyzing the 
messages of posted pictures and videos might prove fruitful.  
To conclude, this study adds to the current research on populist communication in the 
media by systematically investigating how politicians use populist communication strategies 
in their day-to-day social media communication. Future research should follow a 
communication-centered approach and investigate the broad political spectrum, with a 
special emphasis on right- but also left-wing fringe parties. Moreover, it is crucial to 
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differentiate between the various social media platforms. Moreover, the next logical step 
would be to investigate the use of populist communication in different media outlets by 
comparing communication on social media with traditional on- and offline news media, 
broadcast news, or political talk shows.  
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Notes 
1 Populist styles like emotional or colloquial language, simplification or scandalization on the 
other hand refer to the way the content is presented.   
2 Politicians with high social media resonance are identified through the following sources:  
CH: http://twittermonitor.somepolis.ch 
DE: http://www.bundestwitter.de/politiker and https://pluragraph.de/categories/politik   
FR: http://www.elus20.fr/classement-politique-twitter-facebook/#twitter 
 and http://ymobactus.miaouw.net/labo-top-politiques.php 
IT: http://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/profiles/italy/society/politics 
UK: https://thegeographist.wordpress.com/2014/10/08/uk-100-most-followed-british-
politicians-on-twitter 
US: http://www.davemanuel.com/the-most-popular-us-politicians-by-twitter-followers-163 
and http://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/profiles/united-states/society/politics/ 
3 As the distribution of populist statements in the reliability test is skewed and most individual 
statements do not contain any populism, we use Brennan and Prediger’s Kappa (Brennan & 
Prediger, 1981) as a measure of reliability. As Quarfoot and Levine (2016) have shown, this 
measure is more robust in assessing reliability of rare categories than Krippendorff’s Alpha 
and Cohen’s Kappa (p. 397). 
4 The sample contains parties with higher right-wing scores compared to left-wing parties, 
which results in a slight positive skewness (.217) of party extremism.  
5 We can report the same pattern for the single sub-dimensions: parties at the extremes of the 
political spectrum use more anti-elitist (F(4, 83) = 3.74, p < .01, η2 = .154) and people-centrist 
statements (F(4, 83) = .181, ns, η2 = .009). Country comparison for the overall use of populism 
revealed the same u-curve for DE, CH, UK and US. However, in southern Europe (FR and IT) 
the pattern is different as we report a linear increase form left to right-wing parties. 
6 Opposition parties used more populism across all six democracies and both dimensions: anti-
elitism (F(1, 85) = 9.91, p < .01, η2 = .104) and people-centrism (F(1, 85) = .444, ns, η2 = .005). 
7 The degree of anti-elitism (F(1, 1394) = 2.07, p < .05, η2 = .001) and people-centrism (F(1, 
1394) = 8.85, p < .01, η2 = .006) is higher on Facebook than on Twitter. Country comparison 
revealed that Switzerland is the only country where Twitter reported higher degrees of populism 
compared to Facebook (F(1, 214) = 5.315, p < .05, η2 = .024. 
8 When the absolute value instead of squared scores of party extremism is included in the OLS 
regression, the effects for opposition parties (β = .096, p < .001) and Facebook (β = .085, p < 
.001) are identical. For party extremism, we can only report a trend (β = .056, p = .065).  
9 With exception of the German «The Left» which is especially on the regional level, more 
influential by being part of the regional governments compared the other far left parties.  
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Social media have changed politics. The days of politicians being almost entirely 
dependent on professional journalists to distribute their messages to the wider public are 
over. In hybrid media systems, where new and old media are increasingly intertwined and 
complement each other (Chadwick 2013; Kübler and Kriesi, 2017), politicians can choose from 
a variety of communication channels to achieve their goals. Twitter and Facebook, in 
particular, provide political actors with unfiltered access to the public and allow politicians to 
communicate directly with their voters (Golbeck et al. 2010; Jacobs and Spierings 2016; Esser 
et al. 2017). These opportunities allow populist politicians such as Beppe Grillo or Geert 
Wilders to spread their messages to their voters without any journalistic intervention. In sum, 
social media are particularly well-suited as channels of populist communication (Ernst et al. 
2017a): They provide direct access to the public without external interference; they offer the 
possibility of establishing a close and direct connection to the people; they foster the potential 
for targeted, personalized forms of communication; and they can create a feeling of 
community, belonging and recognition among otherwise scattered groups (see also Engesser 
et al. 2017b).   
Against this backdrop, it is obvious that the National Center of Competence in Research 
on ‘Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century’ (NCCR Democracy) decided to examine the 
relation between populism and social media in more detail. The introductory text to this 
debate section (by Kübler and Kriesi, 2017) has already established the wider context and 
explained the relationship between mediatization, globalization and the populist response. Of 
particular interest for this article are the new opportunities provided by new media to political 
actors. In a previous publication, we have demonstrated – by way of qualitative analysis – how 
populist actors craft their messages when spreading aspects of their ideology via the media 
(see Engesser et al. 2017a). In another six-country quantitative analysis, we established that, 
compared with centrist parties, extreme and opposition parties are more populist on social 
media and that they use Facebook more often than Twitter for populist communication, at 
least outside of election campaign periods (Ernst et al. 2017a).  
The present article expands on these earlier NCCR publications and seeks to 
demonstrate that parties at both fringes of the political spectrum are more inclined than 
mainstream political parties to use populist communication on social media. The specific 
affinity of extreme parties for populist communication has already been documented by other 
scholars who analyzed party manifestos (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017; Steenbergen and 
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Weber 2015), press releases (Bernhard 2016) and interviews with parliamentarians (Landerer 
2014). We advance the existing literature by extending the validity of this pattern to social 
media. We focus our analysis on two dimensions of populism – people-centrism and anti-
elitism – and explore how often these dimensions are addressed by left-wing and right-wing 
parties in their respective online communication repertoires. We will utilize a dataset that 
includes information on a wide range of parties from five Western democracies, and, after a 
brief comparative overview, will focus on the exemplary case of Switzerland. We will 
investigate, in-depth, how five major Swiss parties use populist communication and whether 
they prefer people-centrism or anti-elitism in their messages on Facebook and Twitter.  
Populist Communication and its Measurement 
Populism is defined as a thin ideology (Aalberg et al. 2017; Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2008; Abts and Rummens 2007; Mudde 2004; Kübler & Kriesi, 2017) that considers society to 
be separated in two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the “the good people” versus “the 
bad elite,” and postulates the unrestricted sovereignty of the people (Wirth et al. 2016). Due 
to its ideological thinness, populism can be enriched with thicker ideologies (Kriesi 2014; 
Mudde 2004) such as nativism, authoritarianism, liberalism, or socialism. Therefore, populism 
is not an exclusively right-wing phenomenon. Rather, European examples, such as the Greek 
party Syriza (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014) or the Spanish movement Podemos (Casero-
Ripolles et al. 2016), illustrate that left-wing political actors use populism in their 
communication, too.  
Once conceptualized as a thin ideology, populism can be regarded as consisting of 
three core dimensions: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and demands for restoring national 
sovereignty (Wirth et al. 2016). These ideological components are further broken down into 
“key messages” (see Table 1) when populist actors communicate them to the public via the 
media. We conducted a statement-level quantitative content analysis of the Tweets and 
Facebook posts of 77 politicians from five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom) during a three-month period in 20151. For each country, 
we investigated the five largest parties in parliament across the left-right spectrum. In 
Switzerland, for instance, this included – from left to right – the Green Party (GPS), the Social 
Democrats (SP), the Christian Democrats (CVP), the Liberals (FDP) and the Swiss People’s Party 
                                                          
1 Analyzed are the official and verified Facebook and Twitter accounts of 77 politicians 
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(SVP). In the 2015 general election, these five parties received an aggregated total of 83 
percent of the Swiss vote share (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2015).  
Across all countries, we selected politicians for inclusion in our study according to two 
criteria: they held a high position within government or their party (e.g., head of government 
or party leader) or had high resonance on social media (followers on Twitter) as of January 
2015. For the final analysis, we considered only those Tweets and Facebook posts by 
politicians that explicitly addressed an issue or a social actor. This yielded 1,220 social media 
statements, of which 217 were made by Swiss politicians. 
The units of analysis are single social media statements made by a ‘speaker’ about an 
‘issue’ or about a ‘target actor’. Statements could contain one or several populist messages by 
one speaker. A team of multi-lingual student coders were trained extensively until their 
intercoder agreement scores reached acceptable levels of reliability (Brennan and Prediger’s 
κ = .83).  
Behind the three dimensions of people-centrism, anti-elitism and demands for 
restoring sovereignty, we identified nine concrete populist “key messages” (Table 1). 
Theoretically speaking, these key messages denote sentence-level speech acts by politicians 
or other communicators, and these statements are the communicative building blocks of 
larger ideological dimensions. The nine key populist messages that we derived from the 
relevant research literature (see Wirth et al., 2016) are listed in Table 1. To measure the 
occurrence of these key messages, we developed a codebook with several categories for each 
key message. When at least one of the nine key messages was evident in a social media post, 
we treated this occurrence as a manifestation of ‘populist communication’.  
To locate European parties and their politicians on the left-right scale, we relied on the 
classification system of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2014). For a more 
thorough description of the methodological procedures, we refer the reader to our previous 
study, published as Ernst et al. (2017a). 
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Table 1: Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populist Communication 
Dimension 
Populist 
“key 
messages” 
Underlying 
ideology 
Content analysis categories used to capture key 
message on social media 
Anti-Elitism 
Discrediting 
the elite 
Elites are corrupt. 
Elites are accused of being malevolent, criminal, lazy, 
stupid, extremist, racist, undemocratic, etc. The elite 
are called names and denied morality, charisma, 
credibility, intelligence, competence, consistency, etc. 
Blaming the 
elite 
Elites are harmful. 
Elites are described as a threat/burden, responsible for 
negative developments/situations, or as having 
committed mistakes or crimes. Elites are described as 
not being a source of enrichment or responsible for 
positive developments/situations. 
Detaching 
the elite 
from the 
people 
Elites do not 
represent the 
people. 
Elites are described as not belonging to the people, not 
being close to the people, not knowing the people, not 
speaking for the people, not caring for the people, or 
not performing everyday actions. 
People-
Centrism 
Stressing 
the people’s 
virtues 
The people are 
virtuous. 
The people are bestowed with morality, charisma, 
credibility, intelligence, competence, consistency, etc. 
The people are exempt from being malevolent, 
criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, racist, undemocratic, 
etc. 
Praising the 
people’s 
achievemen
ts 
The people are 
beneficial. 
The people are described as being an enrichment or 
responsible for a positive development/situation. The 
people are described as not being a threat/burden, not 
being responsible for negative 
developments/situations, nor as having committed 
mistakes or crimes. 
Stating a 
monolithic 
people 
The people are 
homogenous. 
People are described as sharing common feelings, 
desires, or opinions. 
Demonstrati
ng closeness 
to the 
people 
The populist 
represents the 
people. 
The speaker describes himself as belonging to the 
people, being close to the people, knowing the people, 
speaking for the people, caring for the people, 
agreeing with the people, or performing everyday 
actions. The speaker claims to represent or embody 
the people. 
Restoring 
Sovereignty 
Demanding 
popular 
sovereignty 
The people are the 
ultimate sovereign. 
The speaker argues for general institutional reforms to 
grant the people more power (by introducing direct-
democratic elements or increasing political 
participation). The speaker argues in favor of granting 
more power to the people within the context of a 
specific issue (e.g., election, immigration, security). 
 
Denying 
elite 
sovereignty 
The elites deprive 
the people of their 
sovereignty. 
The speaker argues in favor of granting less power to 
elites within the context of a specific issue (e.g., 
election, immigration, security). 
 
 
Findings 
 To explore whether parties from either end of the political spectrum are more prone 
to using populist communication, we conducted linear and quadratic OLS regressions. We 
used the amount of populist communication on social media as the dependent variable and 
the CHES score for parties as the independent variable. Across all 25 investigated parties from 
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five countries, we found that every tenth Facebook or Twitter statement (11%) contained at 
least one populist key message. Whereas the first two dimensions are used with almost equal 
frequency – six percent of social media statements are anti-elitist and five percent are people-
centrist – the third dimension and the associated demands for more national sovereignty 
remain largely unused (below 1%) during the study period. 
More importantly, our findings show a clear U-curve pattern, illustrating that extreme 
parties use more populist key messages than center parties across the five countries. The 
respective quadratic regression explains 30% of variance (p < .05). In this way, we support 
previous empirical evidence that both left- and right-wing politicians use populism in their 
communication (Cranmer 2011; Jagers and Walgrave 2007) – but we can extend this finding 
to five countries and to social media. 
Separate quadratic regression analyses for each country reveal that the U-curve 
pattern is consistent for Germany (R2 = .66), Great Britain (R2 = .70) and Switzerland (R2 = .93).2 
In fact, Switzerland represents an “exemplary case” in this regard, with 93 percent of Swiss 
parties’ political communication styles explained by this U-curved pattern (see Figure 1). 
Because Switzerland illustrates the essential features of “bipolar populism” so well, we will 
analyze this case in the remainder of this article more thoroughly (on the value of exemplary 
case study analysis, see Yin 2003).3  
In Switzerland, five percent of all social media messages contain at least one populist 
key message. If we look at the individual parties, we see in Figure 1 that the SVP (11%), GPS 
(6%) and FDP (6%) particularly use populism in their Twitter and Facebook communication, 
whereas the CVP (3%) and SP (2%) are more reluctant to use populist communication. It is 
thus not only the usual suspect SVP that resorts to populist key messages (Ernst et al. 2017a) 
but also the Green Party (March 2007). However, we have reasonable grounds on which to 
believe that behind this apparent resemblance, there are notable differences in the use of 
populist online communication by right- and left-wing parties.  
 
                                                          
2 In Italy (R2 = .90) and France (R2 = .94), we find a significant linear effect from left to right but not a 
curvilinear effect. This indicates that in these two countries, the New Left (Greens) refrains from populist 
communication, whereas the New Right (Forza Italia, National Front) relies on it heavily. This can be traced back 
to the peculiar histories of the Italian and French left-wing parties since the 1960s.  
3 For a more comparative cross-national picture see Ernst et al. (2017a).  
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Figure 1: Amount of populist communication on social media by Swiss parties 
 
To gain a better understanding of this difference, we divide the broad concept of 
populist communication (Figure 1) into its main sub-dimensions: people-centrism (Figure 2) 
and anti-elitism (Figure 3). The third dimension, demands to restore sovereignty, is not 
considered further in this analysis because of its rare occurrence. Starting with people-
centrism, it becomes immediately clear from Figure 2 that this dimension is mostly used by 
the left-wing Greens and Social Democrats, while it remains largely ignored by the centrist and 
right-wing parties. The linear regression expressing the relationship between people-centrism 
and left-wing party orientation explains 72 percent (p = .68) of the social media 
communication of Swiss politicians. Particularly, the GPS uses messages on social media that 
advocate for the people. These messages stress the people’s virtues and achievements and 
are designed to express closeness between Green politics and the people. In summary, our 
results support earlier findings by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) that Green and Social 
Democratic parties also behave in a partially populist manner – not by excluding outsiders but 
by championing the causes of ‘the people’.  
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Figure 2: Amount of people-centrist messages on social media by Swiss parties 
 
Moving to the individual analysis of anti-elitism (Figure 3), we find another very clear 
relationship: The farther right a party is located on the political spectrum, the more it uses 
anti-elitist messages in its social media communication. The linear regression explains 77% of 
variance (p < .05). Particularly, SVP and FDP circulate conflictual messages against the elites; 
these messages tend to discredit elites, blame them for alleged failures and present elites as 
detached from the ‘the people’. Again, we can corroborate the finding of Jagers and Walgrave 
(2007) that right-wing parties tend to rely on exclusivist communication that is negative 
toward elites.  
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Figure 3: Amount of anti-elitist messages on social media by Swiss parties 
 
Conclusion and Outlook 
 The brief analysis presented here supports previous findings that parties at both ends 
of the political spectrum have a greater affinity for populist communication than moderate 
mainstream parties do. Furthermore, by investigating the exemplary case of Switzerland in 
more detail, we can confirm that it is not only the SVP that uses populist key messages (e.g. 
Engesser et al., 2017a; Cranmer, 2011) but that the GPS and FDP rely on populist 
communication too. By analyzing the two major dimensions of populism separately, we also 
demonstrated that left-wing parties tend to emphasize people-centrist messages, whereas 
right-wing parties tend to use anti-elitist messages more.  
It is noteworthy that the two dimensions invite different styles of political 
communication: whereas the first is more advocative (‘pro’ people), the second is more 
conflictive in nature (‘against’ elites). The Green Party of Switzerland focuses mainly on the 
advocative people-centrism dimension by claiming closeness to Swiss voters or portraying 
them as unified in their preferences. A cynic could argue that the GPS does not realize its full 
populist potential because, as an opposition party, the Greens could attack and discredit the 
ruling political or financial elite even more. This brings us to the right-end of the scale, where 
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the Swiss SVP represents an exception to the widely held assumption that populist parties may 
be successful when opposing other parties but lose their unique strength once entering the 
government (Heinisch 2003). Although the SVP has been part of the government for decades 
and has been winning the largest voter shares in general elections since 2003 (Ernst et al. 
2017b), the party remains extremely critical of political, legal, cultural, and media elites. By 
being part of the government and simultaneously acting as government’s biggest critic, the 
SVP fulfills a dual role. Its former leader Christoph Blocher, in particular, mastered this double 
role by successfully promoting himself as challenger of the allegedly corrupt and incapable 
government, while, simultaneously, being part of the very same government.  
During the period under investigation, politicians of the Social Democrats used the 
fewest populist messages on social media and only emphasized the people-centrism 
dimension. This low share may be explained by a division of labor with the party’s independent 
youth organization, “Young Socialists of Switzerland (JUSO)”. JUSO’s online communication 
typically features multiple populist characteristics, including people-elite antagonism 
(Luginbühl 2014). Due to the populist communication tendencies of the JUSO, the SP may have 
strategically decided to adopt a more moderate and non-populist tone on social media – in an 
effort to target different segments of the electorate with these two complementary 
approaches.   
Our recommendation for future research is to include more extreme parties in studies 
of various countries. Recall that we did not find clear support for the U-curved pattern in 
France and Italy, but we believe that more updated and extended party samples would 
produce the effect of “bipolar populism” in these two countries as well. For Switzerland, it 
would be interesting to incorporate the communication behavior of far-left parties such as the 
Alternative List (AL) or Swiss Party of Labor (PdA), as well as far-right parties such as the Ticino 
League (LdT) or the Geneva Citizens' Movement (MCG) to further support the validity of the 
U-curve pattern.  
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Review
Today, it has become almost impossible to read the news 
without noticing a reference to populism. Scholarly interest 
in this transnational phenomenon has been growing because 
an increasing number of politicians and parties are appar-
ently resorting to populist communication repertoires. 
Several studies analyzed the utilization of populist rhetoric 
(e.g., Wodak, 2015), populist messages (e.g., Rooduijn, 
2014), or populist communication styles (e.g., Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007) and demonstrated that investigating popu-
list communication is crucial to fully understand the rise of 
political populism, as populism is mostly reflected in the 
oral, written, and visual communication of political actors 
(Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017). In a hybrid (Chadwick, 2017) 
or high choice media environment (van Aelst et al., 2017), 
politicians have gained new options for action because they 
have a greater number of communication channels—which 
differ in their affordances—at their disposal. Hence, it has 
become increasingly difficult to understand the role of a 
single medium in isolation (Bode & Vraga, 2017). These 
difficulties call for a comparative analysis that considers dif-
ferent media systems and different channel types. This type 
of analysis is especially important in the context of popu-
lism because there is conclusive empirical evidence that fea-
tures of specific media channels influence the amount of 
populist communication (Bos & Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 
2011; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017). 
Our study compares the communicative self-presentation of 
political actors in three prototypical media channels for pop-
ulism, Facebook, Twitter, and political talk shows, across 
six Western democracies. In addition to the particularities of 
the channels, we investigate whether the characteristics of a 
political party influence the amount of populist communica-
tion. Although populism in Western democracies is often 
associated with right-wing political actors, several studies 
with a wider scope have revealed that parties at both edges 
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of the political spectrum adopt populist communication 
(Bernhard, 2016; Ernst et al., 2017; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 
2017). In addition to the left/right divide, we are also exam-
ining whether younger parties that adopt a challenger posi-
tion toward the establishment are more likely to use populist 
communication.
We define populist communication as the communica-
tive representation of the populist ideology (what is being 
said) and the use of populism-related stylistic elements 
(how something is being said) by all sorts of political actors. 
We, therefore, follow a communication-centered approach 
(Sorensen, 2017) by defining key characteristics—mes-
sages and styles—of populist communication. Following 
Kriesi’s (2018) suggestion, we will first translate the key 
concepts of populist ideology into empirically measurable 
“key messages.” Next, we will examine the “stylistic ele-
ments” that politicians use when going popular. Because 
Kriesi (2018, p. 13) argues that “populist content and popu-
list style tend to go together,” we will finally investigate 
similarities in politicians’ use of “key messages” and “sty-
listic elements.” 
An important contribution of our study is to identify and 
systematize stylistic elements that politicians use in a similar 
way as they utilize populist key messages. In particular, we 
will determine whether characteristics of the communication 
channel and properties of a political party influence in simi-
lar ways the use of populist key messages and certain style 
elements. For this purpose, we compare a broad spectrum of 
political actors on two social media platforms and 12 politi-
cal talk shows in six Western democracies (CH, DE, UK, US, 
IT, and FR). We find that (a) a variety of stylistic elements 
that previous literature has seen as part of populist actors’ 
communication strategy can be condensed to three dimen-
sions—similarly to three ideological dimensions of populist 
communication, (b) politicians are generally more inclined 
to use populist key messages and related style elements on 
Facebook and Twitter than in TV talk shows, and (c) politi-
cians from both new challenger parties and extreme parties 
use greater amounts of populism-related communication ele-
ments than established mainstream parties.
Populist Communication
Populism is a contested concept with a broad variety of dif-
ferent definitions (e.g., Canovan, 1999). Focusing on politi-
cal actors’ self-presentation and their communicative 
approaches, we can identify two main traditions in the lit-
erature, as populist communication has either been defined as 
an ideology (Mudde, 2004) or a communication style (Jagers 
& Walgrave, 2007). Engesser, Fazwi, & Larsson (2017) argue 
that these two traditions are not mutually exclusive and only 
represent different aspects of populism. Their conceptual-
ization of a populist communication logic distinguishes 
between four main approaches. First, populist ideology con-
ceives populism as a set of ideas and focuses on the 
content—the what—of populist communication. Second, 
populism as a style emphasizes populism as a mode of pre-
sentation and focuses on the form and how the content is 
presented. Third, populism as a political strategy conceives 
populism as a means to an end and is interested in the stra-
tegic motives and aims of populist communication. Fourth, 
research on populism can focus on actors by analyzing the 
messengers.
In terms of a starting point, we are building upon founda-
tions of the political science literature that conceptualizes 
populism as a relational concept with a distinct set of politi-
cal ideas (Hawkins, 2009; Kaltwasser & Taggart, 2016; 
Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). We, therefore, conceive and 
define populism as a thin ideology. Populism claims that the 
people have been betrayed by the elites in charge who are 
abusing their positions of power, and it demands that the sov-
ereignty of the people must be restored. Furthermore, we fol-
low Hawkins (2009) who emphasizes that these basic ideas 
are expressed with specific discourse patterns, and we follow 
Wodak (2015, p. 3) who argues that populist political com-
munication always “combines and integrates form and con-
tent” by providing “a dynamic mix of substance and style.” 
Some scholars—most notably Moffitt (2016)—have built 
ideological elements into stylistic definitions of populism. 
However, this is a proposal that we expressly do not want to 
follow, because we want to keep the basic ideological com-
ponents of populist ideas separate from stylistic elements.
A populist vision of democracy basically separates soci-
ety into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the 
good people” versus “the bad elite,” and postulates the unre-
stricted sovereignty of the people (Abts & Rummens, 2007; 
Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Wirth et al., 
2016).1 Following this conceptualization, Mény and Surel 
(2002) have identified three key notions of populism: glorifi-
cation of the people (people-centrism), condemnation of cor-
rupt elites (anti-elitism), and claims for the restoration of 
popular sovereignty (popular sovereignty). When communi-
cated in public, these ideological dimensions are broken 
down by political actors into nine key messages (Table 1). 
Previous studies have translated these key messages into 
empirically measurable categories of quantitative content 
analysis (see Ernst et al., 2017).
According to Kriesi (2018), the use of these key messages 
is part of a political strategy that manifests itself in broader 
communication patterns. In his view, a populist political 
communication strategy is also expressed by the use of a spe-
cific communication style. Kriesi (2018, p. 12) expects this 
style to be characterized by elements such as “emergency 
rhetoric,” “emotionalization” as well as “assertive/absolut-
ist” and “colloquial” language, among others. His position is 
fully compatible with Sorensen’s (2017) stand that 
“approaching populism from a communications perspective 
(. . . ) inevitably involves considerations of style as well as 
ideology” (p. 139). We follow Hofstadter’s (2008) definition 
of a communication style being the way ideas are believed 
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and advocated by a political actor rather than the truth or 
falsity of the content (Block & Negrine, 2017).
We are interested in finding systematic parallels in the use 
of populist key messages and the use of certain stylistic ele-
ments. We have searched the research literature to identify 
the communicative stylistic elements attributed to populist 
actors. We have finally identified seven of them, which we 
have summarized in Table 2. It is important to make clear 
that until we have examined these stylistic elements in more 
detail, we do not yet claim that they are populist in them-
selves. Following Kriesi (2018), we only say that they can be 
considered expressions of the same communication strategy 
that can also lead to the use of populist key messages.
The first style element with an affinity to populism is nega-
tivism. It refers to the tendency of populist actors to paint soci-
ety darkly by attributing negative characteristics to the elites 
or dangerous others or by condemning situations or actions 
with a negative outcome (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Block & 
Negrine, 2017; Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Engesser, Fawzi 
et al., 2017). Second, populist actors gravitate toward portray-
ing various situations or developments as crises. To employ 
this crisis rhetoric, populist actors usually adopt rhetorical ele-
ments of immorality, exaggeration, scandal, emergency, or 
war. Third, the emotional tone style comprises populist actors’ 
tendency to share positive or negative emotions or reveal feel-
ings (Block & Negrine, 2017; Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 
2013; Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Canovan, 1999; Engesser, 
Fawzi et al., 2017; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017). While 
most authors stress the importance of negative emotions that 
are raised against others or elites, positive emotions can be 
directed to the people or the populist leader. Fourth, absolut-
ism describes the affinity of populist actors to paint the society 
in black and white terms without any shades of gray. The style 
expresses itself in the use of an assertive tone and a hesitation 
to use relativizing words in their communication (Bos & 
Brants, 2014; Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017; Hawkins, 2009). 
Fifth, patriotism as a populist communication style portrays 
the tendency of populists to long for a time when everything 
Table 1. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populist Key Messages.
Dimension Populist key message Underlying ideology Categories
Anti-Elitism Discrediting the elite Elites are corrupt. Elites are accused of being malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, 
extremist, racist, undemocratic, and so on. The elite are called names 
and denied morality, charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, 
consistency, and so on.
Blaming the elite Elites are harmful. Elites are described as a threat/burden, responsible for negative 
developments/situations, or as having committed mistakes or 
crimes. Elites are described as not being a source of enrichment or 
responsible for positive developments/situations.
Detaching the elite 
from the people
Elites do not represent 
the people.
Elites are described as not belonging to the people, not being close 
to the people, not knowing the people, not speaking for the people, 
not caring for the people, or not performing everyday actions.
People 
centrism
Stressing the people’s 
virtues
The people are virtuous. The people are bestowed with morality, charisma, credibility, 
intelligence, competence, consistency, and so on. The people are 
exempt from being malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, 
racist, undemocratic, and so on.
Praising the people’s 
achievements
The people are beneficial. The people are described as being enriched or responsible for 
a positive development/situation. The people are described as 
not being a threat/burden, not being responsible for negative 
developments/situations, nor as having committed mistakes or 
crimes.
Stating a monolithic 
people
The people are 
homogeneous.
People are described as sharing common feelings, desires, or 
opinions.
Demonstrating 
closeness to the 
people
The populist represents 
the people.
The speaker describes himself as belonging to the people, being close 
to the people, knowing the people, speaking for the people, caring 
for the people, agreeing with the people, or performing everyday 
actions. The speaker claims to represent or embody the people.
Restoring 
sovereignty
Demanding popular 
sovereignty
The people are the 
ultimate sovereign.
The speaker argues for general institutional reforms to grant the 
people more power by introducing direct-democratic elements 
or increasing political participation. The speaker argues in favor of 
granting more power to the people within the context of a specific 
issue (e.g., election, immigration, security).
Denying elite 
sovereignty
The elites deprive 
the people of their 
sovereignty.
The speaker argues in favor of granting less power to elites within 
the context of a specific issue (e.g., election, immigration, security).
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was much better and emphasize the superiority of their own 
country by employing rhetorical elements referencing an ide-
alized and sometimes utopic vision of the country or heartland 
(Block & Negrine, 2017; Rydgren, 2017; Taggart, 2000). 
Sixth, populist actors are prone to reduce complexity by 
employing a colloquial style, which manifests itself in simple, 
dialect, colloquial, or vulgar language to reach ordinary citi-
zens (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Bracciale & Martella, 
2017; Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017; Moffitt, 2016). Finally, 
populist actors do not shy away from using an intimization 
style in which they recount personal and intimate details about 
their personal lives to portray themselves as approachable and 
down-to-earth politicians (Bracciale & Martella, 2017; 
Stanyer, 2012).
Overall, we take a communication-centered approach and 
conceive of populist communication as an outcome of a 
strategy that uses both ideological key messages and certain 
stylistic elements (see also Bracciale & Martella, 2017; 
Krämer, 2014; Stockemer & Barisione, 2017; Wirth et al., 
2016). How these two components manifest themselves is an 
open empirical question that we want to clarify. But Krämer 
(2017) has already pointed out that there is often a “homol-
ogy between ideologies and styles” (p. 1305) and that schol-
ars should not refrain from style-based reconstructions of 
populism—however “thin” they may be. Especially because 
content and form tend to interfere and interact with one 
another (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). By combining both 
perspectives, we wish to explore similarities in the use of 
populist key messages and stylistic devices on social media 
and political talk shows.
Populist Communication on Social 
Media and Political Talk Shows
In a hybrid media system where new and old media are inter-
twined and their logics complement each other, political actors 
no longer rely on a single communication channel (Chadwick, 
2017). Instead, they choose a variety of different channels to 
achieve their communicative goals. Bode and Vraga (2017) 
argue that studying single media platforms in isolation ignores 
the reality of the contemporary media system. This argument 
is especially important because research has demonstrated that 
the specific characteristics of the communication channel 
influence the amount of populist communication (Bos & 
Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011; Ernst et al., 2017). By investi-
gating populist communication on television and social media, 
we can gain a more detailed understanding of how the features 
of a platform affect populist communication. Political talk 
shows and social media represent two different types of com-
munication channels that suggest differences in the way politi-
cians from different parties and countries use them for populist 
purposes. What unites these channels is that they offer 
Table 2. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populism-Related Style Elements.
Dimension Stylistic devices Underlying style element Categories
Negativity Negativism Paint society and its members (part of the 
people) “in black” by attributing negative 
characteristics or condemning actions/situations 
with negative outcome.
Targets are accused of being malevolent, criminal, 
lazy, stupid, racist, and so on or are denied being 
benevolent, likable, intelligent, credible, loyal, 
consistent, and so on.
Crisis rhetoric Portraying a situation/development as a crisis 
using exaggerations, emergency rhetoric or 
declaring a scandal.
Speaker uses rhetorical elements of immorality, 
exaggeration, scandal, emergency, or war  
rhetoric.
Emotionality Emotional tone Sharing positive and negative emotions or 
revealing feelings.
Speaker uses emotional language by expressing 
discrete positive (e.g., happiness, contentment, 
hope, pride, trust) or negative (e.g., anger, 
uneasiness, sadness, fear, regret, affection) 
emotions.
Absolutism Using an assertive tone and lacking relativizing 
words. Tendency to paint world in black and 
white without any shades of gray.
Speaker uses rhetorical figure of absolutism  
by presenting something as the only  
conceivable option or as preposterous or 
unbearable.
Patriotism Emphasizing of the superiority of own country 
by referencing an idealized and utopic heartland.
Speaker uses rhetorical figure of patriotism by 
emphasizing superiority of own country or some 
obscure heartland.
Sociability Colloquialism Preference for a simple, dialect, colloquial, or 
vulgar language and use of nicknames to reach 
the ordinary people.
Speaker uses vulgar language or slang, employs 
sarcasm or rhetorical questions and address 
targets with nicknames.
Intimization Recounting personal and intimate details about 
personal life.
Targets are described in their predominately 
personal life by emphasizing their family or love life 
and making references to personal way of life or 
leisure activities.
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politicians favorable opportunities for self-presentation with 
little to no interference from skeptical, hard-nosed political 
journalists (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). They are 
moreover prototypical channels for populist communication 
and both Bos and Brants (2014) and Cranmer (2011) conclude, 
that especially political talk shows offer great opportunity 
structures for populist communication.
Social media plays a major role in the political communi-
cation strategies of contemporary parties (Stieglitz, Dang-
Xuan, 2013). Especially, Twitter and Facebook have emerged 
as central media platforms that rival traditional news media 
in reach and influence (Fisher, Marshall, & McCallum, 
2018). The possibility to bypass news journalists and the 
ability of political actors to communicate directly with their 
publics increases the chances of successful self-promotion 
(Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013). This gives us already an 
idea of why social media networks have transpired as a par-
ticularly well-suited channel for populist communication 
(Ernst et al., 2017).
Four opportunity structures of Facebook and Twitter 
foster the potential for populist communication: They offer 
the possibility to establish a close connection to the people, 
they provide a direct access to the public without journalis-
tic interventions, they can create a feeling of community 
and recognition among otherwise scattered groups, and 
they foster the potential for personalization (Ernst et al., 
2017).
When comparing the two social media platforms in rela-
tion to their potential for populist purposes, Facebook has 
four advantages over Twitter. First, Facebook offers more 
reciprocal message exchanges; second, it has higher levels of 
proximity and the connection between Facebook users is 
generally more intensive, personal, and intimate; and third, 
Facebook is not subject to certain character limits, which 
gives political actors greater opportunity to make their case 
effectively and elaborately. Finally, due to the different char-
acteristics of users (in terms of education, socioeconomic 
status, or political interest), Twitter has a stronger profes-
sional orientation, and political actors may consider it less 
suitable for spreading populism (Jacobs & Spierings, 2018). 
In contrast, Facebook is the platform for ordinary citizens to 
interact with politicians (Kalsnes, Larsson, & Enli, 2017), 
which makes it more suitable for populist communication. 
Schulz (2018) has supported this argument from the audi-
ence perspective by showing that populist citizens are more 
likely to use Facebook as their source of political informa-
tion, while nonpopulist citizens rather use Twitter for infor-
mation purposes.
Television talk shows belong to a completely different 
media category, but can fulfill similar functions for politi-
cians. They are important outlets for the articulation of politi-
cal ideas (Baym, 2013; Jones, 2010; Kessler & Lachenmaier, 
2017) and have a positive effect on viewers’ trust in politi-
cians (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2016). Like social media, 
talk shows offer the opportunity to bypass the watchdog 
journalism more commonly found in hard news programs, 
offer the possibility of self-presentation, and foster the poten-
tial for personalization (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2016; 
Kessler & Lachenmaier, 2017). Political talk shows, there-
fore, represent another ideal stage for populist communica-
tion (Cranmer, 2011) and make the comparison with 
Facebook and Twitter more meaningful.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The aim of this study is twofold. In the first step, we will 
examine the seven populism-related style elements for their 
broader underlying dimensions. To examine the relationship 
between these seven stylistic elements, we examine the fol-
lowing research question:
RQ1: Do populism-related style elements form distinct 
dimensions?
In a second step, we will investigate whether the charac-
teristics of communication channels and the properties of 
parties affect the degree of populist communication on social 
media and political talk shows. Recent research has demon-
strated the importance of Facebook and Twitter for populist 
communication (e.g., Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Engesser, 
Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; 
Stier, Posch, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 2017). However, these 
studies lack a comparison of different media channels. In 
previous research, political talk shows were found to contain 
the highest level of populist communication compared with 
other arenas (Bos & Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011). Yet, none 
of these studies compared the amount of populist communi-
cation to social media. We argue that Facebook and Twitter 
are even more advantageous for spreading populist commu-
nication than talk shows because they allow politicians to 
circumvent traditional gatekeepers completely; they further 
allow for better message targeting and personalization and 
for the establishment of reciprocal relationships and a more 
direct line to their followers (Ernst et al., 2017). Hence, the 
first hypothesis to be tested is
H1: The proportion of populist key messages and related 
style elements are higher on Facebook and Twitter than on 
political talk shows.
In addition, the properties of political parties are of spe-
cial interest to this study. The so-called challenger parties are 
a particularly relevant party category because they are often 
perceived as a threat to the party establishment (Meguid, 
2005) and assumed to use populist communication to gener-
ate attention (Kriesi, 2014). Throughout the various crisis 
cycles since the 1980s, new challenger parties from both the 
left and the right have emerged and gained success in many 
Western democracies (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Müller-
Rommel, 1998). Kriesi (2014) argues that these 
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new challenger parties may be perceived as a threat to the 
establishment because they highlight problems that have 
been neglected by mainstream parties, mobilize outside of 
the electoral channels, and resort to creative, innovative 
forms of protest communication. New right- and left-wing 
challenger parties can thus be expected to blame the elites 
and complain about a neglect of the people’s true concerns 
(Kriesi, 2014). Hence, these parties may rely on populist 
communication to improve their electoral chances (Betz, 
2002) and their media visibility (Mazzoleni, 2008). These 
assumptions are supported by a longitudinal study from 
Switzerland that found that new parties—independent from 
their ideological stance—relied on high levels of populist 
communication in party advertising and press releases dur-
ing their initial “challenger phase” (Weber, 2017). We would 
like to examine this mechanism on a broader empirical basis 
and propose the following hypothesis:
H2: Challenger parties use a greater proportion of popu-
list key messages and related style elements than estab-
lished parties.
Party extremism is also expected to influence the amount 
of populist communication. Populism is often too quickly 
associated with right-wing parties. However, populism 
should be considered as a latent or thin ideology (Hawkins, 
2009; Stanley, 2008) that, due to its “thinness,” can be com-
bined with a variety of “thick” host ideologies (such as 
socialism, authoritarianism, nationalism) that add more spe-
cific content to it. Although right- and left-leaning parties 
differ in their ideologies, party programs, and social basis, 
they have several characteristics in common that are related 
to populist communication. At least in Western Europe, they 
emerged in recent decades, often compensate for their small-
sized party organization with large-sized communication 
offensives, tend to remain opposition parties, and share a 
protest attitude against established parties, politics, and state 
structures (Müller-Rommel, 1998). Moreover, research has 
substantiated that parties at the fringes of the political spec-
trum are more inclined than moderate parties to challenge the 
current government, attack elites, and glorify the people in 
their communication within party manifestos (Rooduijn & 
Akkerman, 2017), press releases (Bernhard, 2016), and on 
social media (Ernst et al., 2017). Against this background, 
we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: Extreme parties use a greater proportion of populist 
key messages and related style elements than moderate 
parties.
Method
We content-analyzed populist key messages and related style 
elements used by 110 politicians on political talk shows and 
social media across six countries in 2015 using a semiauto-
matic coding program. These channels were chosen because 
they mostly lack journalistic interference and allow a rela-
tively unfiltered view of politicians’ communication.
Sample
To test our hypotheses, we need to construct a sample of 
politicians from different political parties who appear on talk 
shows and social media using populist messages and stylistic 
devices during our investigation period. To explore populist 
communication as a transnational phenomenon (Aalberg, 
Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; Moffitt, 
2016), these politicians need to come from different coun-
tries. This requires a three-step procedure: we first identified 
relevant countries, then sampled the relevant political talk 
shows and listed all appearing politicians, and finally col-
lected the social media material of these politicians. By 
applying such an individual matching procedure on the 
microlevel of politicians, the study ensures the comparability 
of communication on both channel types and thus avoids 
ecological fallacies.
In the first step, we selected six countries (CH, DE, IT, 
FR, UK, and US). By performing all analyses under six dif-
ferent macrosocial conditions, our multinational compara-
tive design serves as a robustness check for the meaningfulness 
of our findings. In other words, our conclusions on which 
media types and party types are more susceptible to populist 
communication thus gain more reach and validity. The coun-
try sample provides sufficient variability regarding political 
systems (parliamentary vs. presidential, representative vs. 
directional, consensus vs. majoritarian systems), party char-
acteristics (strong vs. weak populist parties), and consumer 
preferences for political information sources (Aalberg et al., 
2017; Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Kleis 
Nielsen, 2017).
In the second step, we identified two influential political 
talk shows per country (see Table A in online appendix) and 
recorded four episodes of each show during a 2-month period 
of routine news without national elections from April through 
May 2015. The twelve selected talk shows all air weekly and 
achieve high market shares in their segment. They are all pri-
marily political in focus, follow a roundtable format, have a 
length of approximately 60 min,2 and regularly invite politi-
cians as guests. The number of politicians ranged from one to 
five per show; we coded only their statements and disre-
garded those made by the moderator, nonpolitical guests, or 
members of the audience. This led to a total of 1579 state-
ments by 110 political actors across the 48 taped programs.
In the third step, we collected the social media material 
(Facebook posts and Tweets) of all politicians3 who appeared 
on the talk shows during the study period.4 We considered 
only Tweets and Facebook posts that included direct state-
ments of the politician and were longer than eight characters. 
Simple Retweets and Tweets or Facebook posts including 
only pictures, links, or videos were excluded from the analy-
sis. We drew a random sample of 50 social media statements 
per politician (N = 5099).
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Out of the initial sample, we kept only those statements 
that included a veritable statement by a politician and 
expressed either a political position, an elaboration on a 
political issue, or an evaluation, or an attribution of a target 
actor (N = 2130). We further excluded politicians with less 
than five statements in total or no clear party affiliation. This 
led to a final sample of N = 969 talk show statements, N = 734 
Facebook posts, and N = 364 Tweets by 98 politicians from 
31 political parties.
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis is a single statement made by a politician. 
It can contain a key message and/or a stylistic device. In the 
terminology of our codebook, statements are made by speak-
ers (i.e., politicians) about a target actor or an issue. A target 
actor is the object of a politician’s characterization or evalua-
tion and may include politicians, members of the elite, or the 
people. A political issue refers to the thematic context of the 
statement.
A team of intensively trained student coders reached 
acceptable levels of reliability. The average Brennan and 
Prediger’s kappa across all messages and styles is .91 (see 
Table B in online appendix).
Operationalization
Populism-Related Communication. The nine populist key mes-
sages and the seven stylistic devices were gathered based on the 
instructions given in a codebook (for details on the categories 
used see Tables 1 and 2). For each category, we recorded 
whether the variable was present in a statement. A key message 
or stylistic device was considered present if at least one of the 
related categories was coded. The dependent variable, popu-
lism-related communication, was present if at least one of the 
nine populist key messages or seven stylistic elements were 
observed.
Party Categories. The 98 politicians belong to 31 political 
parties. Table 3 depicts the number of politicians per party 
(for further details see Table C in online appendix). To 
determine the degree of party extremism, we assigned each 
party its respective Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) 
score (Table 3). We had to rate American and some Italian 
parties ourselves because the CHES did not include them 
(Polk et al., 2017). For each party score, we subtracted the 
theoretical center of the scale (–5) and took the absolute 
value to obtain a measure of party extremism. We also 
recorded the age of each party. Since most challenger par-
ties emerged in recent decades (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; 
Müller-Rommel, 1998; Weber, 2017), we coded all parties 
founded after 1980 as challenger parties. Furthermore, two 
dummies for Facebook and Twitter (vs. political talk 
shows) were calculated.
Findings
Sample Description
In total, 38% of all statements contain at least one populism-
related communication element. Overall, populist key mes-
sages and stylistic devices are weakly correlated (r = .173, 
p < .01), and the style elements (31.3%) are used significantly 
more, t(2066) = 17.35, p < .001, than populist key messages 
(13.6%). Anti-elitist key messages (9.6%) are more promi-
nent than people-centrist key messages (3.3%). Key mes-
sages about restoring sovereignty are almost absent (0.9%) 
in politicians’ communication on social media and talk 
shows. Negativity (19.9%) and emotionality (12.2%) are 
commonly used style elements, whereas sociability (4.8%) is 
only present in every 20th statement.
Research Question and Hypotheses
In a first step, we conducted a principal component factor 
analysis with the seven style elements (varimax rotation, 
Kaiser normalization). The factor analysis identified three 
distinct dimensions (51.4% explained variance, Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity = χ2(21) = 282.3, p < .001) without any sub-
stantial cross-loadings (Table 4). Negativity comprises nega-
tivism and crisis rhetoric; emotionality includes emotional 
tone, absolutism, and patriotism; and sociability is composed 
of colloquialism and intimization. We consider this finding 
an important empirical contribution to the literature that dis-
cusses stylistic devices as part of populist actors’ communi-
cation strategy. It provides the basis for our further 
analyses.
To test our three hypotheses, we conducted 12 multilevel 
models (Table 5 for an overview) with maximum-likelihood 
estimation (ML). In Models 1 to 4, populism-related com-
munication is the dependent variable, which means the use 
of at least one populist key message and/or at least one style 
element. Due to the rather weak correlation of populist key 
messages and stylistic elements, we calculated eight addi-
tional models to test the effects for both components sepa-
rately. In Models 5 to 8, the dependent variable is the use of 
any populist key message and in Models 9 to 12, the depen-
dent variable is the use of any style element. Units of analy-
sis are statements made by politicians on Twitter, Facebook, 
or political talk shows. These statements by politicians are 
nested in political party properties. Hence, the independent 
variables for Hypothesis 1 (social media) are located at the 
first level, while the independent variables for Hypothesis 2 
and Hypothesis 3 (challenger parties and extremism) are 
located at the second level. Before assessing the multilevel 
models, we determined whether it is useful to let the inter-
cepts vary across parties. If we compare the respective base-
line models with Model 1 (χ2(1) = 46.26, p < .001), Model 5 
(χ2(1) = 42.06, p < .001), and Model 9 (χ2(1) = 38.23, p < .001) 
we can conclude that in all three models, the intercepts vary 
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Table 3. Overview of Political Party Sample.
Country Party information Political stance
Left Moderate Left Center Moderate Right Right
CH Political party GPS SP CVP FDP SVP
CHES score 1.88 2.13 5.5 6.88 8.25
Founding year 1983 1888 1912 2009 1971
Number of represented politicians 3 4 3 3 7
Populism-related communication score 0.28 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.42
Political party GLP  
CHES score 5.25  
Founding year 2007  
Number of represented politicians 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.32  
DE Political party Linke SPD CDU FDP AfD
CHES score 1.23 3.77 5.92 6.54 8.92
Founding year 2007 1963 1945 1948 2013
Number of represented politicians 2 3 4 1 1
Populism-related communication score 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.42
Political party Gruenen CSU  
CHES score 3.62 7.23  
Founding year 1993 1945  
Number of represented politicians 3 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.47 0.13  
FR Political party PS  
CHES score 3.83  
Founding year 1969  
Number of represented politicians 3  
Populism-related communication score 0.25  
IT Political party PD SC FI LN
CHES score 3.57 5.43 6.71 8.86
Founding year 2007 2013 1994 1998
Number of represented politicians 11 1 1 2
Populism-related communication score 0.37 0.44 0.33 0.63
Political party RI M5S Fdl  
CHES score 3 4.67 7.86  
Founding year 2001 2009 2012  
Number of represented politicians 1 1 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.50 0.44 0.38  
Political party IdV  
CHES score 5  
Founding year 1998  
Number of represented politicians 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.40  
UK Political party Green Lab LibDem Cons UKIP
CHES score 1.86 3.57 4.86 7 9.14
Founding year 1990 1900 1988 1934 1993
Number of represented politicians 1 4 4 5 3
Populism-related communication score 0.50 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.55
Political party SNP  
CHES score 3  
Founding year 1934  
Number of represented politicians 3  
Populism-related communication score 0.28  
Political party Plaid  
CHES score 3.25  
Founding year 1925  
Number of represented politicians 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.79  
(Continued)
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Table 4. Factor Analysis of Populism-Related Style 
Elements.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
 Negativity Emotionality Sociability
Negativism 0.78 −0.08 0.16
Crisis rhetoric 0.73 0.20 −0.07
Emotional tone −0.10 0.66 0.09
Absolutism 0.05 0.63 −0.02
Patriotism 0.17 0.57 −0.05
Colloquialism −0.11 −0.02 0.79
Intimization 0.19 0.05 0.70
Self-value 1.23 1.21 1.16
Variance explained (%) 17.50 17.33 16.60
Total variance (%) 51.42
Note. Rotated factormatrix (principal component factor analysis, varimax 
rotation), KMO = .56, Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2(21) = 282.3, p < .001, N = 2065.
Country Party information Political stance
Left Moderate Left Center Moderate Right Right
US Political party D R  
CHES score 3 7  
Founding year 1828 1854  
Number of represented politicians 9 8  
Populism-related communication score 0.27 0.36  
Note. Gray background stands for challenger parties. For RI, IdV, D, and R no CHES score exist. We placed these parties ourselves and assigned them an 
individual extremism score. The populist-related communication score (range = 0-1) is based on both messages and styles across social media and political 
talk shows.
Table 3. (Continued)
significantly across parties and significantly improved the 
model fits.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that populism-related communica-
tion by various political actors is higher on social media than 
political talk shows. To test this hypothesis, we added two 
fixed effects of Twitter (dummy) and Facebook (dummy) to 
the model. A model comparison demonstrated that the fit of 
the models significantly increased for Model 2 (χ2(1) = 49.60, 
p < .001), Model 6 (χ2(1) = 12.14, p < .01), and Model 10 
(χ2(1) = 50.43, p < .001). We find clear support for this hypoth-
esis. Model 2 shows that statements on Facebook (β = .17, 
t(2035) = 7.09, p < .001) and Twitter (β = .08, t(2035) = 3.17, 
p < .001) significantly predict populism-related communica-
tion and demonstrates that the degree of populism-related 
communication is higher on both social media platforms than 
political talk shows. This pattern is identical for style elements 
(Twitter: β = .08, t(2035) = 3.29, p < .001; Facebook: β = .17, 
t(2035) = 7.16, p < .001 Model 10) in isolation as well. For 
populist key messages, we only find a significant effect for 
Facebook (β = .08, t(2035) = 3.45, p < .001). Key messages on 
Twitter, however, are not more common than in political talk 
shows (β = .02, t(2035) = 0.66, ns). If we compare the two 
social media platforms, we can conclude that Facebook is the 
stronger predictor and that political actors tend to prefer 
Facebook for their populism-related communication.
Hypothesis 2 argued that challenger parties use more pop-
ulism-related communication than established mainstream 
parties. To test this hypothesis, we added the challenger party 
dummy as another fixed effect to the models. Again, model 
comparisons revealed that the fit of all models significantly 
improved for Model 3 (χ2(1) = 7.45, p < .01), Model 7 
(χ2(1) = 4.95, p < .05), and Model 11 (χ2(1) = 10.35, p < .001). 
In Model 3, we find support for this hypothesis and show that 
challenger parties use more populism-related communica-
tion (β = .11, t(29) = 2.95, p < .01) than established parties. We 
identified the same pattern for populist key messages in 
Model 7 (β = .09, t(29) = 2.27, p < .05) and style elements in 
Model 11 (β = .12, t(29) = 3.70, p < .001).
To test whether party extremism positively influences the 
amount of populism-related communication, which is postu-
lated in Hypothesis 3, we added extremism as a fourth addi-
tional fixed effect. Model comparisons reveal that for model 4 
with the combined use of populist key messages and stylistic 
elements as the dependent variable, the fit increased signifi-
cantly (χ2(1) = 5.08, p < .05), meaning that parties with high 
extremism scores use populism-related communication more 
often (β = 0.08, t(28) = 2.42, p < .05; model 4) than moderate 
parties with low extremism scores. For the separate use of pop-
ulist key messages (χ2(1) = 2.85, p = .09; model 8) or stylistic 
devices (χ2(1) = 2.64.14, p = .06; model 12), we only find 
somewhat weaker effects. The influence of party extremism on 
the separate use of either populist key messages (β = 0.06, 
t(28) = 1.81, p = .08; model 8) or stylistic devices (β = 0.06, 
t(28) = 1.97, p = .06; model 12) leans toward significance, but 
narrowly missed the standard p-value threshold. In sum, we 
only find partial support for hypothesis 3. Party extremism 
results in a significantly higher use of the combination of pop-
ulism-related communication; for messages and style elements 
separately however, we can only report a trend.
All 12 multilevel models present clear support for the 
three postulated hypotheses, demonstrating that parties are 
generally more inclined to use populism-related communica-
tion on Facebook and Twitter than in talk shows and that new 
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challenger parties as well as extreme parties use higher 
amounts of populism-related communication.5
Discussion and Conclusion
In a communications approach, populist ideology and style 
elements are considered inextricably intertwined, but 
scholars need to keep them analytically distinct and analyze 
them with separate empirical measures. We are aware that 
some researchers such as Moffitt (2016) have incorporated 
ideological elements into the stylistic definition of popu-
lism, but we deliberately do not follow this approach. We 
understand populist communication as the outcome of a 
political strategy that uses both ideological key messages 
and certain stylistic elements. We have developed system-
atic operationalizations for messages (content) and styles 
(form) and examined them with a content analysis that takes 
into account different countries, communication channels 
and party types.
We argued that populism as an ideology consists of three 
programmatic components that are communicated publicly 
through nine key messages. In a similar way, we have exam-
ined stylistic elements of a “going popular” strategy and 
found that they can also be grouped into three dimensions: 
negativity, emotionality, and sociability. This deserves atten-
tion because the research of style elements is still in develop-
ment while the research of ideological key messages is 
already better established. We have placed particular empha-
sis on stylistic elements because politicians have to convey 
their messages through media channels and package them 
effectively. If the stylistic elements we examined were used 
equally by all political parties (including mainstream parties), 
one could not assume a close relationship to populism. But 
our results indicate a different pattern. We find that politicians 
who use ideological key messages most frequently (namely, 
those of challenger parties and extreme parties) also use these 
stylistic elements most often. This is what we had anticipated, 
because we have primarily examined those stylistic elements 
the previous literature had attributed to populist politicians. 
This important finding leads us to conclude that we are deal-
ing here with populism-related or even populist stylistic 
elements.
We further theorized that Facebook and Twitter are more 
susceptible to the use of populism-related communication 
than talk shows because social media makes it easier for 
politicians to bypass the traditional media, to tailor their 
messages to their target groups, and to present themselves as 
close to the people. With regard to political parties, we argue 
Table 5. Multilevel Model of Populism-Related Communication.
Populism-related communication Populist key messages Populism-related style elements
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
 β β β β β β β β β β β β
 SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE
(Intercept) −0.013 −0.003 0.018 −0.007 −0.008 −0.005 −0.015 −0.008 −0.003 0.006 −0.007 −0.003
 0.050 0.044 0.042 0.033 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.050 0.043 0.033 0.030
Twitter 0.076 0.078 0.077 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.079 0.082 0.079
 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024
 *** *** ** *** *** ***
Facebook 0.169 0.171 0.172 0.083 0.084 0.024 0.171 0.175 0.174
 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.023
 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Challenger 
party
0.113 0.102 0.089 0.081 0.121 0.115
 0.038 0.033 0.039 0.036 0.033 0.030
 ** ** * * *** ***
Extremism 0.078 0.064 0.058
 0.032 0.035 0.030
 * † †
AIC 5824.63 5779.04 5775.39 5770.52 5828.83 5820.68 5817.73 5816.88 5832.66 5786.24 5819.73 5776.24
BIC 5841.53 5807.21 5814.83 5809.95 5845.73 5848.85 5851.54 5856.32 5849.56 5814.41 5859.17 5815.68
Log likelihood −2909.32 −2884.52 −2880.70 −2878.26 −2911.42 −2905.34 −2902.87 −2901.44 −2913.33 −2888.12 −2902.87 −2881.12
Level 1 N 
(statements)
2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067
Level 2 N 
(parties)
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Note. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05. †p < .10.
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that it is more likely that young challenger parties as well as 
extreme left- and right-wing parties communicate in a popu-
list manner.
Our study further demonstrates—on the basis of six coun-
tries—that parties are generally more inclined to use popu-
lism-related communication on social media than in political 
talk shows. By comparing the three different media channels, 
we corroborate that populism-related communication is indeed 
connected to Facebook and Twitter and that the advantages of 
social media to bypass gatekeepers and disseminate messages 
without interference are beneficial to populist communication 
in general. This is especially true for Facebook and confirms 
previous empirical evidence that Twitter is less suitable for 
populist communication compared to Facebook (Jacobs & 
Spierings, 2018). These results provide the first empirical evi-
dence for the theoretical assumption, that online opportunity 
structures and populist communication logic interact (Engesser 
et al., 2017). The channel comparison is significant in all 
investigated countries except for the United States. The differ-
ence between social media and talk shows in populism-related 
communication by Republicans and Democrats is not signifi-
cant, and politicians of the Democratic Party such as Bernie 
Sanders or Claire McCaskill tend to use more populism on 
television. However, Republicans in general and especially 
politicians such as John Boehner and Newt Gingrich are fully 
in line with our results and spread their populism-related com-
munication mainly via social media. However, compared to 
European talk shows, American shows tend to offer more lib-
erty and less journalistic interference, presenting opportunities 
for political actors to employ populist communication. Overall, 
these factors thus point to a communication culture in U.S. 
talk shows that is as beneficial for populist communication as 
social media.
At the party level, we find evidence that new challenger 
parties, and to a somewhat lesser extent also parties at the mar-
gins of the political spectrum, use more populism-related com-
munication. It is not only right-wing parties such as Swiss 
SVP, German AfD, Italian Lega Nord, or UKIP, but also left-
wing parties such as the German Linke or British Green party 
that make ample use of populist communication elements 
(Tables 3 and 5). For challenger parties, we find a predisposi-
tion toward populism in all types of statements (Models 4, 8, 
and 12 of Table 5), for extreme parties most strongly in state-
ments that combine key messages with style elements (Model 
4 of Table 5). We thus confirm earlier studies on the commu-
nication repertoire of extreme parties (see also Bernhard, 
2016; Ernst et al., 2017; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017), but 
would like to call for future studies to pay more attention to the 
separate use of key messages and style elements (because we 
found weaker effects there). We find the strongest use of pop-
ulism-related communication, incidentally, for those parties to 
which both the characterization “extreme party” and the char-
acterization “new challenger party” apply at the same time 
(e.g., German Left, Lega Nord, UKIP). But there are also 
many counter examples. The Swiss SVP is a good example of 
a party that has a high extremism score, but has been estab-
lished in Switzerland for a long time and still relies strongly on 
populism-related communication. The British Liberal 
Democrats, German Greens, or the Italian Five Star Movement 
are excellent examples of challenger parties, but have only a 
moderate degree of extremism, and yet use high levels of pop-
ulism in their communication.6 Overall, these examples dem-
onstrate that while commonly labeled populist parties are 
challenger and extreme parties at the same time, political par-
ties holding only one of the properties also employ a high 
degree of populism on social media and talk shows. This con-
firms our argument that extreme position and challenger status 
are two independent properties that are separate explanatory 
factors for populist communication.
Some limitations must be considered. First, due to the 
sampling procedure, the study only includes politicians who 
appeared in political talk shows. Even though most of these 
politicians have active Twitter and/or Facebook accounts, the 
sample does not include politicians who are not regular talk 
show guests and therefore rely heavily on their social media 
communication. This sample strategy excludes social media 
affine politicians that willingly circumvent either tradition 
elite media (e.g., Trump) or political outsiders that are not 
able to find a stage in mainstream media. A sample including 
such politicians might find even stronger support for the 
argument that social media “beats” political talk shows. 
Another limitation is the rather low sample size in terms of 
countries and parties; the findings represent a specific sam-
ple and any generalizations must be drawn carefully. Since 
the party sample includes many more moderate center parties 
than extreme ones, it would be desirable to further investi-
gate far left- and right-wing parties. The sample for France is 
especially problematic because it is only represented by the 
French Socialist Party. In the eight episodes of Le Grand Jury 
and Le Grand Journal, politicians from other parties were not 
invited.7 Including further key French parties such as “Front 
National,” “Left Front,” “The Republicans,” or “La 
République En Marche!” could improve the findings for the 
French context. A final limitation concerns the lack of any 
national elections during the routine time period. Populist 
communication could be different during elections. In par-
ticular, the debates and discussions on political talk shows 
might be enriched and loaded with more populist communi-
cation elements. Future studies should strive to sample both 
routine periods and election campaigns and include a broader 
sample of countries and parties to compare populist commu-
nication across these different modes of operation.
In conclusion, the study at hand contributes to populist 
communication scholarship in several ways. It integrates the 
two diverging perspectives on populist ideology and populist 
style and identifies three populist style dimensions that are of 
heuristic value for further research on populist styles. It fur-
ther establishes that social media is more useful for 
disseminating populism-related communication than talk 
shows—contesting previous studies that identified the 
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importance of talk shows. Finally, the study finds support 
across countries and media platforms that parties still fight-
ing for their place and parties positioning themselves at the 
polar ends of the political spectrum show the highest tenden-
cies to use populist communication. Future research should 
follow a communication-centered approach and investigate 
the broad political spectrum. Furthermore, it is crucial to dif-
ferentiate between various media channels. A next logical 
step would thus be to investigate and compare the populist 
communication by parties on social media and political talk 
shows with their representation in the traditional news media 
(print and TV) or online news.
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Notes
1. We are not including the exclusion of out-groups as a defining 
feature of populist communication as this is rather linked only 
to radical right-wing populism (Rooduijn, 2014).
2. Italian Servizio Pubblico and Ballarò are an exception with an 
airtime of approximately 170 min.
3. From the 110 identified politicians, only 15 had no verified 
Twitter or Facebook account. In the final analysis, only four 
politicians had no verified account.
4. We extended the study period to the whole year for politicians 
who had less than 100 Tweets or Facebook posts.
5. We run the models as an additional robustness check including 
the six countries as another random effect on the third level in the 
models and could replicate the same effects for all 12 models.
6. The party using the most populism in their communication—
the Welsh Plaid Cymru Party—is an exceptional case. With a 
CHES score of 3.25, it has a rather moderate extremism score. 
As it was founded in 1925 and has been part of the U.K. parlia-
ment since 1966, Plaid Cymru cannot be considered an extreme 
or challenger party. However, the results must be interpreted 
with caution because this party is only represented by its party 
leader, Leanne Wood, in our sample. Her tendency to use popu-
lism-related communication in almost 80% of all her statements 
may be related to her role advocating the Welsh independence 
and her critical stance against the U.K. government.
7. One exception is the independent Robert Ménard, who we had 
to exclude from the analysis because of his nonexistent party 
affiliation.
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The rapid diffusion of new communication technologies in a hybrid media system are 
reshaping political communication environments (Chadwick 2017). Politicians no 
longer rely on a single medium to communicate their messages; rather, they use a 
range of channels, including print media, television programs, and social media. This 
is particularly relevant in the field of populist communication, as studies have shown 
that the characteristics of communication channels have an influence on how much 
populism can be expected in them (e.g., Bos and Brants 2014; Cranmer 2011).
We aim with this study to determine to what extent the proportion of populist com-
munication adjusts with regard to different communication channels, issues and attri-
butes of a political speaker. We believe that this will tell us something about what 
media strategies populists use and what chances of success they have in each case. 
Empirical studies so far have identified political TV talk shows as the most favorable 
arena for disseminating populist messages (Bos and Brants 2014; Cranmer 2011). We 
strive to go beyond these studies and ask whether the talk show “bonus” still holds true 
in the age of social media. Furthermore, we would like to inquire which additional 
favorable factors can be identified. In addition to the type of channel, we would like to 
test whether type of issue and type of politician also play a role. Regarding channels, 
we will distinguish between those with high and those with low journalistic interfer-
ence; regarding issues, we will distinguish between those with high and those with low 
populist affinity; regarding politicians, we will distinguish between (1) members of 
populist and nonpopulist parties and (2) leading and ordinary party officials.
To determine to what extent these differentiations have an influence on the extent 
and nature of mediated populist communication, we analyzed the content and style of 
statements of 103 politicians from six countries (France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States) while addressing fourteen issues in three types of 
media genres (print, television, and social networks). The theoretical framing of this 
study can be described as a combination of a communication-centered approach to 
populism (Sorensen 2017) with a discursive opportunity approach (Koopmans and 
Olzak 2004). Our findings allow us to make predictions for a larger number of Western 
countries as to which politicians will most likely make populist statements on which 
topics and on which media channels. While most of our theoretical expectations were 
confirmed, one finding hit us unexpectedly. It concerns the favorable role of newspa-
pers, and we will use the concluding section of this article to offer explanations.
Populist Communication
Although populism is a highly contested concept, a growing consensus describes pop-
ulism in ideational terms and conceptualizes it as a set of ideas (Hawkins 2009; 
Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). Based upon this, we 
conceive populism as a thin ideology that separates society into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups, “the good people” versus “the bad elite,” and postulates the unre-
stricted sovereignty of the people (Abts and Rummens 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2008; Mudde 2007; Wirth et al. 2016).
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In addition to understanding populism as a thin ideology, scholars have conceptual-
ized populism as a communication style (Jagers and Walgrave 2007), a political style 
(Moffitt 2016), or a political strategy (Weyland 2001). We follow Engesser et al.’s 
(2017) argument that these notions are not mutually exclusive and only represent dif-
ferent aspects of populism. Their conceptualization of a populist communication logic 
distinguishes between four main approaches. First, populist ideology conceives popu-
lism as a set of ideas and focuses on the content—the what—of populist communica-
tion. Second, populism as a style emphasizes populism as a mode of presentation and 
focuses on the form and how the content is presented. Third, populism as a political 
strategy conceives populism as a means to an end and is interested in the strategic 
motives and aims of populist communication. Fourth, research on populism can focus 
on actors by analyzing the messengers.
In our understanding, the ideology of populism cannot be communicated without 
stylistic elements. Core characteristics of populism empirically manifest themselves in 
both content and form, as the co-occurrence of ideological expression and communi-
cation style (Bracciale and Martella 2017; Krämer 2017; Kriesi 2018; Sorensen 2017). 
This means that we expect political actors to express their populist ideology in the 
content of their statements while using associated style elements to emphasize their 
overall points and themes further.
Populism consists of three basis dimensions as an ideology: people-centrism, anti-
elitism, and restoring popular sovereignty (Wirth et al. 2016). Communicators will 
break down these core dimensions into more concrete “key messages” when convey-
ing these concepts to the public. These messages are summarized in Table 1.
The styles of populist communication are also underpinned by three dimensions: 
negativity, emotionality, and sociability. For these newer findings on style, we refer to 
a study by Ernst et al. (2018). The authors had identified these three dimensions by 
means of a factor analysis after examining the frequency of seven more concrete “style 
elements” in statements made by politicians from several Western democracies. Table 
2 shows both the style dimensions and the underlying style elements. Ernst et al. 
(2018) first identified and justified these seven populist style elements theoretically 
with a thorough review of the relevant research literature. In their subsequent empiri-
cal analysis, they demonstrated that the same politicians who used ideological key 
messages were also those who used the style elements listed in Table 2.
We build on the consensus emerging in the recent research literature that populist 
political communication should be regarded as a combination of the use of ideological 
key messages and accompanying style elements (see de Vreese et al. 2018; Kriesi 2018; 
Sorensen 2017). In accordance with the theoretical arguments put forward there, we 
define a statement as populist if it combines at least one ideological “key message” and 
one populist “style element.” The separate use of populist key messages or style ele-
ments is—in our admittedly very strict understanding—not sufficient to classify a state-
ment as fully populist. However, as empirical studies have shown that populist 
communication often occurs in a fragmented form (Ernst et al. 2017; Esser et al. 2017), 
not all three ideological and all three style dimensions must be represented in one single 
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Table 1. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populist Key Messages.
Dimension
Populist Key 
Message
Underlying 
Ideology Categories
Anti-Elitism
Discrediting the 
elite
Elites are corrupt. Elites are accused of being malevolent, criminal, 
lazy, stupid, extremist, racist, undemocratic, etc. 
The elite are called names and denied morality, 
charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, 
consistency, etc.
Blaming the elite Elites are harmful. Elites are described as a threat/burden, 
responsible for negative developments/
situations, or as having committed mistakes 
or crimes. Elites are described as not being 
a source of enrichment or responsible for 
positive developments/situations.
Detaching the 
elite from the 
people
Elites do not 
represent the 
people.
Elites are described as not belonging to the 
people, not being close to the people, not 
knowing the people, not speaking for the 
people, not caring for the people, or not 
performing everyday actions.
People-
Centrism
Stressing the 
people’s virtues
The people are 
virtuous.
The people are bestowed with morality, 
charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, 
consistency, etc. The people are exempt 
from being malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, 
extremist, racist, undemocratic, etc.
Praising the 
people’s 
achievements
The people are 
beneficial.
The people are described as being enriched 
or responsible for a positive development/
situation. The people are described as not 
being a threat/burden, not being responsible for 
negative developments/situations, nor as having 
committed mistakes or crimes.
Stating a 
monolithic 
people
The people are 
homogenous.
People are described as sharing common feelings, 
desires, or opinions.
Demonstrating 
closeness to 
the people
The populist 
represents the 
people.
The speaker describes himself as belonging to the 
people, being close to the people, knowing the 
people, speaking for the people, caring for the 
people, agreeing with the people, or performing 
everyday actions. The speaker claims to 
represent or embody the people.
Restoring 
Sovereignty
Demanding 
popular 
sovereignty
The people are 
the ultimate 
sovereign.
The speaker argues for general institutional 
reforms to grant the people more power by 
introducing direct-democratic elements or 
increasing political participation. The speaker 
argues in favor of granting more power to the 
people within the context of a specific issue 
(e.g., election, immigration, security).
Denying elite 
sovereignty
The elites 
deprive the 
people of their 
sovereignty.
The speaker argues in favor of granting less 
power to elites within the context of a specific 
issue (e.g., election, immigration, security).
Ernst et al. 169
statement. We expect all dimensions of populist communication to be represented only 
in the long term of the continuous communication of a politician—not in every single 
speech act.
Table 2. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populist Communication Styles.
Dimension
Populist Style 
Elements Underlying Style Element Categories
Negativity
Negativism Paint society and its members 
(part of the people) “in 
black” by attributing 
negative characteristics 
or condemning actions/
situations with negative 
outcome.
Targets are accused of being 
malevolent, criminal, lazy, 
stupid, racist, and so on or 
are denied being benevolent, 
likable, intelligent, credible, 
loyal, consistent, etc.
Crisis rhetoric Portraying a situation/
development as a crisis 
using exaggerations, 
emergency rhetoric, or 
declaring a scandal.
Speaker uses rhetorical 
elements of immorality, 
exaggeration, scandal, 
emergency, or war rhetoric.
Emotionality
Emotional tone Sharing positive and negative 
emotions or revealing 
feelings.
Speaker uses emotional 
language by expressing 
discrete positive (e.g., 
happiness, contentment, 
hope, pride, trust) or 
negative (e.g., anger, 
uneasiness, sadness, fear, 
regret, affection) emotions.
Absolutism Using an assertive tone and 
lacking relativizing words. 
Tendency to paint world 
in black and white without 
any shades of gray.
Speaker uses rhetorical figure 
of absolutism by presenting 
something as the only 
conceivable option or as 
preposterous or unbearable.
Patriotism Emphasizing of the 
superiority of own country 
by referencing an idealized 
and utopic heartland.
Speaker uses rhetorical figure 
of patriotism by emphasizing 
superiority of own country 
or some obscure heartland.
Sociability
Colloquialism Preference for a simple, 
dialect, colloquial, or 
vulgar language and use of 
nicknames to reach the 
ordinary people.
Speaker uses vulgar language 
or slang, employs sarcasm 
or rhetorical questions 
and address targets with 
nicknames.
Intimization Recounting personal and 
intimate details about 
personal life.
Targets are described in their 
predominately personal life 
by emphasizing their family 
or love life and making 
references to personal way 
of life or leisure activities.
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Favorable Opportunity Structures for the Dissemination 
of Populist Communication
The theory of discursive opportunity structures assumes that the actors involved in 
media discourse will choose the most favorable options for action and communication 
to achieve their goals. Actors include politicians and journalists; their goals include 
visibility, resonance, public support, and legitimacy (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). We 
focus on the perspective of politicians and first discuss the advantages and disadvan-
tages of various media channels regarding their suitability for the dissemination of 
populist communication. In the next step, we discuss the relevance of more and less 
suitable thematic contexts; in a third step, we look at different groups of politicians 
with respect to their probability of using populist communication.
Populist Affinity of Certain Channels
For populists, politics is a direct and nonmediated expression of the general will of the 
people (Mudde 2007). For this reason, they consider channels on which they can com-
municate in a direct and nonmediated way to be a favorable opportunity. This varies 
across channels. According to Paletz’ (2002) theory of media interventionism, Twitter 
and Facebook are regarded as channels without journalistic interference; rather, they 
focus on direct interaction, content distribution among users, and algorithmic connec-
tivity. For Paletz, political talk shows are examples of medium journalistic interfer-
ence, since communication control is shared between host and guest. The dialogical 
format offers politicians the opportunity to present themselves, but journalists deter-
mine the questions and setting. According to Paletz (2002), an example of heavy jour-
nalistic interference is a feature report in a newspaper about a politician, since control 
over the final product—including selection, presentation, framing, and evaluation—
rests exclusively with the journalist.
Against this three-way classification of media interventionism, the oft-asserted 
preference of populist politicians for social media becomes understandable, but fur-
ther aspects can be added. Many populists consider journalists and “established” 
mass media to be controlled by the ruling elite; in their view, mainstream political 
reporting misses the views and interests of “the people,” is corrupt and systematically 
denigrates those politicians who would stand up for the true “will of the people” 
(Fisher et al. 2018; Moffitt 2016). Three expectations can be derived from this 
(Krämer 2017): first, populists want to systematically circumvent the mainstream 
media; second, populists need a platform from which they can criticize the main-
stream media as distorted and unfair; and third, they must offer an alternative medium 
to those citizens they have been able to alienate from the traditional media. This 
alternative medium are social networks. First, because social media can be used to 
create protected spaces in which one-sided, anecdotal evidence of populist convic-
tions can be accumulated in large quantities and made accessible to followers. Second, 
an aggressive, uncivil tone can be cultivated in these spaces because like-minded 
people feel they can talk to their peers without having to worry about criticism or 
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social control. Third, the repeated selective exposure to this one-sided information 
promotes an in-group mentality that populists can use to mobilize their supporters 
and coordinate political actions (Krämer 2017).
These assumptions of a high affinity between populists and social media have not 
been put to a hard test yet. Populism research to date still assumes that talk shows offer 
populists the most favorable conditions for spreading their messages. Bos and Brants 
(2014: 717) found in a long-term analysis spanning twenty years that the populism 
share was higher in political talk shows than in any other Dutch media genres they 
examined; they described talk shows as “the most outspoken populist genre.” Cranmer 
(2011) compared different communication settings in Switzerland and concluded, too, 
that talk shows offer the most effective platform for employing populist communica-
tion. However, we find reason to review these findings, as they are based on older 
studies (without social media) that have not varied the other channels considered sys-
tematically (regarding their degrees of journalistic intervention) and only offer case 
study observations (without comparison of countries).
A core characteristic of populists is their paradoxical relationship to the traditional 
mass media. Although they criticize the mainstream news on one hand, they need it on 
the other hand to reach a larger audience and to increase their legitimacy (Haller and 
Holt 2018). However, the readiness of journalists to offer politicians a favorable plat-
form for conveying their views differs significantly from one media system to another. 
Some journalistic cultures are friendlier toward politicians than are others (Esser 
2008). Politicians must employ clever news management strategies to achieve favor-
able media treatment in more interventionist journalistic cultures. The newsworthiness 
of populist actors (Mazzoleni 2008) and their norm-violating behavior (Haller 2015) 
may trigger journalists to open the news gates for them. However, many European and 
North American quality media are known to position themselves very critically toward 
populists in their lead commentaries (Esser et al. 2017).
Overall, our argument follows the theory of media interventionism, according to 
which it can be expected that the lower the degree of journalistic interference in a 
channel, the greater the potential for unfiltered, unrestricted populism. This assump-
tion leads to the following expectation:
Hypothesis 1: The degree of populist communication by politicians is highest on 
social media, followed by political talk shows, and lowest in newspapers.
Populist Affinity of Certain Issues
A second condition favoring the spread of populist communication is the concentra-
tion on certain issues in the appeals of populist actors. As populism is conceived as a 
thin ideology that can be complemented with other host ideologies, it is not restricted 
to certain parties and can be used by both left-wing and right-wing political actors. We 
see this fact most clearly in the populist mobilization of the involved issues. Certain 
issues serve particularly well as vehicles for mobilizing a sort of latent populist pos-
sibility. Van Kessel (2015), Poier et al. (2017), Smith (2010) and Taggart (2017) agree 
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that it is five political issues in particular—immigration, regional identity, corruption 
and crime, integration, and economic hardship—that have a specifically high affinity 
to populist mobilization in Western democracies. Taggart’s (2017: 250) hermeneutic 
analysis found these issues to be “appropriated” and “politicized” most frequently by 
populist parties in Europe. Van Kessel (2015: 23) ran QCA analyses with thirty-one 
countries to show that “the breeding ground for populist parties is especially fertile 
where related issues are salient” in public discourse. Populists put these issues on their 
agenda and bring them into wider contention, pressurizing the media and other politi-
cal actors to address these issues also.
According to Taggart (2017), the clearest and most commonly mentioned popu-
list issue is immigration, particularly on the political right. Immigration addresses a 
strong focus on the protection of national culture, an emphasis on the people as 
homogenous entity, an opposition to multiculturalism, and hostility toward outsiders 
and ethnic minorities. Second, regional identity relates to subnational identity poli-
tics; it expresses a rejection of central state structures and the idealization of a 
regional “heartland” (Taggart 2017). Third, the issue corruption and crime relates to 
allegations of institutional corruption, the failure of established parties, and that law 
and order policies require tightening (Taggart 2017; Smith 2010). A fourth populist 
issue addresses European/transnational integration, which summarizes populist 
tendencies to perceive supranational authorities and legal orders as a threat to the 
sovereignty of the nation (e.g., Euroscepticism; Taggart 2017). Finally, economic 
hardship relates to high unemployment rates and growing economic inequality, and 
demands to protect the national economy from global competition (Van Kessel 
2015). The resulting populist accusations against the elites often come from the 
political left.
While these five issues are not inherently populist themselves, they often become 
the subject of populist politicization. (Taggart 2017; Van Kessel 2015). Although 
several authors discussed the link between these issues and populists’ successes, 
the actual amount of populist communication within these issues has not been ana-
lyzed empirically or compared to issues with a low affinity to populism. We expect 
that due to the high affinity of these issues to populism, statements about them will 
contain more populist communication elements. Furthermore, because politicians 
are not restricted in their selection and promotion of issues when speaking on social 
media, the amount of populist communication related to the five issues above 
should be highest on Twitter and Facebook. Two hypotheses are tested following 
these arguments:
Hypothesis 2a: Issues with a high affinity to populist mobilization will contain 
more populist communication than topics with a comparatively lower mobilization 
potential.
Hypothesis 2b: Issues with a high affinity to populist mobilization will be espe-
cially more likely to contain populist communication when discussed on social 
media.
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Populist Affinity of Certain Groups of Politicians
A third condition that is expected to affect the dissemination of populist communica-
tion is the characteristics of politicians. We will discuss two characteristics: affiliation 
to a populist party and position within the party hierarchy.
Various studies have investigated the question of whether members of populist par-
ties actually communicate in a more populist manner. Both individual country case 
studies (e.g., Bernhard 2017; Bobba and McDonnell 2016) and some multicountry 
comparisons (e.g., Bracciale and Martella 2017; Van Kessel 2015) have found sup-
porting evidence for this. However, these studies lack a systematic comparison with 
members of nonpopulist parties. There are few single country (e.g., Bos and Brants 
2014; Cranmer 2011; Jagers and Walgrave 2007) and comparative international stud-
ies (e.g., Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017; Schmidt 2017) that uniformly have measured 
the proportion of populist communication among a wide variety of political actors. 
However, these studies again did not test systematically whether members of previ-
ously defined populist and nonpopulist parties differ significantly in their level of 
populist communication.
We want to investigate this question in a more differentiated manner. We want to 
test not only whether politicians commonly classified as populist actually communi-
cate in a more populist way across several Western democracies but also whether they 
do so more strongly on social media (and talk shows) to avoid the mainstream media 
they despise for perceived distorting journalistic intervention and cozy links with the 
establishment (Fisher et al. 2018). In addition, we want to test whether this tendency 
of members from populist parties is particularly strong in the context of the five pop-
ulism-related topics identified above. We expect the following:
Hypothesis 3a: Populist politicians use more populist communications than non-
populist politicians do.
Hypothesis 3b: Populist politicians use especially more populist communication 
than nonpopulist politicians do on social media.
Hypothesis 3c: Populist politicians use especially more populist communication 
than nonpopulist politicians do when talking about issues with a high affinity to 
populist mobilization.
Another characteristic of politicians could promote their tendency to populist com-
munication. Findings by Davis (2009: 209) indicate that those politicians that do not 
have the most elevated status (i.e., backbenchers) especially tend to see the exploita-
tion of “populist news values” as an important strategy to overcome the media thresh-
old, in particular on social media where they can communicate their messages directly 
to the public. Van Aelst and Walgrave (2016: 507) agree that “for backbenchers and 
newcomers, provocative statements are even more needed.” It is noteworthy that their 
underdog status gives them a certain degree of authenticity. Backbenchers can use the 
antiestablishment dimension of populist communication particularly effectively by 
criticizing those in power for political failures and the supposed neglect of the 
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concerns of the population—and in this way mark their own closeness to the people. 
Political frontbenchers and power-holders should sound much less convincing if they 
take a critical stand against the existing political establishment (Stewart 2018). On the 
party level, studies have shown that parties placed at the fringes of the political spec-
trum, or holding an opposition or challenger position, employ higher levels of populist 
communication than do mainstream and governing parties (Ernst et al. 2017; Rooduijn 
and Akkerman 2017; Schmidt 2017). Building on these findings, we examine the like-
lihood of populist communication at the individual level of politicians and argue that 
backbenchers or politicians not holding a key position in a party or government will 
use more populist communication.
Political outsiders often employ a digital campaign strategy to spread their mes-
sages and break into the mainstream media. Backbenchers are less disadvantaged on 
Facebook and Twitter: they are neither dependent on being invited to talk shows nor 
on passing journalists’ criteria of newsworthiness. Social media even can empower 
backbenchers: it offers a possibility to build their own power base of like-minded fol-
lowers, and to establish a more direct and more interactive connection to the people 
than party leaders have (Jacobs and Spierings 2018; Spierings et al. 2018). Hence, we 
expect backbenchers to tap their full populist potential particularly via their social 
media communication. Finally, backbenchers often focus on political issues with high 
news values—and high mobilization potential—to gain the interest of a wide audience 
and attract journalist attention. These arguments lead to three final hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a: Backbenchers use more populist communication than politicians 
holding key positions do.
Hypothesis 4b: Backbenchers use especially more populist communication than 
politicians holding key positions do on social media.
Hypothesis 4c: Backbencher use especially more populist communication than 
politicians holding key positions do when talking about issues with a high affinity 
to populist mobilization.
Methods
We conducted a multinational content analysis to measure the prevalence of populist 
communication of 103 politicians’ statements on political talk shows, social media, 
and newspapers across six countries in 2015. In total, the study analyzed 2,517 state-
ments by politicians from a broad spectrum of parties.
Sample
Populist communication is a transnational phenomenon (Aalberg et al. 2017; Moffitt 
2016), and populist actors in many Western countries are on the rise. This study exam-
ines six news systems (United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Switzerland, 
Germany) to capture the phenomenon more broadly and go beyond case study obser-
vations. We followed an individual matching approach on the actor level across 
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several media channels to analyze the hypotheses. This sampling strategy required a 
four-step procedure: We (1) identified relevant countries, (2) sampled political talk 
shows and recorded all statements from the appearing politicians, (3) downloaded the 
verified social media statements from the politicians, and (4) collected all statements 
in newspapers from the same politicians during the period of investigation.
First, we selected six countries spanning the three relevant models of Western 
media system types: democratic-corporatist versus polarized-pluralist versus liberal 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004). In addition, these countries provide sufficient variability 
regarding political systems (parliamentary vs. presidential, representative vs. direct, 
consensus vs. majoritarian systems), party characteristics (strong vs. weak populist 
parties), and consumer preferences for various political information sources (Aalberg 
et al. 2017; Newman et al. 2017). Our multinational comparative design serves as a 
robustness check for the validity and generalizability of our findings and allows us to 
draw conclusions for a wider scope of countries.
Second, we selected the two most influential political talk shows for each country 
that air on a weekly basis and enjoy high viewing figures and market shares in their 
segments (Table A in the online appendix). All shows focus primarily on politics, fol-
low a roundtable format, have a duration of approximately one hour1 and regularly 
invite politicians as panel guests. We recorded four episodes of the twelve selected 
shows during a three-month period of routine news (with no interfering elections) 
from March through May 2015. We content-analyzed only statements made by politi-
cians and neglected all statements made by talk show hosts, nonpolitical guests or 
audience members. This led to a selection of 110 political actors across the forty-eight 
taped programs.
Third, we collected the verified Facebook posts and Twitter feeds2 of all identified 
politicians during the same three-month period when the talk shows were recorded.3 
We considered only tweets and Facebook posts that included direct statements from 
the respective politician and were more than eight characters long. Simple retweets 
and tweets or Facebook posts including only pictures, links or videos were excluded 
from the analysis. We drew a random sample of fifty Twitter and fifty Facebook state-
ments per politician.
Fourth, we collected direct and indirect statements of the 110 identified politicians 
in the newspapers. We selected two leading upmarket daily newspapers (one left- and 
one right-leaning), two dominant mass-market media newspapers (either paid or free) 
and two important weekly news magazines for each country (see Table B in the online 
appendix). We retrieved all stories that these newspapers had published, including 
statements from these politicians within the wider debates of migration and labor mar-
ket by using a verified search string for Lexis Nexis and Factiva. The sample period 
for the press was extended to twelve months (March 2014 to May 2015) to ensure a 
sufficient number of statements by the individual politicians in the sample.4
Out of the initial sample, we kept only those statements that included a veritable 
statement by a politician and expressed either a political position, an elaboration on a 
political issue, an evaluation, or an attribution from a target actor (N = 2,549). We 
further excluded politicians with less than five statements in total. This led to a final 
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sample of N = 990 talk show statements, N = 363 tweets, N = 708 Facebook posts, 
and N = 456 newspaper statements by 103 politicians.
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis is a single statement made by a politician—who is considered a 
speaker—about a target actor or a political issue. A target actor is the object of a politi-
cian’s characterization or evaluation and may include politicians, members of the elite 
or the people. A political issue refers to the thematic context or policy substance of the 
statement.
Operationalization
Populist Communication
The nine populist key messages and seven populist communication styles were coded 
based on a comprehensive codebook (see Table 1 and Table 2 for details on the catego-
ries). For each category, we recorded whether the variable was present in a statement. 
A message or style was considered present if at least one of the related categories was 
coded. For the dependent variable—populist communication, which we theoretically 
defined as the co-occurrence of populist content and style—we constructed a dummy 
variable, which was present if at least one of the nine populist key messages and one 
of seven populist communication styles cooccurred in the same statement.
Issues
Each statement made on social media, talk shows or in newspapers was coded for its 
connection to one of the following fourteen issue specifications: Economy, welfare, 
budget, freedom and rights, Europe, education, immigration, army, security, ecology, 
institutional reforms, infrastructure, elections, and events. Each of these fourteen 
issues has a variety of subissues that were also coded (n = 133). The fourteen issues 
were divided into two groups—issues with a high affinity to populist mobilization and 
issues with a low affinity to populism—by following specifications by Taggart (2017), 
Van Kessel (2015), Smith (2010) and Poier et al. (2017). The dummy for populism-
affine issues included forty-seven subissues related to immigration, regionalism, cor-
ruption and crime, integration, and economic hardship.
Politicians
Each of the 103 politicians was categorized for populist versus nonpopulist and back-
bencher versus holding a key position. In terms of identifying populist actors, we rely 
on previous categorizations made by Van Kessel (2015), Mudde (2007), Rooduijn 
et al. (2014) as well as the respective country chapters in Aalberg et al. (2017). The 
populist politicians appearing in the talk shows programs we taped came from the 
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Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the German Alternative for Germany (AfD), the German 
Leftist Party (Die Linke), the Italian Northern League (LN), the Five Star Movement 
(M5S), Forward Italy (FI), or the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP). In total, eighteen 
populist politicians were identified.
In a second step, we coded the official political position of each politician during 
the sample period. We categorized politicians as holding a key position who were in 
office as the head of government (e.g., president, chancellor, or federal council), min-
isters of the current cabinet, or a party or vice-party leader. In total, twenty-eight politi-
cians were categorized as holding key positions and seventy-five politicians were 
backbenchers.
A team of intensively trained student coders reached acceptable levels of reliability 
across all coding categories. The average Brennan and Prediger’s kappa across all 
populist messages, styles and political issues is .89 (see Table C in the online appendix 
for details).
Findings
Of the 2,517 statements we found across the four channels (Facebook, Twitter, TV talk 
shows, newspapers), roughly every seventh statement (15.3 percent) contains a popu-
list key message, and roughly every third (37.2 percent) contains a populist style ele-
ment. The proportion of statements in which politicians combine a key message with 
a style element is 9.3 percent. This figure gives us an idea of how widespread the use 
of populist communication is among Western politicians and how often we as media 
consumers are confronted with it on average (see Table D in the online appendix for 
further details).
We conducted analyses of variance using the co-occurrence of populist key mes-
sages and communication styles as the dependent variable to test our nine hypotheses. 
The independent variables (channel type, issue type, politician type) change depend-
ing on the hypothesis for the individual analyses. We ran Bonferroni-corrected post 
hoc tests (p < .01) to analyze the differences further between groups.
Hypothesis 1: Type of Channel
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the amount of populist communication is highest on 
social media (both Twitter and Facebook), followed by talk shows, and lowest in 
newspapers. Although the channel type has a significant main effect, (3,2513) = 
10.33, p < .001, η2 = .012, it is the newspapers of all places where we found the 
highest proportion of populist statements by politicians in the form of direct or indi-
rect speech (M = .15, SD = .35). The politicians of all six countries appear to suc-
ceed surprisingly well in getting populist messages into the news columns of major 
newspapers. Populist politicians seem quite adept in overcoming the journalists’ filter 
and selection mechanisms.5 We found smaller shares of politicians’ populist commu-
nication on Facebook (M = .11, SD = .32), Twitter (M = .07, SD = .26) and talk 
shows (M = .06, SD = .24); the difference between newspapers and Twitter or talk 
shows is statistically highly significant (see Figure 1). Overall, H1 is disconfirmed.
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If we look at the conditions in the six countries examined separately, we found 
(with regard to the media system typology of Hallin and Mancini 2004) for demo-
cratic-corporatist and polarized-pluralist media systems the same pattern as shown in 
Figure 1, but a slightly different picture for the liberal media systems. In the United 
States and United Kingdom, the share of populist statements by politicians is also 
highest in newspapers but is closely followed by the share in talk shows; only then 
follow Facebook and Twitter. It seems that talk shows in the United States and United 
Kingdom have a higher level of tolerance for populist discourses than in continental 
European countries.
Hypotheses 2: Type of Issue
Hypothesis 2a argued that issues claimed by populists to be “in their possession” are 
more frequently the subject of populist politicization than are other issues—and that 
this is particularly evident in social media communication (H2b). H2a is supported 
(F(1,2509) = 7.36, p < .01, η2 = .003). Political statements on the five key topics of 
immigration, regionalism, corruption and crime, integration and economic hardship 
contain on average (M =.11, SD =.31) more populism than do statements on topics that 
we classified as nonpopulist (M =.08, SD =.28). All three types of Western media sys-
tems show the same pattern. In addition to the main effect, we also found a significant 
interaction effect between populist issue and channel type (F(3,2509) = 3.52, p < .01, 
η2 = .004). Post-hoc tests revealed that politicians, in line with the expectation of H2b, 
communicate on Twitter and Facebook in a much more populist way on the five key 
topics than they do on the other channels (see Figure 2).
Where politicians are confronted with a higher degree of journalistic intervention in 
political talk shows and newspapers, they succeed significantly less often in actually 
communicating in a populist manner on topics classified as populist. Although we 
found in the previous step of the analysis that the proportion of populist communication 
Figure 1. Populist communication across type of media channels.
Note. Type of channel: F(3,2513) = 10.33, p < .001, η2 = .012.
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is highest in newspapers, news journalists select populist statements regardless of 
whether they write stories on a populist or nonpopulist topic.
Hypotheses 3: Type of Party
We suspected a difference between members of populist and nonpopulist parties in 
their use of populist communication (H3a), especially in statements on social media 
(H3b) and in statements on the five populist-related topics (H3c). The significant 
main effect supports H3a (F(1,2509) = 22,38, p < .001, η2 = .009) and demonstrates 
that members of populist parties use more populist key messages and style elements 
(M = .14, SD = .29) than do members of nonpopulist parties (M = .08, SD = .26). 
Single country comparisons suggest that this effect is robust across all three media 
system types.6
Furthermore, we find indications of an interaction effect between type of party and 
channel use (F(3,2509) = 2.25, p = .08, η2 = .003). If we compare the different chan-
nel types using post hoc tests, we find that members of populist parties make intensive 
use of one of the two social media channels for populist communication7 but that they 
are also very successful at breaking into the coverage of the news media with their 
messages and styles. This finding, graphically displayed in Figure 3, only can be read 
as a partial and weak confirmation of H3b.
Hypothesis 3c must be rejected because we find no significant interaction between 
affiliation to a certain party group and the way populism-related topics are addressed 
(F(1,2513) = .53, ns). Members of populist parties do not address issues with a high 
affinity to populist mobilization per se in a more populist manner than do members of 
other parties.
Figure 2. Degree of populist communication in statements about political issues
Note. Type of political issue: F(1,2509) = 7.36, p < .01, η2 = .003/ Type of channel: F(3,2509) = 10.18, 
p < .001, η2 = .012/ Type of political issue*Type of channel: F(3,2509) = 3.52, p < .05, η2 = .004.
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Hypotheses 4: Type of Politician
Finally, we expected that backbenchers are more populist than politicians holding a 
leadership position (H4a), in particular when communicating via social media chan-
nels (H4b) and addressing populism-affine topics (H4c). We find a significant main 
effect that backbenchers (M = .10, SD = .30) are more populist in their communica-
tion than are high-ranking politicians (M = .09, SD = .29/F(1,2509) = 6.44, p < .01, 
η2 = .003). The differences between the two groups are small8 but in all probability 
would have been larger if we had considered “real” backbenchers; after all, our back-
benchers were invited to talk shows, otherwise they would not have been included in 
the sample. Country comparisons further reveal that our backbenchers used signifi-
cantly more populist communication in Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, and France. 
Frontbenchers used more populism in their statements in Switzerland and the United 
States. H3a thus finds only partial support. At a second view, this finding makes much 
sense because many populist politicians in Switzerland and the United States are in 
leadership positions of large parties with partial governmental responsibility.
The significant interaction of backbenchers and type of channel (F(3,2509) = 3.02, 
p < .05, η2 = .004) supports H4b. Post hoc tests reveal that backbenchers communi-
cate in a much more populist way on Twitter and Facebook9 in comparison to those in 
the other two channels (see Figure 4). As expected, backbenchers particularly are keen 
to use social media and especially Twitter for their populist communication because 
there they can demonstrate particularly well their responsiveness to the alleged will of 
the people.
Hypothesis H4c is not supported because no significant interaction effect exists 
between the type of politician and their populist communication of certain issues 
Figure 3. Degree of populist communication by political parties.
Note. Type of political party: F(1,2509) = 22,38, p < .001, η2= .009/ Type of channel: F(3,2509) = 10.89, 
p < .001, η2 = .013/ Type of political party*Type of channel: F(3,2509) = 2.25, p = .08, η2 = .003.
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(F(1,2513) = .01, ns). Politicians in general use populist messages and styles much 
more often when they address populist issues; however, this is not more pronounced 
for backbenchers.
Multivariate Analysis of Opportunity Structures
To validate these findings further, we integrated all variables of the individual analyses 
of variance (ANOVAs) into a comprehensive binary logistic regression model (see 
Table 3) by using the dummy variable for populist communication as dependent vari-
able and considering all channel, issue, party, and politician types as dummies for the 
independent variables. Additionally, we controlled for differences between the differ-
ent types of media systems. The multivariate model confirms that populist communi-
cation is highly prevalent in newspapers and for members of populist parties. While 
the main effect for backbenchers is no longer significant, the interactions demonstrate 
that they use one preferred social media channel—Twitter—for their populist com-
munication. The effects for populism-related issues stay robust when circulated on 
Facebook and the model overall reinforces the argument that social media channels in 
combination with other opportunity structures promote the spread of populism.
A final word on country differences: The previous ANOVAs had shown that politi-
cians in all six countries find very similar opportunity structures for populist commu-
nication. The only notable country differences were (1) talk shows, where U.S. and 
U.K. politicians are allowed to express themselves more populist than in the other 
countries, and (2) frontbenchers, who communicate in an even more populist way than 
backbenchers in the United States and Switzerland. The main, overarching country 
difference is also reflected in the multivariate regression (Table 3): the share of popu-
Figure 4. Degree of populist communication by politicians.
Note. Type of politician: F(1,2509) = 6,44, p < .01, η2 = .003)/ Type of channel: F(3,2509) = 9.43, 
p < .001, η2 = .011/ Type of politician*Type of channel: F(3,2509) = ‘3.02, p < .05, η2 = .004 .
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list communication is higher in liberal Anglo-American media systems than in conti-
nental European ones.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study’s main contribution to the international political communication literature 
is that we link populism research with a discursive opportunity approach. With regard 
to favorable opportunities, we studied the role of different types of politicians, parties, 
issues, and communication channels. We find that members of populist parties rely 
more frequently on the combination of populism-related key messages and stylistic 
elements than do members of mainstream parties. This is the case in every tenth of 
their statements, and particularly often on social media and in news articles. 
Backbenchers can rely less on invitations to TV talk shows and make therefore greater 
use of social media channels and their contacts to press journalists. While frontbench-
ers rely more on Facebook, backbenchers use Twitter for populist communication.
We no longer can prove the talk show bonus claimed in the literature under today’s 
multichannel conditions. Populists now use more social media and have become more 
successful in getting their messages in the news columns of newspapers. This 
Table 3. Binary Logistic Regression of Populist Communication (N = 2,517).
Populist Communication
 B SE Odds Ratio
Constant 3.04*** 0.31 0.05
Liberal media system (vs. democratic corporatist) 0.56*** 0.18 1.74
Polarized media system (vs. democratic corporatist) 0.32 0.20 1.37
Twitter (vs. talk show) −1.33* 0.63 0.27
Facebook (vs. talk show) −0.25 0.36 0.78
Newspapers (vs. talk show) 0.83*** 0.20 2.30
Populist issue −0.29 0.27 0.75
Populist Issue × Twitter 0.83 0.49 2.30
Populist Issue × Facebook 0.82** 0.32 2.28
Populist party 0.54* 0.26 1.72
Populist Party × Twitter −0.35 0.49 0.71
Populist Party × Facebook 0.49 0.32 1.64
Populist Party × Populist Issue 0.24 0.29 1.28
Backbencher −0.02 0.25 0.98
Backbencher × Twitter 1.48* 0.69 4.40
Backbencher × Facebook 0.47 0.35 1.59
Backbencher × Populist Issue 0.20 0.31 1.22
Nagelkerke R2 .07***
Note. Likelihood-Ratio-Test: χ2(16) = 1,489.3, p < .001
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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observation is perhaps the most surprising finding of our study. How is it possible that 
the supposedly interventionist news media report so extensively on populism state-
ments by politicians? We believe there are seven explanations for this.
First, populist politicians often have a so-called news value bonus because their mes-
sages are controversial, spectacular, and taboo-breaking—and thus meet the selection 
criteria of the media (Mazzoleni 2008). Second, their messages often take extreme posi-
tions on hotly debated issues for which populists claim ownership and problem-solving 
competence—and for which journalists feel obliged to open the news gates for reasons 
of balance (Esser et al. 2017). Third, journalists pay very close attention to what populist 
politicians say on other channels and incorporate this into their newspaper articles 
(Rogstad 2016). Fourth, populist politicians do not use social media only “to bypass” 
traditional news media but above all “to influence” the news media agenda with their 
posts and tweets—as Trump exemplified in the 2016 presidential election campaign 
(Chadwick 2017: 263). Fifth, we confirm the “paradox of populist communication,” 
according to which populists may publicly condemn the traditional media on one hand, 
but on the other hand regard any confirmation by them as the greatest possible triumph 
(Haller and Holt 2018). Sixth, the news media include many populist messages in their 
news articles to criticize and deconstruct them. In our sample, for example, 56 percent of 
the news articles offered populists a neutral platform, whereas 44 percent offered a criti-
cal discussion. In these latter articles, the majority of the criticism came from the journal-
ists themselves, not from quoted sources. Many populist political statements in newspaper 
articles are thus embedded in a critical context, and we consider this a clear expression 
of the undiminished persistence of journalistic interventionism. However, many journal-
ists have been frustrated to learn that populists follow the principle of “There is no such 
thing as bad publicity,” because populists like to use every instance of media criticism as 
proof that news journalists are part of the opposing elite and deserve to be scorned for it. 
Seventh, the higher proportion of populist politician quotes in the newspaper sample 
could be related to our methodology. As a result of our sampling strategy, there are more 
statements on the topics of migration and labor market (45 percent) in the newspaper 
sample than in talk shows (41 percent) or on Facebook (33 percent) or Twitter (21 per-
cent), which theoretically could increase the populism share.
This brings us to the limitations of the study. Due to our specific sampling strategy, 
which takes its starting point in talk shows, our sample does not include politicians who 
generally avoid talk shows or were not invited on them during the period under study. 
This led to the under-representation of not only Front National members but also of 
populists and backbenchers as a whole in our sample. We call for future studies to rep-
licate our findings with larger numbers of cases, considering more politicians from an 
even wider variety of parties, more media channels and more countries. The generaliza-
tions that can be drawn from our sample thus are limited somewhat. One final limitation 
is that we have only analyzed statements by politicians (direct and indirect quotes) in 
detail; how they were integrated in news stories was examined only roughly. Future 
studies should examine the contribution by journalists in much greater depth.
Nevertheless, we are convinced we have made a significant contribution to under-
standing the beneficial opportunity structures for populist communication under 
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multichannel conditions with this study. We can demonstrate that politicians indeed 
address populism-related issues in a more populist way than other issues. Populist politi-
cians who raise these issues have been surprisingly successful in getting their messages 
into the news media. As many as half of these messages are transmitted uncritically. 
Populists turn to their own followers via social media. It may be that populists use 
Facebook and Twitter not only to bypass the news media but also to influence them. 
These findings broaden our understanding of the communication strategies of populist 
politicians.
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Notes
1. Italian Servizio Pubblico and Ballarò are an exception, with an airtime of approximately 
170 minutes.
2. In the final analysis, only ten politicians had no Facebook or Twitter account.
3. We extended the study period to the whole year for politicians who had less than 100 
tweets or Facebook posts during the three-month period.
4. The reason why only newspaper articles with a loose connection to migration and the labor 
market were available to us was that this study is part of larger research program.
5. To better understand politicians’ great chances of success in the news media, we examined 
the frequency of populist political statements in upmarket newspapers (M = .13, SD = 
.33), mass-market (M = .13, SD = .34) and weekly magazines (M = .23, SD = .42). It 
turns out that weekly magazines are the most receptive: almost one in four direct and indi-
rect quotes by politicians are populist in nature. The high affinity of weekly newspapers 
for popularizing and populist communication had already been shown in earlier studies 
(Umbricht and Esser 2016; Wettstein et al. 2018).
6. We could not run these analyses for France and the United States because of too few mem-
bers of populist parties in the sample.
7. We can only report a tendency for Twitter (p = 0.10)
8. The differences are no longer significant when tested in a single analysis of variance.
9. For Facebook we can only report a tendency (p = 0.09), but the preferred use of Twitter by 
backbenchers is well-known (Rogstad 2016).
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